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Introduction
I’ve just picked up a fault in the AE35 unit. It’s going to go 100%
failure in 72 hours. [...] The 9000 series is [...], by any practical
definition of the words, foolproof and incapable of error.
—HAL 9000 in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey
The ultimate goal of today’s monetary policy makers around the world is to maintain
price stability. Modern central banks mostly have refined this goal to keeping inflation on a
well-defined target value, or, in case of deviation, bringing inflation back to target. Often,
monetary policy makers have the additional pursuit of stabilizing output around potential
output. To control these target variables inflation and output growth, a central bank sets the
level of its control variable, which usually is some short-term interest rate. Lags in monetary
policy transmission, however, complicate the issue, such that a change in interest rates affects
inflation and output growth with considerable delay only. Thus, to set interest rates properly,
central banks typically consider future values of inflation and output growth when casting the
level of the key interest rate. Since these future values are unknown, central banks engage in
forecasting to make informed monetary policy decisions in a best possible way.
Different from the science fiction example quoted above, forecasts in the real world are
inherently subject to uncertainty. While in earlier times, central banks had a clear emphasis on
point forecasts, they have by now recognized that assessments of future uncertainties and risks
to the economy are valuable information in their own rights. Today, monetary policy makers
employ human capital, computer power and sophisticated models extensively to cope with
keeping the standard of publishing forecasts for inflation and output growth in company of an
explicit quantification of the respective forecast uncertainties and their potential asymmetries,
mostly by publishing entire density forecasts. Moreover, central bankers have contributed to
the public understanding of matters by visualizing possible future inflation and output growth
values and their uncertainty ranges in form of the well-known fan charts.
A number of questions can come up when considering the intricate and also delicate
task for a central bank to making statements concerning likely future developments of the
economy. Specifically, it is important to understand why and how central banks communicate
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their forecasts, and what these central bank forecasts ought to convey besides pure figures.
Therefore this thesis aims at providing answers to four specific questions related to the infor-
mational and political dimensions of density forecasts and fan charts. This is accomplished
by questioning, first, the information content of macroeconomic risk forecasts, second, the
construction principles of fan charts, third, the implication of conditioning assumptions for
forecast accuracy of point and density forecasts and, fourth, the overall usability of uncertainty
and risks forecasts for monetary policy decisions.
Chapter one deals with the information contained in macroeconomic risk forecasts,
which are hardly studied in the literature, given that central banks have only since fairly
recently been engaged in the quantification of future asymmetries of forecast uncertainty.
Many central banks have started providing assessments of the uncertainty surrounding point
forecasts and, in addition, a large share of these banks also issues statements about the
probability of future outturns lying above or below the point forecasts. Hence, these monetary
policy makers are explicit about the asymmetry of the forecast density.
When studying central bank statements, the term ‘risk’ generally appears, usually
in form of phrases like ‘the overall risks’, ‘the balance of risks’, or simply ‘the risks’ to a
certain variable. A typical example is a statement as made by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (2008, p. 41), saying that “Most participants viewed the risks
to their projections for GDP growth as weighted to the downside.” Such statements thus
apparently often refer to the entire set of single risks that have been identified and weighted
by their perceived probabilities of materialization as well as their potential impact, while a
single risk is usually understood as a possible future event whose occurrence would lead to
outturns markedly different from the point forecasts. Hence, statements as shown above are
supposed to contain information about the asymmetry of the forecast density.
Forecasting a phenomenon related to third moments, however, is an extremely chal-
lenging task, which might be illustrated by the fact that many central banks simply base their
assessment of forecast uncertainty, i.e. a phenomenon related to second moments and there-
fore generally easier to assess, on past forecast errors, see for instance Deutsche Bundesbank
(2010, pp. 34-36) for an overview. This is due to the lack of models which can accomplish
this task, as explained by Wallis (1989). If forecasting uncertainty appropriately is already
difficult, and central banks nonetheless engage in risk forecasting despite the difficulties en-
countered, it is important to find out how successful these risk forecasts are and whether
there is a systematic connection between risk forecasts and mode forecast errors.
This question is investigated using risk forecasts for inflation published by the Bank
of England and the Sveriges Riksbank. If there is a systematic connection, given the point
forecast is a mode forecast, upside [downside] risks should on average be followed by outturns
that are greater [less] than the point forecasts. Moreover, the magnitude of the mode forecast
error should on average correspond to the magnitude of the suitably defined forecast risk. If
this is the case, the risk forecasts can be considered optimal, or rather, partially optimal in
the sense of Diebold and Lopez (1996). If there is no systematic connection, i.e. if the risk
forecasts do not help to predict the mode forecast errors, the risk forecasts are uninformative.
It turns out that there is considerable evidence against the optimality of risk forecasts,
at least for the Bank of England. For both the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank, no
robust evidence is found that risk forecasts have the intended information content. Hence, it
seems that there is no systematic connection between risk forecasts and mode forecast errors.
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Nonetheless, central banks continue to cast assessments of risks into density forecasts,
and chapter two investigates further the reasons why. Results from density forecasting are
often depicted as graphs of the central projection and potentially asymmetric uncertainty
intervals surrounding this projection, known as fan charts. While potentially asymmetric fan
charts are a well established device for monetary policy makers to communicate a baseline
and its uncertainties, there exists an oddity regarding their construction. Usually, central
bank fan charts are not generated by a model. Blix and Sellin (1999, pp.2-3) describe for
the Sveriges Riksbank that “The traditional statistical approach to producing uncertainty
intervals would involve [...] constructing a model intended for inflation forecasts. [...] The
Riksbank, however, does not use the approach [...].” It is documented, for instance by Britton,
Fisher, and Whitley (1998, p.32) for the Bank of England, that fan charts are rather the result
of a forecasting process where the “central tendency for inflation [...], the degree of uncertainty
[...] and the balance of risks” are to be evaluated. Further examples of central banks that
follow this practice include the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the Banco Central do Brazil and the
Banco Central de Chile.
If central bank fan charts are not resulting from a model, the question arises how width
and skewness of these graphical devices are set. More generally speaking, what determines
the shape of central bank fan charts? Reasons for macroeconomic risk forecasting, which is
closely related to skewed densities and asymmetric fan charts, are collected by Knüppel and
Schultefrankenfeld (2012) and include non-linearities, frozen-forecast issues, biases in recent
forecast errors, expert expectations about future asymmetries of shocks or simply from central
bank communication strategies.
An important reason for risk forecasting that virtually summarizes the aforementioned
ones is disagreement in decision-making. Disagreement in decision-making within institutions,
in particular in the form of disagreement and dissenting views in monetary policy committees,
plays a prominent role, since forecasting and monetary policy decisions are usually the concern
of several decision-makers in a decision-making body of a central bank. In committees such
as the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, the Policy Board of the Bank of
Japan, the Federal Open Market Committee at the Federal Reserve System and the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank, several members vote on an interest rate proposal
made by the chairman to raise, maintain or lower the key interest rate. If at the end of the
voting procedure a proposal has attained the majority of the member votes, the aggregate
interest rate decision is achieved. In a second round, the committee then has usually to agree
on an aggregate inflation projection that consistent with this interest rate decision.
Typically, committee members form their interest vote on the basis that inflation in
two years ahead has to be on target. If there are minority views that do not agree with
the interest rate decision, these minority voters probably do not agree with the aggregate
projection, as they may consider future inflation unlikely to hit the target given the aggregate
interest rate decision. If views of the decision-making body as a whole are represented by fan
charts, then it seems reasonable that dissenting views on monetary policy have an effect on
the shape of central bank inflation fan charts.
Although no individual inflation forecasts are available, the Bank of England, the Mag-
yar Nemzeti Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank are the only central banks that make attributed
interest rate voting records as well as the entire forecast densities published in their inflation
reports available. Hence, the individual paths of interest rates for the committee members can
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be determined. This dataset allows to investigate if there is a systematic connection between
the degree of disagreement about monetary policy committee decisions on the level of the
policy instrument and risks and uncertainties to forecasts of the target variable inflation, as
published in the subsequent monetary policy reports. Disagreement is found to translate into
wider fan charts in case of the Hungarian national bank. For the Bank of England and the
Sveriges Riksbank, there is statistical evidence that disagreement on the level of interest rates
can fairly well explain the skewness of forecast inflation fan charts. This prepares ground for
the argument that dissenting views in monetary policy committees voting on central banks’
level of the policy instrument are a significant determinant of the shape of forecast inflation
fan charts.
After having addressed the relationship between disagreement on interest rates and
density forecasts, chapter three takes a different perspective and asks if certain assumptions
about the future path of interest rates affect the predictive accuracy of mean and density
forecasts of central banks. For the forecasts of variables central banks intend to control, the
policy variable, i.e. the short-term interest rate set by the central bank, plays a special role.
According to Galí (2011), in practice one can basically distinguish three approaches. Firstly,
forecasts can be conditioned on a constant interest-rate assumption, such that the interest
rate is assumed to remain at the level it had attained at the time the forecast was made. This
so-called CIR approach was pursued, for example, by the ECB until 2006 and the Sveriges
Riksbank until the end of 2005. Secondly, the expectations of market participants can serve
as a conditioning assumption about the interest rate path. The so-called ME approach is
current practice at, for example, the Bank of Japan and the ECB. Market expectations are
usually derived from the term structure of interest rates. Finally, a central bank can issue
unconditional forecasts for its target variables by using its own expectations about the interest
rate path. The CBE approach, as it is called, has been adopted, for instance, by the Norges
Bank, the Riksbank and the Federal Reserve System. The Fed’s December 2011 FOMC
statement contributed to drawing the attention of economists to the topic of interest rate
assumptions when announcing that “participants agreed that adding their projections of the
target federal funds rate to the economic projections already provided in the SEP [Summary
of Economic Projections] would help the public better understand the Committee’s monetary
policy decisions”.
Among academics, there seems to be a clear ranking of the three approaches in terms
of their suitability for central bank forecasts. Galí (2011), Svensson (2006) and Woodford
(2005) advocate the approach of central bank expectations, i.e. prefer unconditional forecasts.
Galí (2011) shows that it is possible to construct different forecasts conditional on one given
nominal interest rate path, thus calling into question any conditioning assumptions about
interest rates, and a similar point is raised by Woodford (2005). Overall, in the theoretical
literature, it is evident that the CBE approach is supposed to yield the highest forecast
accuracy. This property serves as one of the main reasons for preferring the CBE approach
over conditional forecasts. For instance, Galí (2011, p.539) states that “it is not clear why
the central bank would want to base its projections on a rule other than the actual rule it
follows for, among other things, in that case the projections would also correspond to the
best unconditional forecasts”. Svensson (2006) also resorts to the potential gains in forecast
accuracy when advocating the CBE approach. The literature does not provide comparably
clear ideas concerning the relative forecast accuracy of the ME approach with respect to the
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CIR approach. However, it seems plausible that the ME approach should perform better
unless the policy rate is best described by a random walk.
A large share of central banks, however, does not base its forecasts on its own interest
rate expectations, probably also to circumvent potential communication issues. Goodhart
(2009), for instance, finds that using the central bank’s expectations of the interest rate could
be misunderstood as a commitment. Therefore, an interest rate path derived from market
expectations is “a brilliant compromise” (Goodhart 2009, p. 94) between the potential lack
of credibility of a constant rate assumption and the problems associated with publishing a
path of future interest rates expected by the central bank. However, there are also central
banks, for instance the Swiss National Bank, that use the constant interest rate assumption,
whose merits are described in Goodhart (2001). Several empirical aspects related to interest
rate assumptions are investigated in Andersson and Hofmann (2009), for instance that if a
central bank is transparent and committed to maintaining price stability, the behavior of key
variables like inflation expectations and long-term bond yields does not seem to be affected
by the type of interest-rate assumption. In contrast to that, Winkelmann (2010) finds that
using the CBE approach instead of the ME approach leads to better private-sector forecasts
of longer-term interest rates.
The effects of the interest rate assumptions is assessed by testing for differences in
forecast accuracy, since forecast accuracy is one the main reasons given in the academic
literature for preferring the CBE approach. Moreover, forecast accuracy is related to central
bank communication and the banks’ ability to steer market expectations for interest rates,
inflation, and growth, and, thus, financial variables like bond yields, if the precision of central
bank information varies with the conditioning assumption. Hence, forecast accuracy may also
to detect if any of the three forecasting approaches yields improvements in monetary policy,
such that central banks may better control macroeconomic volatility. To this extent, interest
rate, inflation forecast and real GDP data from the Bank of England and the Banco Central
do Brazil are exploited in order to assess the impact of the various interest rate assumptions
on forecast accuracy. Results show that there is no significant difference in the predictive
accuracy of competing forecast made conditional on different interest rate assumption. Thus,
the theoretical ranking of the CBE, ME and CIR approaches cannot be confirmed empirically
on the basis of data from the two central banks.
Finally, chapter four asks how central banks utilize information from their own forecasts
of their target variables, in particular so from uncertainty and risk forecasts of these, when
deciding on monetary policy. Monetary policy makers, such as the Bank of England, Sveriges
Riksbank, Banco de Portugal, or Magyar Nemzeti Bank, to name but a few, publish entire
probability distributions of the forecast variables inflation and output growth and thereby
explicitly quantify forecast uncertainty. Forecasting entire densities is not an end in itself. If
monetary policy decisions are made subject to economic prospects, it seems reasonable that
uncertainty about these prospects may have an influence on the decisions.
Forecast-based rules encompass the lags of monetary policy transmission, and the fore-
cast data are already conditioned on the relevant information set on future economic develop-
ments, see Batini and Haldane (1999). Thus, forecast-based rules can be a fairly precise and
yet compact tool for characterizing historical monetary policy decisions, as shown by Kuttner
(2004) who evaluates forecast-based rules for New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Similarly, Goodhart (2005) presents estimates of a forecast-based Bank
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of England’s Monetary Policy Committee reaction function and emphasizes the Committee’s
high degree of forward-looking with respect to inflation. Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008)
analyze the role of heterogeneity among the board members of the bank’s committee in a
forecast-based rule setting. Gorter et al. (2008, 2009) provide evidence for the performance
of interest rate rules for the European Central Bank, based on expectations data constructed
from Consensus Economics forecasts. Orphanides and Wieland (2008) explain the Federal
Open Market Committee decisions by its own projections for inflation and unemployment.
Studies in particular of Bhattacharjee and Holly (2010), Kim and Nelson (2006) and
Martin and Milas (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009) have considered the impact of uncertainty on
interest rate decisions and find either intensified or attenuated reactions. Yet, the uncertainty
measures used in these studies do not reflect the measure of uncertainty that the institution
under study was facing when making the monetary policy decision. To account for that lack,
chapter four shows how to recover the exact forecast standard deviations for inflation and for
output growth directly from the forecast densities which are published by the Bank of England
between 1997Q4 and 2009Q4, following a recipe of Wallis (2004). These forecast standard
deviations originally associated with the forecast location parameters reflect the genuine and
thus relevant measure of uncertainty about future economic developments which the Monetary
Policy Committee has available at the time the interest rate decision is made. Uncertainty
measures are incorporated directly in forecast-based interest rate reaction functions in order to
estimate the strength and the direction of the impact of forecast uncertainty on the Monetary
Policy Committee’s interest rate responses to forecast deviations of inflation from target and
output growth from long-run mean.
Since the Bank of England emphasizes its use of the two-piece normal distribution,
potential asymmetries in forecast uncertainty have to be taken into consideration. Forecast
uncertainty is asymmetric when an average of likely alternative outcomes for one variable
is seen to exceed or to fall short of the central projection for that variable. The Monetary
Policy Committee defines such a difference between mean and mode forecast as forecast
risk to the central projection. Hence, to control for these risks, the exact forecast Pearson
mode skewness for inflation and for output growth, is included into the regression models.
Results show that forecast inflation uncertainty has a very strong and intensifying effect on
interest rate reactions. In contrast, forecast output growth uncertainty has an attenuating
effect on the interest rate decision response. Forecast upward risks to inflation contribute
to the intensifying effect of forecast inflation uncertainty. Forecast risks for inflation have a
direct effect on interest rate decisions, in particular when the central projection for inflation
is close to target. Interestingly, the bank’s inhouse uncertainty and risk measures seem to be
exhaustive, as insignificant results obtained from using direct uncertainty and risk measures
constructed from the density forecasts of the bank’s Survey of External Forecasters show.
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Chapter 1
How Informative Are Central Bank
Assessments of Macroeconomic
Risks?
Abstract: Many central banks publish regular assessments of the magnitude and balance
of risks to the macroeconomic outlook. In this paper, we analyze the statistical properties
of the inflation risk assessments that have been published by the Bank of England and the
Sveriges Riksbank. In each case, we find no significant evidence of any systematic connection
between the ex ante risk assessments and the ex post forecast errors at horizons from zero to
eight quarters. These results illustrate the difficult challenges in making accurate real-time
assessments of temporal changes in the distribution of forecast errors.
Keywords: Forecast Evaluation, Risk Forecasts, Inflation Forecasts
JEL-Codes: E37, C12, C53
This chapter is based on
Knüppel, M. and Schultefrankenfeld, G., 2012, How informative are central bank assessments
of macroeconomic risks?, International Journal of Central Banking 8(3), 87-139.
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1.1 Introduction
“If Banks routinely report risk assessments, then those assessments should be
systematically evaluated, just as the accuracy of Banks’ inflation forecasts are
evaluated. [...] If such an analysis finds no systematic connection between risk
assessments and forecast errors, then the value of the risk assessments is called
into question.”
— Eric Leeper (2003, p.16)1
Today, most major central banks publish point forecasts for macroeconomic variables
that play an important role in the monetary policy decision-making process. Moreover, many
central banks also provide an assessment of the uncertainty surrounding these forecasts. In
addition to this information, a large share of central banks issues statements about the prob-
ability of future outturns lying above or below the point forecasts, i.e. about the asymmetry
of the forecast density. In these statements, the term ‘risk’ generally appears. A single risk to
the forecast is usually understood to be a possible future event whose occurrence would lead
to outturns that differ markedly from the point forecasts. Statements about ‘the overall risks’,
‘the balance of risks’, or simply ‘the risks’ to a certain variable then apparently often refer to
the entire set of single risks that have been identified and weighted by their perceived prob-
abilities of materialization as well as their potential impact. These statements are supposed
to contain information about the asymmetry of the forecast density. For example, a typical
statement of this kind can read “Most participants viewed the risks to their projections for
GDP growth as weighted to the downside.”2 We will further elaborate on central bank’s use
of the term ‘risk’ below.
Determining the asymmetry of a forecast density, i.e. forecasting a phenomenon related
to third moments is certainly an extremely challenging task. This might be illustrated by
the fact that many central banks simply base their assessment of forecast uncertainty, i.e.
a phenomenon related to second moments and therefore generally easier to assess, on past
forecast errors.3 This is due to the lack of models which can accomplish this task, as ex-
plained by Wallis (1989). However, if it is so difficult to forecast the uncertainty surrounding
an institution’s forecast appropriately, it is questionable whether risks can be forecast in a
reasonable manner. Given that so many institutions engage in risk forecasting despite the
difficulties encountered, it is important and interesting to find out how successful these risk
forecasts are.
1In a footnote, Eric Leeper thanks Stefan Palmqvist for making this suggestion.
2See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2008, p.41). Henceforth, we will refer to the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System simply as the Federal Reserve.
3See Deutsche Bundesbank (2010, pp.34-36) for an overview.
How Informative Are Central Bank Assessments of Macroeconomic Risks? 11
In this paper, we concentrate on risk forecasts for inflation published by the Bank
of England (henceforth BoE) and the Sveriges Riksbank (henceforth Riksbank) due to data
availability. To the best of our knowledge, there have hardly been any investigations of risk
forecasts in the literature. For the BoE, which has the longest risk forecasting record, risk
forecasts have at best been evaluated in the context of investigations of the entire forecast
density. For instance, Wallis (2003, p.165) states that “the excessive concern with upside risk
was not justified over the period considered.” In a comprehensive study of the BoE’s density
forecasts, Mitchell and Hall (2005) note that the null hypothesis of equal density forecast
accuracy for the BoE’s asymmetric and the corresponding symmetric forecast densities could
not be rejected. Both studies focus on one-year-ahead inflation forecasts.4
While these results already hint at the existence of problems with the risk forecasts, it
still remains to be analyzed whether there is a systematic connection between the BoE’s risk
forecasts and its forecast errors. If there is a systematic connection, and if the point forecast
is a mode forecast, then upside [downside] risks should on average be followed by outturns
that are greater [less] than the point forecasts. Moreover, the magnitude of the mode forecast
error should on average correspond to the magnitude of the (suitably defined) forecast risk.
If this is the case, the risk forecasts can be considered optimal.5 If there is no systematic
connection, i.e. if the risk forecasts do not help to predict the mode forecast errors, the risk
forecasts are uninformative.
The analysis in this study is performed in the context of tests for forecast optimality
similar to those of Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969). It turns out that there is considerable
evidence against the optimality of risk forecasts, at least for the BoE. For both central banks
under study, we fail to find robust evidence that risk forecasts have the intended information
content. Put differently, it seems that there is no systematic connection between risk forecasts
and mode forecast errors.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We present a survey of current risk-forecasting
practices at several central banks in Section 2. In Section 3, we give an overview of our
forecast data set. In Section 4, we explain the methodology used, and Section 5 follows with
a detailed analysis of the risk forecasts of the BoE and the Riksbank with respect to optimality
and informativeness. In Section 6, we briefly address reasons for risk forecasting in light of
the apparent lack of information content found in Section 5. Section 7 concludes.
4Wallis (2003) does not find major problems when studying the inflation nowcasts.
5To be more precise, they would at least be considered partially optimal in the sense of Diebold and
Rudebusch (1996). The concept of optimality used in this paper will become clear in Section 1.4.
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1.2 An Overview of Risk Forecasting
Although the term ‘risk’ is used in many forecasting-related central bank publications, there is
no unique definition of its meaning. In the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Machina
and Rothschild (2008) state that “A situation is said to involve ‘risk’ if the randomness
facing an economic agent presents itself in the form of exogenously specified or scientifically
calculable objective probabilities, as with gambles based on a roulette wheel or a pair of
dice.” However, the term ‘risk’ as used by central banks often refers to important events with
a rather uncertain probability of occurrence, like a large change in oil prices or in exchange
rates. A different interpretation of the term ‘risk’ is provided by Kilian and Manganelli (2007),
who link the risks to the preferences of central bankers. This might be a valid interpretation
with respect to several statements made by the Federal Reserve during a certain period. It
is not adequate, though, for the current risk forecasts of the Federal Reserve and many other
central banks, among others those whose data are investigated in this study.
Many central banks devote a kind of stand-alone publication such as a box, a chapter,
or an article to their respective definitions of risk. An example-based yet precise definition is
given by the BoE in Britton, Fisher, and Whitley (1998, pp.32-33).6 According to the BoE, a
risk is given by an uncertain and important event not taken into account in the central view,
where the central view, i.e. the point forecast, corresponds to the mode of the forecast density.
In contrast to the definition of Machina and Rothschild (2008), the probability of the event
is not exogenously specified or scientifically calculable, and in contrast to the interpretation
of Kilian and Manganelli (2007), the risk is unrelated to the preferences of the central bank.
The balance of risks refers to the probabilities of the events mentioned producing values above
or below the point forecast. The balance of risks is thus directly related to the skewness of
the forecast density, which, in the case of the BoE, is measured as the difference between the
mean and the mode of the forecast density. In Figure 1.1, two asymmetric forecast densities
from the BoE are displayed.
The fact that the mode (and not the mean) of the forecast density serves as the BoE’s
point forecast appears surprising, since aiming at the mode is associated with a rather im-
6It reads: “In deciding upon central assumptions and risks across key components of the forecast, it
may become clear that the risks are unbalanced. A good example of this is the effect of ‘windfall’ gains to
consumers from the conversion of several building societies to banks in 1997. Uncertainty about the pace
at which the windfalls would be spent represented a risk to the forecast of consumer spending. The Bank’s
theoretical analysis suggested that only a small proportion of these gains would be spent in the first year, and
correspondingly took this as a central view. In the Bank’s judgment, the risks were much greater that actual
expenditure would be in excess of the central forecast assumption than that it would be less. This was an
upside risk to the forecast during most of 1997. In order to produce the fan chart, only one number is needed
to summarise the degree of skewness (the balance of risks). Just as with the central view and the degree of
uncertainty, there is more than one possible choice of parameter. The Bank’s analysis focuses on the difference
between the mean and the mode of the forecast distribution to be presented in the Report. This difference is
of interest as a summary statistic of the balance of risks.”
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Figure 1.1: Two of the Bank of England’s density forecasts for inflation
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Note: The forecast in the left-hand panel, made in the second quarter of 2002 for the first quarter of
2004, implies an upward risk, where the mean (dashed vertical line) exceeds the mode (solid vertical line).
The forecast in the right-hand panel, made in the second quarter of 1998 for the same quarter, implies a
downward risk, with the mean (dashed vertical line) falling short of the mode (solid vertical line).
plausible all-or-nothing loss function of the policy maker.7 Interestingly, however, nearly all
of the central banks we consider in this study as listed in Table 1.1 specifically indicate that
their point forecasts are mode forecasts.8
Definitions of risk similar to the one used by the BoE can be found in the publications
of other central banks. The Riksbank (1998, p.36) writes that “[...] two aspects of the
forecast distribution are assessed subjectively: whether the uncertainty in the forecast differs
from the historical uncertainty [...], and whether the risk of forecasting errors is symmetric,
upside or downside. In the absence of information to the contrary, the risk is assumed to be
symmetric. [...] A skewed uncertainty (a difference between the upside and downside risks in
the assessment of a particular variable, e.g. imports) affects the distribution of the inflation
forecast by the amount of the variable’s weight in the macro model. Skew is measured as the
difference between the mean value and the most probable value (the mode of the distribution).”
Again, the mode forecast serves as the point forecast. Further details concerning the forecasts
of the Riksbank can be found in Blix and Sellin (1999). However, the Riksbank changed its
forecasting procedure in 2007. Since then, it has only published symmetric forecast densities
and has not mentioned the balance of risks, but just scenarios and risks. The Riksbank
(2009, p.22) now states that “The forecasts in the main scenario show the path which the
Riksbank expects the economy to take and is a weighted consideration of various conceivable
7See Wallis (1999) for a discussion.
8From Table 1.1, only the Bank of Israel and the Swiss National Bank do not explicitly characterize the
meaning of their point forecasts. Moreover, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve do not produce unified
forecasts but instead publish summary statistics and histograms of modal forecasts from individual policy
makers. The European Central Bank only publishes forecast ranges.
How Informative Are Central Bank Assessments of Macroeconomic Risks? 14
development paths (scenarios) and risks”; therefore, its main forecast currently seems to be
a mean forecast. The Norges Bank appears to use the same approach.
Other central banks have followed the path set out by the BoE and the Riksbank. For
example, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (2004, p.108) writes that “The method that we follow in
preparing fan charts broadly corresponds to that of the Bank of England, and the same holds
true for the Swedish method”.
The Federal Reserve (2008, p.45) explains that the members of the Board of Governors
and the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks “provide judgements as to whether the risks
to their projections are weighted to the upside, downside, or are broadly balanced. That is,
participants judge whether each variable is more likely to be above or below their projections
of the most likely outcome”. Hence, in contrast to the approaches mentioned so far, the risk
assessments are only qualitative (naming upside, downside, or broadly balanced risks) and
not quantitative. This means that there is no number attached to the risk forecasts; only the
direction of the risk is given. The same applies to the risk forecasts of the European Central
Bank (henceforth ECB). For example, the ECB (2010, p.6) states that “In the Governing
Council’s assessment, the risks to this improved economic outlook are slightly tilted to the
downside”.9
Several other central banks also link the overall forecast risks to the asymmetry of
the forecast density, among them the Bank of Canada, the Banco Central de Chile, the
Banco de España, the Bank of Japan, the Banco de Portugal, the Deutsche Bundesbank, and
the International Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF).10 Details concerning the corresponding
references are provided below.
We also found central banks which regularly report their assessments of individual
risks but which do not always mention the balance of these risks. For example, the Reserve
Bank of Australia (2008, p.68) states that “Risks to these forecasts can be identified in
both directions. A further deterioration in the outlook for global growth would be the main
source of downside risk to the forecasts for domestic activity”. Another example is the Swiss
National Bank (2010a, p.40), which declares that “The biggest risk for the global economy is
the continued increase in tension on financial markets [...]. At the same time, there are upside
risks for the global economy [...]”. In both cases, no overall assessment of risks follows. Yet
9However, the ECB often also mentions “risks to price stability”, where the term ‘risks’ instead appears
to refer to the possibility that the ECB might not achieve its “aim of keeping inflation rates below, but close
to, 2% over the medium term” (ECB, 2010, p. 6). In this case, the risks are apparently unrelated to the
asymmetry of a forecast density. Note that the risks to price stability can also be asymmetric, as described
in the statements: “The information that has become available [...] has confirmed that [...] upside risks to
price stability over the medium term prevail” (ECB, 2008, p.5). Yet this asymmetry supposedly just refers
to the probability of observing inflation rates above 2% over the medium term being larger than 50%, and is
therefore also unrelated to the asymmetry of forecast densities.
10The IMF is an intergovernmental organization, but we consider it here because its interpretation of risk
forecasts is identical to that used by most central banks.
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Table 1.1: Central bank assessments of macroeconomic balances of risks
Type Assessment Assessment Publication
Central Bank of of of of
Assessment Inflation Risk Real Risk Fan Charts
Bank of Canada quantitative yes no asymmetric
Banco Central quantitative yes yes asymmetricde Chile
Bank of England quantitative yes yes asymmetric
Banco de España qualitative yes yes symmetric
Bank of Israel qualitative yes no symmetric
Bank of Japan quantitative yes yes none
Banco de Portugal quantitative yes yes asymmetric
Board of Gover-
qualitative yes yes nonenors of theFederal Reserve
System
Deutsche qualitative yes yes symmetricBundesbank
European qualitative yes yes noneCentral Bank
International quantitative yes yes asymmetricMonetary Fund
Magyar quantitative yes yes asymmetricNemzeti Bank
Norges Bank none no no symmetric
Reserve Bank qualitative yes yes noneof Australia
Reserve Bank qualitative yes yes noneof New Zealand
Sveriges Riksbank none no no symmetric(2007 - present)
Sveriges Riksbank quantitative yes no asymmetric(1999 - 2006)
Swiss qualitative yes yes noneNational Bank
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sometimes such an assessment is made by these central banks.11 The Reserve Bank of New
Zealand behaves similarly to the two aforementioned central banks, making clear statements
concerning the overall risks on some occasions and mentioning only individual risks on others.
The same applies to the Bank of Israel.
In Table 1.1, we present an overview of the risk forecasting practices of several central
banks. Of course, this table only reflects the current situation, and the approaches to risk
forecasting might change over time, as in the case of the Riksbank. Moreover, in some cases
we have not been able to discover statements concerning the balance of risks, but it is not
impossible that these exist.12 All central banks shown in the table regularly discuss risks to
their forecasts.13 Furthermore, as mentioned above, almost all of these central banks use the
mode forecast as their central forecast.
All central banks shown in the table which make precise statements concerning the
meaning of the balance of risks use at least one of the following definitions. If the balance
of risks for a certain variable is tilted to the upside, this means that the expected value of
that variable exceeds the most likely value (i.e. the point forecast which is identical to the
mode forecast), that the probability of an outturn above the point forecast is more likely than
an outturn below, or that the forecast density is positively skewed.14 Thus balance-of-risks
statements are supposed to contain information about the potential asymmetry of the forecast
density.
It should be noted that, for many asymmetric distributions, the above-mentioned in-
equalities E[Y ] > mode(Y ), P (y > mode (Y )) > P (y < mode (Y )), and E[(Y − E[Y ])3] > 0
imply each other.15 This holds, for example, in case of the two-piece normal distribution used
by the BoE, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, the IMF and the Riksbank (until 2006) for their
asymmetric fan charts.16 Therefore, potential differences in the technical definitions of the
balance of risks are probably irrelevant in actual practice.
It is perfectly possible for a central bank to consider the balance of risks to be asymmet-
ric and nevertheless publish symmetric fan charts, as in the case of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
the Banco de España, or the Bank of Israel. This could be due to the fact that these central
banks, like many others, assess the balance of risks in a qualitative manner only. Asymmet-
ric fan charts tend to be used if quantitative risk assessments are produced. The Banco de
11For example, the Swiss National Bank (2010b, p.26) claims that “At present, the upside and downside
risks are relatively balanced” for output growth.
12We corresponded with members of several central banks in order to minimize the possibility of certain
definitions having slipped our attention.
13Table 1.6 in Appendix A.1 lists where these discussions can be found.
14In Appendix A.1, we provide the references on which several of the statements made above and Table 1.1
are based.
15The same applies to the reversed inequalities E[Y ] < mode(Y ), P (y > mode (Y )) < P (y < mode (Y ))
and E[(Y − E[Y ])3] < 0. E[Y ] denotes the expectation of Y and P (A) the probability of event A.
16We will elaborate on this distribution below.
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Portugal and the Riksbank (1999-2006) are the only central banks which also release figures
measuring the risk of the forecast density in their main publications.17 The Banco de Portugal
shows the probabilities of an outturn below the central projection. The Riksbank (1999-2006)
publishes the values of the mode and the mean of the forecast density.
Reading through central bank publications, it seems that risks to inflation or other
aggregates are commonly identified via risks to variables that determine these aggregates.
For example, an upward risk to inflation might be caused by an upward risk to oil prices, to
the value-added tax (henceforth VAT) rate or by a risk of the domestic currency depreciating.
Thus, in order to correctly forecast the risks to inflation, one has to forecast the risks to these
determinants. Actually, the process of risk forecasting could be thought of as a three-step
process. In the first step, those determinants which are subject to forecast risks have to be
identified. In the second step, these risks must be quantified, and in the third step, their
impact on the aggregate of interest has to be calculated.
All of these steps appear extremely demanding. The first step requires the identification
of variables whose most likely future paths (represented by the mode forecast) differ from their
expected future paths (represented by the mean forecast). This might be possible for fiscal
variables like the VAT rate, where one could imagine that a certain rate is likely, but that
an alternative rate is being discussed by the government at the time the forecast is made.
For variables like oil prices and exchange rates, however, this task is very challenging. The
subsequent quantification of the identified risks appears fairly difficult as well. Elekdag and
Kannan (2009) propose methods for accomplishing this task which can be applied to certain
variables. However, their empirical performance is not evaluated. Apparently, most central
banks rely on judgement for identifying as well as quantifying risks. Yet even if the risks to
determinants are correctly identified and quantified, assessing their impact on the aggregate
of interest is no trivial matter, as explained in Pinheiro and Esteves (2010).
To summarize, all central banks considered discuss risks to their forecasts, and many
of them also assess the balance of these risks. The balance of risks is supposed to contain
information about the asymmetry of the forecast density. The published point forecast corre-
sponds to the mode of the forecast density for almost all central banks. In the following, the
term ‘risk forecast’ will refer to the balance-of-risks forecast, i.e. to a potentially asymmetric
forecast density. It will thus not denote the assessment of certain individual risks without the
evaluation of their overall effect on the forecast variable of interest.
17Figures for the BoE’s and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s density forecasts can be downloaded from the
respective websites.
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1.3 Data
1.3.1 Data Sources
The risk forecasting record of most central banks is very limited. As explained in Knüppel
and Schultefrankenfeld (2011), inference concerning risk forecasts tends to be easier with
quantitative than with qualitative risk forecasts. Therefore, we focus on data sources where
quantitative risk forecasts are available. The first quantitative risk forecast that we are aware
of was published by the BoE in its Inflation Report from February 1996 for inflation.18 As
mentioned before, the Riksbank issued quantitative risk assessments from 1999 to 2006. Our
subsequent analysis will be restricted to the risk forecasts of these two central banks, because
the quantitative risk forecasts of the other institutions shown in Table 1.1 are (still) unsuitable
for evaluation purposes.19
The BoE and the Riksbank use the two-piece normal distribution (henceforth tpn-
distribution) as described, for example, in Wallis (2004, p.66). Our analysis utilizes the
BoE’s forecasts for inflation, based on the assumption that the future official Bank Rate,
i.e. the interest rate paid on commercial bank reserves, follows a path implied by market
interest rates.20 In line with Elder, Kapetanios, Taylor, and Yates (2005), for the purpose of
forecast evaluations we consider this assumption more adequate than that of a constant official
Bank Rate. The forecast and inflation data range from the first quarter of 1998 (henceforth
1998Q1) - the first time the aforementioned interest assumption was used - to 2010Q2. Each
of the BoE’s quarterly projections covers the current and the subsequent 8 quarters. For
some forecasts, mean and mode forecast coincide, which results in a risk forecast equal to
zero. This means that the risks to the inflation forecast are balanced.21 The BoE publishes
several parameters of the forecast densities that allow a straightforward calculation of the
Pearson mode skewness which will serve as our risk measure. The Pearson mode skewness of
a density is defined as the mean-mode difference divided by the standard deviation.
18According to the numerical parameters that can be downloaded at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/inflationreport/irprobab.htm, the skewness of the forecast density then differed from zero
for the first time.
19The Banco de Portugal started to publish quantitative risk forecasts in December 2003, but these are
annual forecasts, which means that only very few observations are available. The IMF and the Bank of Japan
only release annual risk forecasts, too. The Bank of Canada and the Banco de Chile do not publish data
which allow a calculation of their quantitative forecast risks. Finally, the quantitative risk forecasting record
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank dates back to its Inflation Report from November 2002, and its forecasts have a
quarterly frequency. However, the magnitudes of the asymmetries we backed out from its density forecast data
are far too small for reliable inference about risk forecast optimality and informativeness. The asymmetries
were backed out in a similar way as described for the Riksbank in Appendix A.2.2. Further details are available
upon request.
20Until 2003, the BoE used to forecast the inflation of the All Items Retail Price Index excluding mortgage
interest payments (RPIX). Since 2004, it has forecast CPI inflation.
21The BoE also publishes risk forecasts for GDP. We do not study these forecasts here, since the analysis
of GDP risk forecasts would be more complicated due to the effects of data revisions. Such revisions play a
substantial role for the assessment of the BoE’s GDP forecasts, as noted by Elder et al. (2005).
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Our forecast data set from the Riksbank starts in December 1999, when the data used
to produce the fan charts of the respective Inflation Report were made publicly available
on the Riksbank’s website for the first time.22 The last asymmetric fan chart appeared
in October 2006. From 1999 to 2005, there were always four Inflation Reports per year,
namely in February/March/April, May/June, October, and December. Like the Riksbank,
we will refer to these as the Inflation Reports y:1, y:2, y:3, and y:4, respectively, where ‘y’
stands for the year. There was no Inflation Report 2006:4, and since 2007, the fan charts
of the Monetary Policy Reports, which succeeded the Inflation Reports, have always been
symmetric. Therefore, our data sample covers the forecasts from the Inflation Reports from
1999:4 to 2006:3.23
A potential drawback of the data from the Riksbank is given by the constant interest
rate assumption underlying the forecasts in the Inflation Reports 1999:4 to 2005:2, i.e. it
was assumed that the interest rates do not change during the forecasting period, but remain
on the level they had attained at the time the forecast was produced. Starting with the
Inflation Report 2005:3, the forecasts have been conditioned on interest rates expected by
market participants.24
In the case of a constant interest rate assumption, it might be difficult to assess the
optimality of risk forecasts, at least for larger horizons. For example, if the constant interest
rate assumption leads to inflation forecasts that exceed the target at the relevant policy
horizon, the policy maker is likely to raise the policy rate to dampen inflation. Thus, the
inflation forecast error mainly depends on the point forecast for inflation, and only to a very
limited extent on the risk forecast.25 For short horizons, however, testing for risk forecast
optimality should be possible even with a constant interest rate assumption for two reasons.
Firstly, a constant interest rate assumption is probably a good approximation to the behavior
of interest rates in the short run. Secondly, inflation responds to changes in the interest
rate only with a certain delay. Therefore, in case of the Riksbank, we will only consider risk
forecasts for up to four quarters ahead.
The Riksbank forecasts two monthly inflation measures, where we decide to focus on
CPI inflation only. From the available 24 forecast horizons, we use every third monthly
forecast for up to four quarters ahead. We are therefore left with 5 forecast horizons, always
with one observation per quarter.26 The shortest forecast horizon is chosen such that it
22See http://www.riksbank.se/templates/DocumentList.aspx?id=5031.
23Unfortunately, the forecast data from the Inflation Report 2000:1 are not available, which means that our
sample contains only 27 instead of 28 forecasts.
24See Sveriges Riksbank (2005, p.57).
25Only if the central inflation forecast implies that inflation will be close to target, could the inflation
forecast error be well predicted by the risk forecast if the risk forecast is optimal.
26Using all monthly forecasts yields practically no additional insights, since the monthly risk forecasts are
quantitatively very similar for adjacent forecast horizons, and the forecast errors of adjacent horizons are often
similar, too. Moreover, the results can be compared more easily to those for the BoE using every third monthly
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Figure 1.2: Scatter plots for the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank
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Note: The forecast Pearson mode skewness is shown on the X-axis, the scaled forecast error of the mode on
the Y -axis. The lower right-hand panel is a scatter plot of all data of the Bank of England for h = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8
and of the Sveriges Riksbank for h = 0, 2, 4.
contains a forecast for the month of the publication of the Inflation Report, meaning that this
forecast is actually a nowcast. Thus, we consider the Riksbank’s 0-, 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month-
ahead forecasts. In contrast to the BoE, the Riksbank only published the mode of the forecast
density and the values of several quantiles. From these data and the corresponding statements
in the Inflation Reports, we carefully back out the parameters which permit calculation of
the Pearson mode skewness of the forecast densities. Details are provided in Appendix A.2.2.
forecast only.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for forecast data of the Bank of England and the Sveriges
Riksbank
h 0 2 4 6 8
Bank of England
Sample average
mˆt+h|t 2.35 2.23 2.06 2.03 2.14
µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
σˆ2t+h|t 0.08 0.29 0.43 0.58 0.77
Interquartile range
mˆt+h|t 0.71 0.48 0.58 0.52 0.47
µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.20
σˆ2t+h|t 0.05 0.14 0.16 0.24 0.42
Sveriges Riksbank
Sample average
mˆt+h|t 1.44 1.46 1.71
µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t 0.00 0.01 0.02
σˆ2t+h|t 0.09 0.24 0.54
Interquartile range
mˆt+h|t 1.52 0.85 0.67
µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t 0.00 0.03 0.09
σˆ2t+h|t 0.01 0.02 0.05
Note: The sample size equals T = 50 for the Bank of England and T = 27 for the
Sveriges Riksbank.
The risk forecasts of the BoE and the Riksbank as measured by the Pearson mode
skewness of the forecast densities are displayed in Tables 1.7 and 1.8 in Appendix A.2 for all
forecast horizons. For ease of exposition, in the following we focus on the results for even
horizons, i.e. BoE results for h = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 and Riksbank results for h = 0, 2, 4.27 No major
insights are lost by leaving the odd horizons aside.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Before turning to the empirical tests, it is useful to take a brief look at the forecast risks and
the associated realized risks used in this study. The forecast risk, measured by the Pearson
mode skewness, is defined as (µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t)/σˆt+h|t, where µˆt+h|t is the mean forecast for
period t + h made in period t, mˆt+h|t is the corresponding mode forecast, and σˆt+h|t is the
corresponding forecast of the standard deviation.28 Our measure of realized risk is given by
the scaled mode forecast error, i.e. by (yt+h − mˆt+h|t)/σˆt+h|t, where yt+h is the realization of
27These quarterly horizons correspond to the the Riksbank’s 0-, 6-, and 12-month-ahead forecasts, respec-
tively.
28Further explanations concerning the use of the Pearson mode skewness follow in Section 1.4 and compu-
tational details are provided in Appendix A.2.1.
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Figure 1.3: Plots of the differences between the mean forecast and the mode forecast for
the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank
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the forecast variable in period t+h. Figure 1.2 shows horizon-specific scatter plots of forecast
and realized risks for the BoE and the Riksbank. The lower right-hand panel contains all
data from the previous plots summarized in a single scatter plot. The largest forecast risks
equal about 0.5, the smallest about −0.3. The realized risks, i.e. the scaled mode forecast
errors, range from about −2.6 to about 4.5. For a large number of periods, the risks were
actually forecast to be balanced.
If the risk forecasts are optimal, most points in the scatter plots should be located in
the first and third quadrant. If the risk forecasts are not informative, the points should spread
broadly evenly above and below the zero-line.29 Thus, the regression lines in all BoE data
plots in Figure 1.2 rather suggest a lack of information content, because they are not
29Of course, if the risk forecasts are not unbiased, the points would simply be shifted away from the zero-line.
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upward-sloping. In contrast, the regression lines for h = 2 and h = 4 for the Riksbank are
upward-sloping, but the scatter plots indicate that there is considerable uncertainty about
these slopes. Finally, the line computed for the entire sample of risk forecasts is slightly
downward-sloping.
In Table 1.3.2, we provide summary statistics for the forecast data of the BoE and the
Riksbank. While the sample averages of the difference between mean and mode forecasts
increase with the forecast horizon, they remain very close to zero. The sample averages of
the forecast variance grow substantially with the horizon, indicating the increasing forecast
uncertainty. While the interquartile ranges for the forecasts of mean-mode differences and
variances also increase with the forecast horizon, for the mode forecasts they do not. The
latter finding is, of course, due to the fact that the long-run inflation point forecasts tend to
be close to the inflation target.
Figure 1.3 shows the differences between mean and mode forecasts. It reveals that serial
correlation in these differences seems to be fairly contained. In contrast, there are pronounced
correlations across horizons.30
1.3.3 Bias Tests
As explained in Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2011), when applying the framework of
regression-based tests for forecast optimality as proposed by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969) to
risk forecasts, estimates of the intercept and the slope coefficient might be biased since the
forecast data used to construct the Pearson mode skewness might themselves be biased.
Testing for a bias of the mean forecasts is interesting in itself. In addition, if the mean
forecast µˆt+h|t is biased, the squared forecast error of the mean,
(
yt+h − µˆt+h|t
)2
, is unlikely
to be a good measure for the variance of inflation realization yt+h. Therefore, it is useful to
test whether an estimate of the intercept c in the equation
yt+h − µˆt+h|t = c+ εt+h (1.1)
is equal to zero. If the true variances, and hence the true standard deviations σt+h are,
on average, smaller than σˆt+h|t, estimates of intercept and slope in a Mincer-Zarnowitz-type
regression for risk forecasts are biased towards zero.31 Conversely, if σt+h is larger than σˆt+h|t,
the estimates of intercept and slope are biased away from zero. Thus, it is important to test
for unbiasedness of the volatility forecasts, too. Analogously to above, in the equation(
yt+h − µˆt+h|t
)2 − σˆ2t+h|t = c+ εt+h, (1.2)
30This can also be seen in Tables 1.7 and 1.8.
31The corresponding regression equation (1.3) can be found in the following section.
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Table 1.3: Tests for bias of forecast mean and forecast variance
h 0 2 4 6 8
Bank of England
T 50 48 46 44 42
mean 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.25 0.11
(0.02) (0.12) (0.26) (0.30) (0.28)
variance -0.05 0.13 0.38 0.24 0.01
(0.03) (0.11) (0.32) (0.38) (0.39)
Sveriges Riksbank
T 27 27 27
mean -0.04 -0.01 -0.24
(0.04) (0.19) (0.29)
variance −0.05∗∗ 0.13 0.02
(0.01) (0.17) (0.16)
Note: Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors. The sample
size is denoted by T . One asterik indicates significance at the 5% level, two asteriks
indicate significance at the 1% level.
we conduct a test for the null that c = 0.32 In both equations (1.1) and (1.2), εt+h denotes a
zero-mean error term which is potentially subject to serial correlation. We address this issue
by using Newey-West (1987) standard errors and prewhitening as suggested by Andrews and
Monahan (1992). The truncation lags are chosen based on the procedure of Andrews (1991).
For the above and all other tests in this study, we employ the conventional significance level
of 5%.
The results in Table 1.3 show that all mean forecasts and all but one of the volatility
forecasts are unbiased. The Riksbank’s variance nowcast is an exception, showing a significant
overprediction of volatility.
1.4 Methodology
The evaluation of risk forecasts will be based on tests for risk forecast optimality and infor-
mativeness as discussed in Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2011). In order to conduct such
tests, a measure for the asymmetry of the forecast density has to be selected. Knüppel and
Schultefrankenfeld (2011) find that the above-mentioned Pearson mode skewness is strongly
preferable to the standard third-moment based skewness, because the latter implies a very
low power of the tests. As briefly stated above, the Pearson mode skewness of a random
32We also conducted bias tests for the mode forecast (under the potentially restrictive assumption of bal-
anced risks on average) and the average balance of forecast risks. In both cases we could not reject the null of
no bias for any forecast horizon.
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variable Y is given by (E [Y ]−m) /σ, where E [Y ] is the expectation, m is the mode, and σ
is the standard deviation of Y .
Given a forecast horizon h, risk forecasts can be evaluated using the OLS regression
equation
yt+h − mˆt+h|t
σˆt+h|t
= α+ β
µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t
σˆt+h|t
+ εt+h, t+ h = 1, 2, . . . , T, (1.3)
where the error term εt+h has an expectation of zero, and intercept α and slope β are the
coefficients to be estimated. T denotes the sample size.
As stated above, the term (µˆt+h|t − mˆt+h|t)/σˆt+h|t on the right-hand side is simply the
risk forecast for period t+ h, made in period t, where risk is measured by the Pearson mode
skewness. On the left-hand side, (yt+h − mˆt+h|t)/σˆt+h|t is the measure of realized risk, being
equal to the scaled mode forecast error. It would be preferable to use (yt+h−mt+h|t)/σt+h|t as
the measure of realized risk, where mt+h|t and σt+h|t are the true values of mode and standard
deviation of the forecast variable in period t+ h, conditional on information available to the
forecaster in period t, but these quantities are, of course, unknown. However, as long as
mˆt+h|t and σˆt+h|t are unbiased forecasts of mt+h|t and σt+h|t, no major complications arise.
If mˆt+h|t is biased, αˆ, the estimate of the intercept α, will be biased as well, but the
slope β will continue to be estimated consistently by βˆ.33 If σˆt+h|t is biased, βˆ will also be
biased.
Assuming that mˆt+h|t and σˆt+h|t are unbiased, it should not be possible to reject the
joint hypothesis α = 0, β = 1 if the risk forecasts are optimal, resembling the hypothesis for
mean forecast optimality used by Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969). However, potential biases of
mˆt+h|t and σˆt+h|t suggest a slightly different approach. Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2011)
recommend checking for a potential bias of σˆt+h|t first, and focusing on the single hypothesis
β = 1 due to its robustness with respect to biased mode forecasts. A complementing test
of α = 0 can be useful, but a rejection does not necessarily imply non-optimality of the risk
forecasts, since it could be caused by biased mode forecasts.
If the risk forecasts contain useful information, one should expect a rejection of the
hypothesis β = 0. If the test does not reject this hypothesis, there is no statistical evidence
against a lack of information content. In view of the excerpt from Leeper (2003) cited at the
beginning of this paper, this test, which checks for a systematic connection between forecast
risks and realized risks, could actually be considered the most important one.
Although the tests have a much greater power if the Pearson mode skewness is used
instead of the standard skewness as the measure of asymmetry, their power can still be
33In the remainder of the paper, a hat over a character always denotes the estimate or the forecast of the
corresponding parameter. Whether the object is a forecast or an estimate will be clear from the context.
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expected to be fairly low in our empirical application.34 This is due to several reasons. Firstly,
our samples of risk forecasts are rather small. Moreover, the magnitude of the forecast risks
is, at best, moderate. The smaller these magnitudes are, however, the more difficult the
inference about β becomes. In addition, the fact that mt+h|t and σt+h|t are unknown also
contributes to the tests’ low power, even if mˆt+h|t and σˆt+h|t are unbiased forecasts. Finally,
the potential serial correlation of the error terms also reduces power.
In order to alleviate these problems, in this analysis the quantitative risk forecasts will
be investigated in a panel setup, where all forecast horizons are analyzed simultaneously and
where, in addition to the serial correlation, the cross-correlation of the error terms is taken
into account. The cross-correlation is caused by the fact that, for example, if yt is far from
its unconditional mean, it is very likely that the realized risks, i.e. the scaled mode forecast
errors associated with yt are large for all but the short forecast horizons. For the panel
estimation, we use the approach described in Greene (1997, p.687). This approach can also
be applied to unbalanced panels, which allows us to use all of the BoE’s risk forecast data. In
a first step, the Prais-Winsten transformation is employed to remove autocorrelation. Then
the transformed data are analyzed using the seemingly unrelated regressions model.35
As described above, many central banks do not publish quantitative, but only qualita-
tive risk forecasts, giving assessments about the direction of the forecast risk. It is therefore
important to evaluate direction-of-risk forecasts as well, even if the corresponding tests can
be expected to suffer from lower power than those for the quantitative risk forecasts.36 The
evaluation here is based on the categorical variables qt+h and qˆt+h|t, determined by the quan-
titative risk forecasts and realizations, where qt+h is related to the direction of the realized
risk by
qt+h|t =

1 if yt+h > mˆt+h|t
0 if yt+h < mˆt+h|t
na if µˆt+h|t = mˆt+h|t
, (1.4)
34Using standard skewness, the forecast risk would be given by E
[(
Yt+h|t − µˆt+h|t
)3]
/σˆ3t+h|t and the
proxy for the realized risk by
(
yt+h − µˆt+h|t
)3
/σˆ3t+h|t. E
[(
Yt+h|t − µˆt+h|t
)3] would be calculated based on
the forecast density of the random variable Yt+h|t.
35Note that there is a minor error in the formula (15-57) by Greene (1997, p.687). For the construction
of the final covariance matrix of the errors, the covariance matrices of AR(1)-processes as defined in formula
(13-10) are required. When estimating the covariances of the errors, we make use of the entire unbalanced
sample in case of the BoE. This approach is commonly attributed to Wilks (1932). Note that this approach
does not necessarily produce a positive-semidefinite covariance matrix. Using only the balanced sample for the
covariance estimation leaves the results virtually unchanged.
36However, tests based on direction-of-risk forecasts might be more reliable in the event of outliers or severe
problems with the forecasts of σt+h.
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and qˆt+h|t is related to the direction of the forecast risk by
qˆt+h|t =

1 if µˆt+h|t > mˆt+h|t
0 if µˆt+h|t < mˆt+h|t
na if µˆt+h|t = mˆt+h|t
, (1.5)
where na denotes a missing value which will be excluded from the analysis. Then, if qt+h|t =
qˆt+h|t, the direction-of-risk forecast is successful, and if qt+h|t 6= qˆt+h|t, it is not.
In order to construct variables without missing values, we use the transformations
qNh = AhqTh ,
qˆNh = AhqˆTh ,
(1.6)
where the vector qTh is given by qTh =
(
q1+h|1, q2+h|2, . . . , qT+h|T
)′
, the vector qˆt+h|t is given by
qˆt+h|t =
(
qˆ1+h|1, qˆ2+h|2, . . . , qˆT+h|T
)′
and Ah is a known (N × T ) selection matrix consisting
of 1’s and 0’s, and with N ≤ T . Ah is chosen such that the vectors qNh and qˆNh do not contain
missing values.37
Denoting the elements of qNh and qˆNh by qn+h|n and qˆn+h|n, respectively, with n =
1, 2, . . . , N , we test for the optimality of the direction-of-risk forecasts based on the regression
qn+h|n = αq + βq qˆn+h|n + εn+h. (1.7)
Optimal risk forecasts neither imply βq = 1 nor αq = 0, as explained in Knüppel and Schul-
tefrankenfeld (2011). However, a necessary condition for forecast optimality is given by the
inequality βq > 0. While a test of this inequality should not reject in the case of optimal
forecasts, the hypothesis βq = 0 should be rejected. The hypothesis βq = 0 implies that the
direction-of-risk forecasts are not informative.38
1.5 Analysis of Risk Assessments
1.5.1 Quantitative Assessments
In Table 1.4, the results of the tests for risk forecast optimality are shown for the even forecast
horizons of both central banks, respectively. Note that the Riksbank forecast unbalanced risks
only in about half of its forecasts. The same holds for the BoE for nowcasts and forecasts
37If there are no missing values, Ah is a (T × T ) identity matrix. If, for example, only the risk forecast for
the first forecast of horizon h is balanced, i.e. in the case µˆ1+h|1 = mˆ1+h|1, N equals T − 1 and Ah is given by
Ah = [0N IN ], where 0N denotes an (N × 1) vector of 0’s and IN denotes the (N ×N) identity matrix.
38In principle, tests based on the binomial distribution could be used for direction-of-risk forecasts, but the
potential serial correlation of εn+h renders the regression-based approach presented here more appealing for
our investigations.
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up to one year ahead. For longer forecast horizons, the share of unbalanced risk forecasts
equals about two-thirds. Interestingly, the estimates of β are negative for horizons h = 0, 4, 6
in the case of the BoE, while the Riksbank’s slope coefficients are all positive. The standard
errors for the slope are often smaller for longer horizons than for shorter ones. This is due
to the fact that the cross-correlations of the error terms are especially pronounced for longer
forecast horizons.
For both the BoE and the Riksbank, we cannot reject the null that the estimated
intercept αˆ is equal to zero at the 5% level. This means that there is no significant bias issue
for any forecast horizon. In the case of the BoE, the p-values for the single null of optimality,
i.e. for tests of β = 1, indicate rejections for all horizons but h = 8. The results of the
joint null hypothesis of risk forecast optimality α = 0, β = 1, which are not reported in the
table, tend to confirm this finding, with rejections for all forecast horizons except h = 0 and
h = 8. The hypothesis of no information content is only rejected for the horizons h = 4 and
h = 8, as shown by the p-values for informativeness. However, βˆ is negative for h = 4, which
means that this rejection does not appear very plausible, because it would imply an adverse
informative value. For the Riksbank, the estimation uncertainty turns out to be very large,
so that no hypothesis about the slope β can be rejected. Put differently, we cannot make
clear statements with respect to the hypotheses of informativeness and of optimality, because
the confidence intervals for the slope β contain zero and unity likewise.
The results for the BoE strongly indicate that its risk forecasts are not optimal, and
that there is no systematic connection between realized risks and forecast risks. The only
potential exception is the forecast horizon h = 8. However, it does not appear too convincing
that the properties of the risk forecasts just for the horizon h = 8 should be so different from
the other horizons.39
Moreover, a horizon-specific regression yields a negative estimate of β for h = 8, as
also suggested by Figure 1.2. Based on this estimate and its Newey-West standard error, one
would reject the optimality hypothesis, β = 1, but not the hypothesis of no informativeness,
β = 0.40 The results for h = 8 are therefore rather unclear. The results for the Riksbank do
not provide evidence against the hypothesis that risk forecasts and realized risks are unrelated
at all forecast horizons. However, this result could also be caused by the small sample size,
which strongly hampers inference.41
39For the neighboring horizon h = 7, the estimated slope βˆ equals 0.1 with a standard error of 0.2, which
means that the null of optimality is rejected, while the null of non-informativeness is not. The same results
are obtained for all other odd horizons except for h = 5, where, as in case of h = 4, βˆ is significantly negative.
40The horizon-specific estimate for β equals −0.46, its standard error being 0.62. It should be mentioned
that for no other forecast horizon do the panel setup and the separate analysis of each horizon give such
contradictory results, i.e. for no other forecast horizon, including the odd horizons not reported here, is one
of the hypotheses β = 0 or β = 1 rejected in one setup, and the other hypothesis rejected in the other setup.
The same applies to the results for the Riksbank. In general, the standard errors are, of course, considerably
larger when each horizon is analyzed separately, which makes inference rather difficult.
41We also ran an estimation with the very restrictive assumption that intercept α and slope β are identical,
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Table 1.4: Panel-based tests for bias, informativeness and optimality of quantitative risk
forecasts of the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank
h 0 2 4 6 8
Bank of England
T 50 48 46 44 42
N 24 22 22 30 28
coefficient estimates
intercept 0.09 0.19 0.33 0.24 -0.09
(0.10) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18)
slope -0.45 0.13 -0.52 -0.30 0.71
(0.61) (0.26) (0.21) (0.26) (0.21)
p-values
bias 0.376 0.253 0.066 0.209 0.621
informativeness 0.465 0.619 0.017 0.267 0.002
optimality 0.021 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.173
Sveriges Riksbank
T 27 27 27
N 13 15 15
coefficient estimates
intercept -0.09 -0.07 -0.31
(0.13) (0.38) (0.31)
slope 1.08 1.64 0.47
(1.68) (2.02) (1.05)
p-values
bias 0.513 0.855 0.336
informativeness 0.529 0.425 0.656
optimality 0.965 0.755 0.618
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. T denotes the sample size. N
denotes the number of forecasts with unbalanced risks. The row ‘bias’ refers to tests
for α = 0, ‘informativeness’ to tests for β = 0, and ‘optimality’ to tests for β = 1 in
equation (1.3).
1.5.2 Direction-of-Risk Assessments
Since we are not aware of approaches for analyzing categorical data with potentially autocor-
related residuals in a panel setup, in the following analysis each forecast horizon is investigated
separately. The results of the analysis of direction-of-risk forecasts are reported in Table 1.5.
When recoding the data according to equations (1.4) and (1.5), and selecting only observa-
tions with corresponding non-zero risk forecasts according to (1.6), we are left with, at most,
30 observations per forecast horizon. The estimates for the intercept αq are unrelated to
forecast optimality and only reported for information. Note that, according to Pesaran and
Timmermann (2006), the problem of autocorrelation of the error terms in equations with
respectively, across all horizons. Even in this case, no hypothesis of interest can be rejected.
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Table 1.5: Tests for informativeness and optimality of direction-of-risk forecasts of the Bank
of England and the Sveriges Riksbank
h 0 2 4 6 8
Bank of England
N 24 22 22 30 28
coefficient estimates
intercept 0.57 0.86 0.71 0.60 0.42
(0.15) (0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.16)
slope -0.10 -0.32 -0.38 -0.25 0.02
(0.18) (0.19) (0.24) (0.12) (0.20)
p-values
informativeness 0.571 0.104 0.126 0.039 0.919
optimality 0.286 0.052 0.063 0.020 0.541
Sveriges Riksbank
N 13 15 15
coefficient estimates
intercept 0.33 0.50 0.33
(0.20) (0.19) (0.20)
slope 0.10 0.06 0.11
(0.34) (0.26) (0.18)
p-values
informativeness 0.787 0.832 0.549
optimality 0.606 0.584 0.726
Note: Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors. N denotes
the sample size, being equal to the number of forecasts with unbalanced risks. The
row ‘informativeness’ refers to tests for β = 0, and ‘optimality’ to tests for β > 0 in
equation (1.7).
categorical data like equation (1.7) can be addressed using Newey-West standard errors.42
The estimates for βq are negative in the case of the BoE except for h = 8, and positive in the
case of the Riksbank. For the Riksbank, again, none of the null hypotheses can be rejected.
For the BoE forecasts, a rejection of the hypothesis βq > 0 occurs for h = 6, suggesting that
the respective risk forecasts cannot be optimal. At the same time, the null of no information
content must be rejected. This result, however, does not seem very plausible due to the neg-
ative sign of the slope. For all other horizons, i.e for h = 0, 2, 4, 8, the p-values for the test
for informativeness substantially exceed 0.05. Hence, there is no evidence against a lack of
information content in the BoE’s direction-of-risk forecasts at these horizons. Although the
null of risk forecast optimality is not rejected for h = 2 and h = 4, it should be noted that
the respective p-values hardly exceed 5%.43
42Since Pesaran and Timmermann (2006) do not address the possibility of prewithening, we do not use it
here. Apart from that, we employ the same approach as for the bias tests in Section 1.3.
43Moreover, for the horizons h = 1 and h = 3 not reported in the table, the null of risk forecast optimality
is rejected.
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Interestingly, the best risk forecast performance in the case of the BoE is again observed
for h = 8. However, even for this horizon only 50% of the direction-of-risk forecasts were
successful, which means that the qualitative risk forecast performance rather tends to support
the hypothesis of no information content for this horizon.
1.5.3 Summary of Empirical Results
Summing up the results for quantitative and direction-of-risk forecasts, for the BoE there is
strong evidence against the optimality of risk forecasts for almost all forecast horizons. In
contrast, there is no conclusive evidence against the hypothesis that risk forecasts and realized
risks are unrelated at all forecast horizons. The latter result also holds for the Riksbank. Yet
the results for the Riksbank are subject to great uncertainty, because with only 7 years of
data an evaluation of macroeconomic risk forecasts can be extremely difficult.
Given the number of central banks which engage in risk forecasting and the resources
which are devoted to it, the fact that risk forecasts and realized risks seem to lack a systematic
connection might appear surprising. However, taking into account the often rather poor
performance of macroeconomic forecasts even for first moments, i.e. point forecasts, except
for short forecast horizons, it does not seem too implausible for macroeconomic forecasts of
third moments to be unsuccessful.
1.6 Reconsidering the Rationale for Risk Assessments
In light of the results of the previous section, it is interesting to consider some of the reasons
that are commonly mentioned in order to explain why macroeconomic risk forecasts are made.
The IMF (2008, pp.42-43) offers four reasons for potential asymmetries of forecast
densities. Firstly, non-linearities such as capacity constraints or the zero-lower bound for
interest rates might result in asymmetric forecast densities. Given the apparent lack of in-
formativeness as shown by the evaluation results for the quantitative risk forecasts and the
direction-of-risk forecasts, non-linearities either seemed to play no role in the samples under
study, or the forecasters’ understanding of these non-linearities is too limited to lead to suc-
cessful risk forecasts. For example, while the zero lower bound for the policy rate is a popular
motivation for asymmetric forecast densities, one could ask whether the effects of quantitative
easing might not counteract the zero-lower-bound problem in such a way that the forecast
density is actually close to symmetric even if the policy rate is at a very low level.
Secondly, the figures of the central forecast might already be fixed when sudden large
changes in important variables such as oil prices or exchange rates occur. Due to time con-
straints it might be infeasible to calculate a new central forecast and to adapt the often exten-
sive explanatory notes that come with the central forecast. Nonetheless, it might be possible
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to adapt the asymmetry of the forecast density to reflect the new information. However,
if risk forecasts were used to incorporate last-minute information into the forecast densities
without having to change the central forecast, the risk forecast accuracy ought to have been
higher than it was above, in particular at very short forecast horizons. So at least for the
BoE and the Riksbank, it can be stated without much doubt that this reason for issuing risk
forecasts does not matter.
Thirdly, forecasts are often based on ‘technical’ assumptions, in many cases concerning
exogenous variables. For example, exchange rates are commonly assumed to remain constant
for all forecast horizons. If such an assumption is used for institutional reasons but the
forecaster believes that the domestic currency will appreciate soon, the asymmetry of the
forecast density can be employed to allow for this view. However, if ‘technical’ assumptions
are used in the forecasting processes of the BoE and the Riksbank, and risk forecasts are used
as an attempt to improve upon the forecast accuracy implied by these assumptions, it seems
that such an improvement is infeasible. Coming back to the example of constant exchange
rates, the difficulties in beating the random-walk forecast are actually well-known.44
The fourth reason concerns the possibility of biased forecasts. If recent forecast errors
appear to be biased, maybe owing to an undetected structural change, the forecaster might
refrain from shifting the current central forecast. Instead, he might be inclined to issue an
asymmetric forecast density in order to account for the potential bias. Such an attempted bias
correction using risk forecasts has either not been carried out by the BoE and the Riksbank,
or was carried out but did not work as intended. However, it is not possible to assess the
individual probability of these two explanations based on the results of the optimality tests.
In addition to the reasons mentioned by the IMF, experts’ expectations about asym-
metric shocks might be a further motivation for risk forecasting. For example, a forecaster
could simply believe that, in a certain situation, positive shocks are more likely than negative
shocks.45 The asymmetry of future shocks is apparently often assumed in the forecasts of
central banks, but our results suggest that such assumptions might not be justified. Actually,
the BoE gives some narrative support to this supposition. Referring to inflationary develop-
ments from 1997 to 1999, the BoE states that “In general, the modal inflation forecast has
been closer to actual outturns than the mean projection. This is because the MPC judged
44See, for instance, Meese and Rogoff (1983).
45Actually, this reason for risk forecasts is very common in the publications of central banks. Two examples
read: “Risks to this [inflation] outlook are fully confirmed to lie on the upside. These risks include the
possibility of further rises in oil and agricultural prices, as well as of unanticipated increases in administered
prices and indirect taxes”, (ECB, 2007, p.55), and “The balance of risks to the inflation outlook, relative to the
central projection, lies on the upside, as the prospect of a faster exchange rate depreciation and the associated
adjustment to the level of import prices is the dominant influence”, (BoE, 2002, p.49). It is unlikely that
non-linear forecasting models are the motivations for assuming unbalanced risks in oil and agricultural prices
or exchange rates. Moreover, the BoE apparently made no technical assumption with respect to exchange
rates. Instead, the forecasters simply seem to anticipate an asymmetry of future shocks.
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the risks to the central projection to be on the upside, largely because of the risk that the
sterling exchange rate might depreciate sharply. Up to 2000 Q2 this did not occur; indeed,
the exchange rate tended to be higher than the central assumption”, (Bank of England, 2000,
pp.63-64).
Furthermore, minority views may lead to asymmetric forecast densities. In institutions
where several decision makers have to agree on a single central forecast, as, for instance, the
board members of the BoE have to, a minority of the decision makers may not agree with
the central forecast decided upon by the majority. The view of the minority then can be
accommodated by the asymmetry of the forecast density. If this is actually the case, the
results shown above suggest that such minority views do not help to produce more accurate
forecasts.
Finally, risk forecasts could also be employed as a (subtle) communication device. For
example, if the forecasts of an inflation-targeting central bank are made conditional on future
interest rates as expected by market participants, it is rather unlikely that the inflation
forecast will deviate strongly from the target at the relevant policy horizon. If there were a
strong deviation, this might cause market participants to believe that either the policy of the
central bank has changed, or that the central bank’s assessment of the economic conditions
strongly differs from their own assessment. Both possibilities are not very attractive for a
central bank that seeks to be transparent and predictable. In order to signal the possibility
of an unexpected increase in the policy rate, a central bank might therefore prefer to forecast
an inflation rate that is only slightly above target and to add upward risks to this forecast.
By doing so, the central bank’s central forecast is basically in line with the forecasts of the
market participants. At the same time, the central bank makes it clear that these forecasts are
subject to uncertainty, and that the materialization of certain risks considered to be likely by
the central bank would require a policy response different to the one expected by the market.
As the probabilities of these risks materializing will change over time, the market participants
will adapt their interest rate expectations accordingly. However, Rasche and Thornton (2002)
investigate the balance-of-risks statements of the Federal Reserve and find that these do not
appear to be a crucial factor in the market expectations concerning the Fed Funds Rate.46
The likelihood of the possibility that risk forecasts are being used as a communication device
cannot be evaluated based on our risk forecast evaluation. However, if risk forecasts are used
in this way, they should be positively correlated with the (small) deviations of the inflation
forecasts from the target. However, for neither the BoE nor the Riksbank do we find evidence
of positive correlations.47
46However, the balance-of-risks statements supposedly had a different interpretation during that period.
They were rather related to a loss-function as suggested by Kilian and Manganelli (2007) than to asymmetries
of forecast densities.
47Depending on the forecast horizon and the central bank being analyzed, the correlation coefficients range
from about −0.2 to 0.2. They are all insignificant.
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1.7 Conclusion
Many central banks augment their point forecasts with assessments of the balance of risks. For
virtually all of the central banks surveyed in this work, we actually find clear statements that
the presence of unbalanced forecast risks corresponds to an asymmetry of forecast densities.
Surprisingly, the point forecasts published almost always correspond to the modes of the
forecast densities.
The risk forecasts are made and presented in a variety of ways. They can be quantitative
as in the case of the BoE and the Riksbank, or qualitative, thus only indicating the direction
of the balance of risks, as, for example, in the case of the Federal Reserve and the ECB.
Risk forecasts can also be discussed without referring to the balance of risks, thereby just
giving an idea of how the central forecast would change if a certain risk materialized. This
is often the case, for instance, for the Reserve Banks of Australia and New Zealand. Apart
from the verbal presentation of the (balance of) risks, balance-of-risks forecasts are frequently
represented in potentially asymmetric fan charts.
Since the balance of risks is supposed to contain information about the asymmetries of
the densities of the forecast variables, there should be a systematic connection between risk
forecasts and realized risks, where the realized risks in our study correspond to the scaled
mode forecast errors. Investigating the risk forecasts for inflation produced by the BoE and
the Riksbank, we fail to find such a connection. While the results for the Riksbank could also
be caused by the small sample size, the results for the BoE indicate relatively clearly that the
risk forecasts do not provide the intended information. Instead, it seems that risk forecasts
and forecast errors are unrelated. This holds for both quantitative forecasts and direction-of-
risk forecasts. We therefore conclude that it seems questionable whether macroeconomic risk
forecasts are meaningful.
If inflation is actually endogenous with respect to a central bank’s risk forecast, then it
could of course be that the estimation results presented are misleading. For instance, in case of
an upward risk, economic agents could anticipate a risk of rising interest rates. In response to
this risk, economic activity could be dampened, leading to lower demand and, consequently,
to lower inflation. Then, even if the upward risk to inflation materialized, inflation could
still be lower than forecast. However, if the endogeneity issue were empirically relevant, we
would expect our estimated slope coefficients to decrease with the forecast horizon, because
the endogeneity would tend to be less pronounced for shorter forecast horizons. Since there is
no such decrease, the presence of an endogeneity problem appears unlikely. A deeper analysis
of this issue, though, is left for future research.
However, two other caveats must also be mentioned. Firstly, the success of risk forecasts
might depend on the variable under study. If, for example, output growth is best described
by a regime-switching process as proposed by Hamilton (1989), it should be possible to issue
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informative risk forecasts for this variable. At least for short horizons, one would just have
to forecast upward risks during recessions and downward risks during expansions. Secondly,
if discrete random variables with few possible outcomes are an important determinant of
the variable under study, risk forecasts could also perform well. One example might be a
potential future change in the VAT rate and its effect on inflation. However, in such cases
one might prefer to conduct scenario analyses, as the Riksbank has done since 2007. This has
the additional advantage of clarifying the comovements between variables in the event of the
risk materializing.
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Appendix
A.1 Central Bank Statements on Risk Forecasting
The following section cites the statements of central banks on which Section 1.2 and Table 1.1
are based. Table 1.6 contains the positions in these central banks’ publications where their
risk assessments can be found.
Bank of Canada
“The staff projection is an outlook for the economy’s most likely path.”48
“While the underlying macroeconomic risks to the projection are roughly balanced, the
Bank judges that, as a consequence of operating at the effective lower bound, the overall risks
to its inflation projection are tilted slightly to the downside”, (Bank of Canada, 2009, p.27).
“Chart 23 and Chart 24 depict the 50 per cent and 90 per cent confidence bands for
year-over-year core and total CPI inflation [...] In particular, they show the slight downward
tilt to the confidence bands that results from monetary policy operating at the effective lower
bound”49, (Bank of Canada, 2009, p.26).
Banco Central de Chile
“Balance of risks: Evaluation of possible alternative scenarios to the baseline scenario used
in projections (considered the most likely in the Monetary Policy Report) and their impli-
cations for future paths of output and inflation. The combined analysis of different sources
of uncertainty to the baseline projection scenario are reflected in the balance of risks, which
may be biased downward, upward or balanced, in terms of growth and inflation, as compared
to the baseline scenario”, (Banco Central de Chile, 2007, p.32).
“When the balance of risks around the central or modal projection slopes upward
(positive bias), values above the modal projection are considered more likely to occur than
values below it”, (Banco Central de Chile, 2001, p.13).
Bank of England
“The central projection of inflation is then interpreted as being the ‘mode’ of the statistical
distribution - it is the single most likely outcome based on current knowledge and judgment”,
(Britton et al., 1998, p.32).
“In order to produce the fan chart, only one number is needed to summarise the degree
of skewness (the balance of risks). [...] The Bank’s analysis focuses on the difference between
48See http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/monetary/monetary_decision3.html.
49Note that this statement suggests that expected inflation is lower than the central projection of inflation.
Moreover, it implies that the Bank of Canada produces quantitative risk forecasts.
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the mean and the mode of the forecast distribution to be presented in the Report. This
difference is of interest as a summary statistic of the balance of risks”, (Britton et al., 1998,
p.32).
“If the MPC believed there was a higher probability that inflation would be above the
mode than below, then the area under the curve would be skewed to the right”, (Bank of
England, 2002, p.48).
Banco de España
“[...] These factors [...] suggest that the risks surrounding the output growth projections are
on the low side. This means that downward deviations from the growth path of the central
scenario of this report are considered more likely than upward ones”, (Banco de España, 2008,
p.4).
“[...] a central projection scenario is obtained [...]. This central scenario is considered
the most likely”, (Ortega, Burriel, Fernández, Ferraz, and Hurtado, 2007, p.19).
Bank of Israel
“Nonetheless, within the horizon of a year or more, the upside risks of inflation balance out
with its downside risks”, (Bank of Israel, 2008, p.26).
“The principal risk factor that could lead to the nonmaterialization of this forecast is
the course of global developments”, (Bank of Israel, 2010, p.36).
Bank of Japan
“Each Policy Board member submits his or her forecasts in the form of point estimates, the
values to which he or she attaches the highest probability of realization [...] each Policy Board
member also indicates, in the form of a probability distribution, the likelihood that upside
or downside risks will materialize and cause divergence from the forecast value”, (Bank of
Japan, 2008, p.9).
“The probability distribution for the rate of real GDP growth in fiscal 2008 is skewed to
the left. This suggests that Policy Board members consider the downside risks to be greater
than the upside risks”, (Bank of Japan, 2008, p.9).
Banco de Portugal
“Risks on economic activity are on the downside, particularly in 2011”, (Banco de Portugal,
2010, p.10).
“According to the quantification of risks, the likelihood that GDP growth may fall
below the present outlook stands at 54 per cent in 2010 and 63 per cent in 2011”, (Banco de
Portugal, 2010, p.18).
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“The baseline point forecasts are interpreted as the mode of the joint distribution”50,
(Pinheiro and Esteves, 2010, p.1).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
“Participants also provide judgments as to whether the risks to their projections are weighted
to the upside, downside, or are broadly balanced. That is, participants judge whether each
variable is more likely to be above or below their projections of the most likely outcome”,
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008, p.45).
“The projections now produced by FOMC participants are explicitly modal forecasts
in that they represent participants’ projections of the most likely outcome. Although par-
ticipants provide qualitative assessments of whether the risks around their projections are
weighted to one side or the other, we do not have quantitative estimates of any skew”, (Reif-
schneider and Tulip, 2007, p.12).
“Most participants viewed the risks to their inflation projections as weighted to the
upside. Recent sharp increases in energy and food prices and the passthrough of dollar
depreciation into import prices could boost inflation in the near term by more than currently
anticipated”, (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008, p.41).
Deutsche Bundesbank
“It is generally assumed that uncertainties are distributed symmetrically around the most
likely value, ie the baseline. Depending on the specific data situation and conditions, there
may well be signs when the projections are produced that this will not be the case. Indeed,
unlike in the historical patterns, there is often a skewed distribution. In this case, the terms
upside or downside risks are used”, (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.27).
European Central Bank
“Risks to the outlook for price developments are slightly tilted to the upside. They relate, in
particular, to the evolution of energy and non-oil commodity prices. Furthermore, increases in
indirect taxation and administered prices may be greater than currently expected”, (European
Central Bank, 2010, p.6).
“ECB/Eurosystem staff projections are presented in the form of ranges. The use of
ranges acknowledges the inevitable uncertainty surrounding macroeconomic projections.”51
50Note that this interpretation differs from those of most other central banks, which consider the marginal
modes.
51See www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/newprocedureforprojections200912en.pdf.
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Table 1.6: Publications of risk assessments by central banks
Central Bank Risk assessments published in
Bank of Canada Monetary Policy Report, Chapter “Risks to the outlook”
Banco Central de Chile Monetary Policy Report, Chapter “Inflation scenarios”,Section “Risk scenarios”
Bank of England Inflation Report, Chapter “Prospects for inflation”,Section “Key judgements and risk”
Banco de España Economic Bulletin, Chapter “Spanish economic projections report”,Section “Risks to the projection” (Chapter appears semi-annually)
Bank of Israel
Inflation Report, Chapter “Update of the forecasts”,
Section “Assessments regarding the development of inflation and the
balance of its risks”
Bank of Japan
Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices,
Figure “Risk balance charts” and
Section “Upside and downside risks”
Banco de Portugal Economic Bulletin, Chapter “Outlook for the Portuguese economy”,Section “Uncertainty and risks” (Chapter appears semi-annually)
Board of Governors of Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, Chapter “Summary of
Federal Reserve System economic projections”, Section “Uncertainty and risks”
Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, Chapter “Outlook for the German economy”,Section “Risk assessment” (Chapter appears semi-annually)
European Central Bank Monthly Bulletin, “Editorial” and “The outlook for economic activity”
International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, Chapter “Global prospects and policies”
Magyar Nemzeti Bank Quarterly Report on inflation, Chapter “Inflation and real economyoutlook”, Section “Inflation and growth risks”
Norges Bank
Monetary Policy Report, Chapter “Monetary policy assessments
and strategy”, Section “Uncertainty surrounding the
projections (scenario analyses)”
Reserve Bank of Australia Statement on Monetary Policy, Chapter “Economic Outlook”,Section “Risks”
Reserve Bank of New Zealand Monetary Policy Statement, Chapters “Overview and key policyjudgements” and “International developments and outlook”
Sveriges Riksbank 2007-present Monetary Policy Report, Chapter “Alternative scenarios andrisks (scenario analyses)”
Sveriges Riksbank 1999-2006 Inflation Report, Chapter “Inflation assessment”,Section “Risk assessment”
Swiss National Bank Quarterly Bulletin, Chapter “Monetary policy report”,Section “SNB inflation forecast”
How Informative Are Central Bank Assessments of Macroeconomic Risks? 44
International Monetary Fund
“[...] The IMF staff has presented risks to the WEO projections using a fan chart [...] The
methodology for constructing the fan chart is similar to that originally developed by the
Bank of England. The central forecast is represented as the mode, or the most likely outcome
[...] The skewness of the distribution, or the relative size of the two pieces of the normal
distribution, represents the balance of risks to the central forecast”, (International Monetary
Fund, 2008, pp.41-42).
“In the case of the balance of risk being tilted to the downside [...] the expected
probability of outcomes being below the central forecast exceeds 50 percent”, (International
Monetary Fund, 2006, p.25).
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
“In order to plot the fan chart, the uncertainty distribution must be determined for each point
in time on the projection horizon. [...] The mode of distribution is identical to the central
projection. [...] In determining the skewness that indicates risk direction, the risk perception
of the Economics Department prevails”, (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2004, p.107).
“The method that we follow in preparing fan charts broadly corresponds to that of the
Bank of England, and the same holds true for the Swedish method”, (Magyar Nemzeti Bank,
2004, p.108).
“On the whole, our inflation forecast is apparently jeopardised by significant upward
risks, which means that actual price increases will more likely exceed our expectations, rather
than fall short of them”, (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2008, p.46).
Norges Bank
“There is also a risk that the global downturn will be deeper and more prolonged than
expected. [...] Overall, the outlook and balance of risks suggest that the key policy rate
should be gradually reduced further to a level of around 1% in the second half of 2009”,
(Norges Bank, 2009, p.13).
Reserve Bank of Australia
“ [...] it would be a mistake to focus only on the point forecast; it makes much more sense
to think of the central forecast as simply the modal point on the distribution of the possible
outcomes, with a sequence of progressively less likely outcomes on either side. Nor is that
distribution necessarily symmetric – it may be skewed one way or the other. [...] We do not
use fan charts per se, but we do try to consider alternative scenarios to the central forecast.
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We attempt to use the results of that process to articulate some sense of the balance of risks
– both on the inflation outlook and on growth prospects – in the published statements.”52
“As always, there are risks in both directions around the forecasts, although overall,
these risks are viewed as evenly balanced”, (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2010, p.57).
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
“[...] the central forecast is only one of a large number of potential outcomes for the economy,
albeit the outcome that the Bank considers to be the most likely”, (Conway, 2000, p.14).
“We continue to see the balance of risks to the central projection as being to the
downside for activity and inflation”, (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2009, p.4).
Sveriges Riksbank (2007-present)
“The forecasts in the main scenario show the path which the Riksbank expects the economy to
take and is a weighted consideration of various conceivable development paths (scenarios) and
risks. [continued in footnote 11 ] There are therefore no grounds to revise the main scenario
afterwards in light of a certain specific risk. This approach was adopted previously in the
Inflation Report”, (Sveriges Riksbank, 2007, p.22).
“The uncertainty bands for the forecasts for inflation and GDP growth are based on the
Riksbank’s historical forecast errors. [continued in footnote 12 ] This entails a change in the
method used for designing the fan chart for inflation, which has previously been calculated
using a weighted average of underlying risks. With the new method, the uncertainty bands
are symmetrical”, (Sveriges Riksbank, 2007, p.22).
Sveriges Riksbank (1999-2006)
“The distribution that is used as an approximation of the inflation forecast’s distribution is
known in statistical terminology as two-piece normal. [...] From Fig. B3 it will be seen that
forecast inflation for the second quarter of 2000 carries a downside risk (the distribution in
Fig. B3 is somewhat skewed to the left). The broken line is the inflation forecast in the main
scenario (the mode)”, (Sveriges Riksbank, 1998, pp.36-37).
“Skew is measured as the difference between the mean value and the most probable
value (the mode of the distribution)”, (Sveriges Riksbank, 1998, p.36).
“The overall assessment of different risks is that the probability of inflation being higher
than in the main scenario is slightly greater than the probability of lower inflation”, (Sveriges
Riksbank, 2006, p.38).
52See http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2001/sp-ag-101001.html
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Swiss National Bank
“[...] the higher inflation expectations and the possibility of second-round effects will keep
inflation risks on the upside”, (Swiss National Bank, 2008, p.13).
“Uncertainty about the future outlook for the global economy remains high, however,
and downside risks predominate”, (Swiss National Bank, 2010c, p.19).
A.2 Data Details
A.2.1 Bank of England
As mentioned in Section 1.3, the BoE and the Riksbank use the tpn-distibution. The density
of a tpn-distributed variable Y is given by
f (y) =

A exp
(
− (y−m)22σ21
)
if y ≤ m
A exp
(
− (y−m)22σ22
)
if y ≥ m,
with A = 2√2pi(σ1+σ2) and m denoting the mode of the distribution. The more σ1 differs
from σ2, the more asymmetric the distribution becomes. If σ1 and σ2 are identical, a normal
distribution is obtained.
In order to determine the Pearson mode skewness, defined as the difference between the
mean and the mode forecast, scaled by the forecast standard deviation, we have to calculate
the variance, which is given by
σ2 =
(
1− 2
pi
)
(σ2 − σ1)2 + σ1σ2.
For this calculation three parameters of the BoE’s forecast densities are required, which can
be downloaded directly from the bank’s website.53 These parameters are the mean µ, the
mode m and an uncertainty measure ω. Following Wallis (2004), it is helpful to define
s = µ−m
ω
,
from which the quantity γ can be determined as
γ = sign (s)
√√√√1− 4(√1 + pis2 − 1
pis2
)2
.
53See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/irprobab.htm.
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Table 1.7: Pearson mode skewness of forecast densities of the Bank of England
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1998Q1 0.197 0.170 0.176 0.178 0.178 0.248 0.292 0.321 0.352
1998Q2 −0.338 −0.324 −0.320 −0.332 −0.332 −0.119 0.047 0.178 0.283
1998Q3 0.202 0.229 0.231 0.224 0.224 0.236 0.256 0.262 0.267
1998Q4 0.159 0.209 0.209 0.209 0.204 0.113 0.025 −0.034 −0.093
1999Q1 0.107 0.107 0.107 0.089 0.096 0.029 −0.026 −0.082 −0.118
1999Q2 0.166 0.166 0.189 0.166 0.182 0.195 0.197 0.199 0.207
1999Q3 0.230 0.272 0.267 0.265 0.256 0.206 0.143 0.103 0.073
1999Q4 −0.060 −0.108 −0.077 −0.080 −0.090 −0.132 −0.218 −0.272 −0.292
2000Q1 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.179 0.178 0.190 0.192
2000Q2 0.060 0.072 0.078 0.100 0.090 0.050 0.000 −0.040 −0.063
2000Q3 0 0 0 0 0 −0.034 −0.078 −0.114 −0.135
2000Q4 0.059 0.071 0.101 0.079 0.089 0.065 0.029 0.013 0
2001Q1 −0.120 −0.108 −0.103 −0.100 −0.090 −0.147 −0.214 −0.264 −0.291
2001Q2 −0.120 −0.108 −0.103 −0.080 −0.090 −0.116 −0.147 −0.172 −0.185
2001Q3 0 0 0 0 0 −0.050 −0.118 −0.159 −0.185
2001Q4 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.313 0.283 0.258 0.243
2002Q1 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.341 0.370 0.402 0.427 0.441
2002Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0.089 0.190 0.280 0.324
2002Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0.054 0.128 0.172 0.200
2002Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0.056 0.115 0.174 0.202
2003Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 0.104 0.162 0.190
2003Q2 0.190 0.190 0.180 0.200 0.190 0.144 0.082 0.030 0.000
2003Q3 0 0 0 0 0 −0.038 −0.087 −0.128 −0.152
2003Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004Q4 −0.240 −0.240 −0.226 −0.251 −0.240 −0.263 −0.292 −0.315 −0.328
2005Q1 −0.239 −0.239 −0.251 −0.250 −0.239 −0.264 −0.294 −0.319 −0.333
2005Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005Q3 0 0 0 0 0 −0.047 −0.107 −0.158 −0.187
2005Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2006Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2007Q1 −0.165 −0.165 −0.151 −0.168 −0.160 −0.063 0.090 0.213 0.272
2007Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0.075 0.156 0.216 0.260
2007Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0.030 0.085 0.108 0.132
2007Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2008Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2008Q2 0.124 0.133 0.128 0.131 0.124 0.144 0.159 0.160 0.178
2008Q3 0.131 0.127 0.116 0.125 0.119 0.167 0.217 0.259 0.277
2008Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009Q1 0 0 0 0 0 −0.059 −0.128 −0.179 −0.205
2009Q2 0.456 0.454 0.458 0.449 0.452 0.337 0.207 0.070 0
2009Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2010Q1 0.162 0.163 0.169 0.164 0.164 0.192 0.222 0.247 0.258
2010Q2 0.091 0.076 0.081 0.079 0.083 0.094 0.110 0.124 0.134
Note: The forecast horizon h is measured in quarters. A zero without a decimal point refers to the situation
of exactly balanced forecast risks.
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The standard deviations σ1 and σ2 can then be calculated as
σ1 =
ω√
1 + γ , σ2 =
ω√
1− γ ,
and can be inserted into the formula for the variance of the forecast density σ2 given above.
Then the Pearson mode skewness (µ−m) /σ can be determined. Its values are displayed in
Table 1.7.
A.2.2 Sveriges Riksbank
There are two inflation fan charts in each Inflation Report we study. One chart refers to
the price index CPI, the other to the price index UND1X.54 We focus on the CPI only.
Forecast values are given for the current month and the next 24 months. The values which
are published are the central forecast (mode forecast) and the quantiles belonging to the 50%,
75% and 90% confidence intervals. Unlike the intervals published by the BoE, these intervals
are symmetric around the median, as clarified by Blix and Sellin (2000, footnote 7).
In contrast to the BoE, the Riskbank does not publish the means and standard de-
viations of the tpn-distributions that underlie the fan charts.55 Therefore, we first have to
back out the parameters of these distributions in order to calculate their means and standard
deviations. The precision of the parameter estimates of course depends on the precision of the
published forecast values. For Inflation Reports 1999:4 to 2004:4 they are very precise, hav-
ing fourteen decimal places. Then, for the Inflation Reports 2005:1 and 2005:2, the published
values have two decimal places. Finally, the published values have only one decimal place for
Inflation Reports 2005:3 to 2006:3. Surprisingly, the mode forecasts from Inflation Report
2004:4 also have only one decimal place. Hence, while backing out the exact parameter values
is relatively easy until at least Inflation Report 2004:3, the estimates can be expected to be
less precise for the following Inflation Reports due to the rounding of the forecast values.
Backing out the parameter values requires fitting a tpn-distribution to the modes and
quantiles published. This fitting can either be carried out using a least squares criterion
or a likelihood ratio criterion as shown by García and Manzanares (2007). For forecasts
from Inflation Reports 1999:4 to 2004:4, the differences between the results obtained with
both criterions are small in general. But especially when only 1 decimal place is used, the
differences can become larger. In these cases, the likelihood ratio criterion gives more plausible
results. For example, the skewness of the Riksbank’s density forecasts published in a certain
Inflation Report never changes sign from one forecast horizon to the next,56 i.e. the skewness
54The index UND1X is defined as the CPI excluding household mortgage interest expenditure and the direct
effects of changes in indirect taxes and subsidies.
55The fact that the Riksbank uses a tpn-distribution is stated in Sveriges Riksbank (1998, pp.36-37).
56This becomes clear when reading the chapters of the Inflation Reports that discuss the balance of risks.
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Table 1.8: Pearson mode skewness of forecast densities of the Sveriges Riksbank
h 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21
Dec 1999 0.014 0.053 0.089 0.124 0.157 0.140 0.124 0.107
Jun 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0.018 0.038 0.059
Oct 2000 0.014 0.054 0.092 0.127 0.152 0.159 0.165 0.172
Dec 2000 0.023 0.089 0.150 0.207 0.261 0.272 0.282 0.293
Mar 2001 −0.000 −0.035 −0.067 −0.098 −0.126 −0.114 −0.101 −0.089
May 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mar 2002 0.012 0.244 0.240 0.110 0.139 0.125 0.111 0.097
Jun 2002 0.252 0.244 0.080 0.111 0.140 0.126 0.112 0.098
Oct 2002 −0.006 −0.025 −0.043 −0.059 −0.070 −0.073 −0.076 −0.079
Dec 2002 −0.006 −0.023 −0.040 −0.055 −0.070 −0.073 −0.077 −0.080
Mar 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 2003 −0.009 −0.035 −0.059 −0.082 −0.104 −0.095 −0.086 −0.077
Oct 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Apr 2004 0.006 0.022 0.037 0.052 0.062 0.067 0.071 0.076
May 2004 0.000 0.024 0.046 0.067 0.087 0.093 0.093 0.092
Oct 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 2004 −0.157 0 −0.004 −0.096 −0.167 −0.160 −0.132 −0.100
Mar 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 2005 −0.000 −0.038 −0.057 −0.086 −0.109 −0.092 −0.077 −0.055
Oct 2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dec 2005 0 0.120 0.133 0.206 0.166 0.221 0.163 0.084
Feb 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jun 2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Oct 2006 0 0.120 0.201 0.300 0.253 0.214 0.169 0.159
Note: The forecast horizon h is stated in months. A zero without a decimal point refers to the situation
of exactly balanced forecast risks. Only the horizons h ≤ 12 are used in the empirical analysis.
might switch between zero and positive, or between zero and negative, but not between
positive and negative. Looking at the Inflation Report 2005:4, however, with the least squares
criterion, the skewness for the 5-month-ahead forecast is negative, while it is positive for 4
and 6 months ahead. With the likelihood ratio criterion, the skewness is positive for 4, 5 and
6 months ahead. Therefore, we use the likelihood ratio criterion to back out the parameters
and to calculate the skewness of the inflation forecasts.
The skewness obtained in this way is cross-checked with the statements in the Inflation
Reports. If an Inflation Report states that risks are balanced, we set the skewness of the
corresponding forecast densities to zero, even if the estimated parameters indicate a (small)
non-zero skewness. We do this because the parameter estimation results, as explained above,
can be affected by imprecise data. The Pearson mode skewness for the selected forecast
horizons is displayed in Table 1.8.
Chapter 2
What determines the Shape of
Inflation Fan Charts?
Abstract: To investigate potential determinants of the shape of forecast inflation fan charts,
we analyze the historical interest rate voting patterns of the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s Monetary Council and the Sveriges Riksbank’s
Executive Board. We find that current disagreement about the level of interest rates translates
into the asymmetry, but not the width of the subsequent forecast inflation fan charts of the
Bank of England and of the Sveriges Riksbank. The opposite is true for the Magyar Nemzeti
Bank. As fan charts are usually seen to represent the common view of all members of the
decision-making body, we argue that forecasting potentially asymmetric uncertainties serves
to accommodate minority views on monetary policy.
Keywords: Bank of England, Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Sveriges Riksbank, Committee Dissent,
Forecast Risk, Fan Charts
JEL-Classification: E52, C12
This chapter is based on
Knüppel, M. and Schultefrankenfeld, G., 2013, What determines the Shape of Inflation Fan
Charts?, mimeo.
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2.1 Introduction
Many central banks publish regular assessments of the magnitude and balance of risks to their
macroeconomic outlook, as surveyed in Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2012). A substantial
fraction of the central banks examined casts these assessments into density forecasts of their
target variables. Often, the forecasting results are depicted as graphs of the central projection
and potentially asymmetric uncertainty intervals surrounding this projection. Pioneered by
the Bank of England (BoE), these graphs are today known as fan charts.
While asymmetric fan charts are a well established device for central banks to com-
municate a baseline and its uncertainties, the way of constructing them is in many cases less
straightforward: central bank fan charts are typically not generated by a model. Rather, they
are the result of a forecasting process where the “central tendency for inflation [...], the degree
of uncertainty [...] and the balance of risks” are to be evaluated, as described by Britton,
Fisher, and Whitley (1998, p.32) for the BoE. Blix and Sellin (1999, pp.2-3) describe for the
Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank) that “The traditional statistical approach to producing uncer-
tainty intervals would involve [...] constructing a model intended for inflation forecasts. [...]
The Riksbank, however, does not use the approach [...].” As further examples, the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank (MNB), the Banco Central do Brazil and the Banco Central de Chile proceed
similarly to the aforementioned central banks.1
If the ‘traditional statistical approach’ is not used to obtain central bank fan charts,
the questions arises what determines the shape of the uncertainty intervals surrounding a
central tendency. In particular, what determines the width and the skewness of central bank
fan charts? Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2012) have collected reasons for macroeconomic
risk forecasting, which is directly related to skewed forecast distributions and asymmetric
fan charts. Asymmetries in the forecast uncertainty may result from non-linearities, frozen-
forecast issues, biases in recent forecast errors, expert expectations about future asymmetries
of shocks or simply from central bank communication strategies. A further reason that vir-
tually summarizes the aforementioned ones is provided by disagreement in decision making.
Both forecasting and monetary policy decisions are usually the concern of several decision-
makers in a decision-making body of a central bank. If the views on future values of the
instrument and the target variable(s) of the decision-making body as a whole are represented
by fan charts, then minority views leading to disagreement about such variables may have
their effects on the shape of these fan charts.
Disagreement on forecasts can either term deviations between competing forecasts for
one variable of forecasters from different institutions or within one institution. Differences
1See the MNB’s Inflation Report of May 2004, p.108, the Banco Central do Brazil’s Inflation Report
of September 1999, p.79, and the Banco Central de Chile’s December 2011 Monetary Policy Report, p.33,
exemplarily for further details.
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across institutions can for instance occur in statistical surveys like the Survey of Professional
Forecasters or the Livingston Survey, as analyzed for instance by Banternghansa and Mc-
Cracken (2009) or D’Amico and Orphanides (2008). The cross-sectional dispersion of mean
forecasts from surveys is known to be a proxy for forecast uncertainty, as shown in Bomberger
(1996) or Giordani and Söderlind (2003). Relationships between macroeconomic uncertainty
approximated by survey dispersion and stock market volatility have been found by Arnold
and Glasbeek (2011).
Disagreement plays a prominent role in decision-making within institutions, in particu-
lar in the form of disagreement about and dissenting views on the level of the monetary policy
instrument within monetary policy committees. Modern, inflation-targeting central banks
usually employ such a decision-making body to decide on the level of interest rates based on
forecasts for inflation. Monetary policy committees typically consist of several members and
are chaired by the bank’s governor or president. Examples for such central bank committees
include the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the BoE, the Policy Board of the Bank
of Japan, the Federal Open Market Committee at the Federal Reserve System and the Gov-
erning Council of the European Central Bank. The standard task for the committees is to
obtain decisions on future monetary policy, i.e. deciding if to raise, maintain or lower the
key interest rate. These decisions are usually achieved by letting the members vote on an
interest rate proposal made by the chairman. At the end of the voting process, which may
have several stages, the proposal that has attained the majority of the member votes will be
the aggregate interest rate decision. If there is no unanimity about the instrument level, it is
implied that a minority of decision makers has been outvoted.
Numerous reasons lead members to vote for or against an interest rate proposal such
that there is dissent in voting. Particulary important is that committee members may have
different inflation expectations due to different priors, models and other differences in their
information set about the future, such that their individually preferred level of interest rates
required for achieving target inflation may also be different from the aggregate interest rate
decision. Other reasons that may cause members to deviate from the majority include profes-
sional skill, geographical and professional background, uncertainty about policy effectiveness,
social reasons, etc., as discussed for example by Belden (1989), Gerlach-Kristen (2002), Meade
and Sheets (2005), Chappell Jr. et al. (2000, 2004, 2007), Gerlach-Kristen and Meade (2010),
and in the literature surveyed by Gerlach-Kristen (2006).
If the majority voters achieved an aggregate interest rates decision, the task for the
whole committee (or the staff on behalf of the committee, depending on the central bank) is
to form an aggregate inflation forecast that is consistent with the new level of the instrument.
This typically results in a central tendency for inflation. Yet, the minority voters that opted
for another level of the monetary policy instrument have their individual inflation forecasts
that are likely to be different from the central tendency. Hence, these minority views may be
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factored in by widening the confidence intervals to attach a certain probability of occurrence
to these alternative views on future inflation. Moreover, minority views can be accommodated
by introducing skewness to the forecast density.
Although no individual inflation forecasts are available, the BoE, the MNB and the
Riksbank are the only central banks that make attributed interest rate voting records as
well as the entire forecast densities published in their inflation reports available. Hence, the
individual paths of interest rates for the committee members can be determined. This gives us
the unique opportunity to investigate if there is a systematic connection between the degree of
disagreement about monetary policy committee decisions on the level of the policy instrument
and risks and uncertainties to forecasts of the target variable inflation, as published in the
subsequent monetary policy reports. In case of the MNB, we find that the more minority
views deviate from the aggregate interest rate decision, the wider are the MNB inflation fan
charts. For the BoE and the Riksbank, however, we cannot link dissenting views to the
width of fan charts. Yet, there is statistical evidence that the more minority voters dissent
from the majority’s vote on the level of the monetary policy instrument, the more skewed
are the forecast inflation fan charts published in the monetary policy reports. Therefore, we
argue that dissent in voting is a reason for forecasting risk to accommodate and communicate
minority views about monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on
the data we use. Section 3 sets up our hypotheses, the corresponding regression models, and
presents test results. Section 4 studies possible effects of hawkish and dovish interest rate
voting on the shape of inflation fan charts. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Fan Chart Width and Skewness
To measure the width of the fan charts for inflation, we use the forecast standard deviation
as the most common measure for forecast uncertainty. The BoE’s, the MNB’s and the Riks-
bank’s inflation forecasts have a two-piece normal (tpn) distribution.2 The tpn distribution
is described for instance by Wallis (2012). Given values for the mode, the mean and a disper-
sion parameter, one can easily calculate the standard deviation of a tpn-distributed variable
following the manual in Wallis (2004).
The BoE provides on its website all parameters needed for calculating the standard
deviation. These are the BoE’s central projection which is a mode forecast, an average of
likely alternatives which is the mean forecast, and a measure of uncertainty which is the
2For further details on the fan charts of BoE, MNB, and Riksbank, see Britton et al. (1998), the MNB’s
Quarterly Report on Inflation of May 2004, and Blix and Sellin (1999), respectively. Further work using the
tpn distribution in the context of central bank forecasting is provided by Novo and Pinheiro (2005).
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dispersion parameter.3 All three central banks under study publish a mode forecast as the
central projection for inflation. Yet, from the required parameters listed above, the MNB and
the Riksbank do not publish mean forecasts and dispersion parameters. In addition to their
mode forecasts, the MNB publishes quantiles belonging to 30%, 60%, and 90% confidence
bands, while the Riksbank publishes quantiles belonging to 50%, 75% and 90% confidence
bands. To the modes and quantiles available we fit a tpn distribution as proposed by García
and Manzanares (2007) to back out the relevant parameters for calculation of the standard
deviation. Further details on the procedure are described by Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld
(2012) on the basis of the Riksbank data set. The resulting standard deviation series for
inflation for the BoE, the MNB and the Riksbank are denoted by σpi,t+h|t. The forecast
horizon is indexed by h = 0, . . . ,H. Once the standard deviations for all periods across
forecast horizons are retrieved from the fan charts, we can easily calculate a measure of
forecast risk known as Pearson mode skewness:
κt+h|t ≡
piet+h|t − pit+h|t
σpi,t+h|t
. (2.1)
The mean forecast for inflation, made in period t for period t + h, is denoted by piet+h|t, the
corresponding mode forecast is denoted by pit+h|t. The Pearson mode skewness is a scale-free
measure of forecast risk, whose desirable test properties for evaluating macroeconomic risk
forecasts have been investigated in Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2011). The Pearson mode
skewness is closely related to the original BoE (and, hence, MNB and Riksbank) definition
of forecast inflation risk, given by the difference between the mean forecast, piet+h|t, and the
mode forecast, pit+h|t. This difference is simply scaled by the forecast standard deviation.
The Pearson mode skewness will be the measure of the asymmetry of the fan charts in the
following analysis.
The BoE data set of forecasts, made conditional on interest rates as expected by market
participants, ranges from 1998Q1 to 2011Q2 and thus over 54 quarters. The BoE publishes
a nowcast and forecasts for up to two years out such that the maximum forecast horizon is
H = 8.4 For the MNB, we can back out the nowcasts and forecasts for up to seven quarters
out from 2002Q4 to 2011Q2, where 2008Q4 is missing.5,6 Since the attributed voting record
3See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/irprobab.htm.
4In addition to market-rate forecasts, BoE risk and uncertainty forecasts made under the assumption that
interest rates remain constant over the forecast horizon are available from 1997Q4 on. Since 2004Q3, the BoE
publishes market-rate forecasts for up to three years ahead.
5The MNB inflation forecasts used in this study were made assuming a constant repo rate over the fore-
casting period. With the Quarterly Report on Inflation of March 2011, the MNB forecasts are based on
endogenous monetary policy.
6The forecast data for 2008Q4 is missing because, as stated in the MNB November 2008 Quarterly Report
on Inflation, p.7, “The November projection was produced in a much more uncertain financial and macroeco-
nomic environment compared with previous years. Therefore, we departed from the past practice of building
the forecast around a central estimate.”
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Figure 2.1: Disagreement in the Bank of England’s monthly interest rate decisions
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
−25
−12.5
0
12.5
25
Note: The bars show the degree of disagreement, calculated as the difference between the average of the
members’ preferred interest rate and the level of the official bank rate agreed upon in the MPC meeting,
measured in basis points.
of the MNB begins in 2005Q4, we have to skip the first 12 quarters of the inflation forecast
dataset for the regression analysis. Overall, we have 22 observations for each of the seven
forecast horizons, and H = 6. For the Riksbank, we use monthly forecasts starting with the
first publication date of December 1999. Potentially asymmetric fan charts were discontinued
in October 2006, such that this date marks the end of the Riksbank sample used in this
study.7 From the 24 forecast horizons available, we choose the month of an Inflation Report
publication to be the nowcast date. Then, we select every third forecast to achieve a quarterly
timing, with the maximum number of forecast horizons being H = 7. The sample starts in
1999Q4, ends in 2006Q4 and comprises 27 observations for each of the eight forecast horizons,
since the data of the first Inflation Report of 2000 are not available and for 2006, only three
Inflation Reports were published.
2.2.2 Individual and Aggregate Interest Rate Decisions
BoE, MNB and Riksbank publish the individual interest rate votes of the committee members
and the underlying motivation in form of minutes of the monetary policy meetings. For further
user convenience, all three central banks issue regularly updated voting spreadsheets which
contain the entire histories of interest rate voting.
For the BoE, we consider 162 monthly MPC decisions on the official bank rate from
1998Q1 to 2011Q2 to match the time span of the available inflation forecast data.8 To create
individual interest rate series for all past and present members for a current month, we take
the level of the official bank rate from a previous month and add the individually desired
7The Riksbank inflation forecasts are made conditional on a constant interest rate assumption up to the
third Inflation Report of 2005.
8The historical interest voting spreadsheet starts with the interest rate decision of June 1997 and is available
under www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/decisions.htm.
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interest rate change from the current monthly meeting. The resulting ‘member interest rates’
are denoted imt , where m indexes the number of members such that m = 1, . . . ,M .
To investigate fan chart width using the forecast standard deviation as uncertainty
measure requires a corresponding measure that gauges the degree of disagreement on the
monetary policy decisions. To this extent, we calculate the root mean squared deviations of
the member interest rates from the aggregate interest rate decision, it:
dσ,t ≡
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
m=1
(imt − it)2. (2.2)
We name this variable dσ,t ‘interest rate deviation’, where the letter d synonymously implies
disagreement, dissent, deviation or dissension. The subscript σ indicates that we use this
measure in the context of fan chart width only. Using squared deviations prevents that
negative and positive dissent cancel each other out, although such occasions are extremely
rare, as already noted by Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
To generate a measure for the degree of disagreement that corresponds to the Pearson
mode skewness, we first average the individual interest rate series over all M members of the
MPC to obtain i¯t, the ‘member’s average rate’.9 Then, we calculate the difference between
this member’s average rate and the MPC’s aggregate interest rate decision:
dκ,t ≡ i¯t − it, i¯t = 1
M
M∑
m=1
imt . (2.3)
The advantages of this measure of the degree of disagreement is that it preserves the direction
of dissent and thus potentially allows to discuss qualitative aspects of dissenting views. More-
over, it has the characteristic of a mean-mode difference, since the majority decision on the
instrument can be interpreted as a modal value. Appropriately, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) terms
this measure for committee disagreement ‘skew’. As we will elaborate on issues of forecast
inflation skewness throughout this paper, we name this variable dκ,t the ‘interest rate skew’
to avoid any ambiguities. Moreover, we use dκ,t to measure the degree of disagreement on
monetary policy when analyzing fan chart skewness only. As an example for dissent in central
bank voting, figure 2.1 shows the monthly interest rate skew series for the BoE, as calculated
using definition (2.3).
The two monthly series dσ,t and dκ,t are converted to quarterly periodicity by simply
selecting the values of every first month of the quarter, i.e. from January, April, July and
October. We do so in order to avoid endogeneity, since the BoE inflation reports are published
9The BoE MPC is regularly made up of nine members, with Governor Mervin King having the casting vote
when no majority is achieved. The number of attendants of the MPC policy meetings, however, has varied
occasionally.
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in the mid-quarter months February, May, August and November. Thus, the index t =
1, . . . , T refers to the date of the quarterly inflation report publication of the BoE in the
following. Moreover, the new quarterly measures of the degree of disagreement are denoted
by dσ,t−τ for the interest rate deviation and by dκ,t−τ for the interest rate skew, respectively.
Yet, the subscript t − τ = 1, . . . , T indicates that data stems from the month before the
publication of the Inflation Report.
For the MNB, the publication practice follows the same timing as those of the BoE,
so that we can proceed in the same fashion, using the monthly interest rate decisions of the
Monetary Council (MC) on the level of the base rate. Before September 2005, the voting
record of the MNB has been unattributed, that is, no individual interest rate changes are
available. Yet, for the period 2005Q4 to 2011Q2 we can calculate monthly dissent series.
We have to number inflation forecasts by n = 1, . . . , N , however, since the 2008Q4 inflation
forecast is missing. After time-matching the two disagreement series to the forecast data, we
are left with a sample of both 22 quarterly observations in the interest rate deviation series
dσ,n−τ and the interest rate skew series dκ,n−τ .10
Individual interest rate decisions of the Riksbank’s Executive Board (EB) members are
available from January 1999 onwards. In case of the Riksbank, τ can sometimes imply a delay
of almost two months for the inflation forecasts to follow the interest rate decisions. That is,
the Inflation Report may follow up to eight weeks after the policy meeting where interest rates
are set. Table 2.5 shows the detailed announcement dates t − τ [MNB, Riksbank: n − τ ] of
the interest rate decisions and the publication dates t [MNB, Riksbank: n] for the respective
inflation reports of the three central banks under study.11 Because earlier Riksbank interest
rate decision and forecast publication dates are unequally spaced, we take the dates of the
numbered inflation forecasts and select the interest rate votes from the meeting preceding the
Inflation Report. Therefore, for the Riksbank data, n− τ in the following simply means ‘one
time before n’ and refers to the previous meeting before the current inflation report forecasts,
where n denotes the publication date of the report. Again, we calculate the interest rate
deviation dσ,n−τ and the interest rate skew dκ,n−τ according to the definitions (2.2) and (2.3)
and obtain series with both 27 observations matching the Riksbank inflation forecast series.12
Figure 2.2 shows the quarterly measures of the degree of disagreement for the BoE (top
row), the MNB (middle row) and the Riskbank (bottom row). The left panels show bar plots
of interest rate deviation, based on definition (2.2). The right panels show plots of interest
10The “voting records of the Monetary Council members” are available online under
english.mnb.hu/Monetaris_politika/decision-making/voting-records-of-the-mc-members.
11Usually, the monetary policy meetings last over two days, and the second day sees the announcement of
the interest rate decisions. Hence, meeting dates and announcement dates coincide. Yet, the publication date
of the minutes of the policy meeting is not an issue in the ex-post perspective we concentrate on.
12For the sake of convenience, in the following hypothetical explanations and setting-up of models will only
be made using the t− τ subscripting.
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Figure 2.2: Disagreement in central bank’s interest rate decisions
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Note: Bar plots show the quarterly interest rate deviation (left panels) and interest rate skew (right panels)
for the Bank of England, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the Sveriges Riksbank, where the bars’ height shows
the degree of disagreement measured in basis points.
rate skew, based on definition (2.3). In these quarterly series, there is dissent in 33 out of
56 BoE MPC meetings held in the first month of a quarter. In absolute terms, the average
degree of disagreement in first-month-of-quarter meetings measures about 5.5 basis points
(5.49 basis points). For the MNB, we have in our sample 22 meetings held in a first month of
quarter. Only 5 meetings show unanimous interest rate decisions of the Monetary Council,
and the average absolute deviation from the aggregate decision is 7.25 basis points. For the
Riksbank, the bar plots show much less unanimity, and only 8 out of 27 meetings are marked
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by dissent. In these meetings, the average absolute deviation measures roughly 7 basis points
(6.98 basis points).
2.3 Investigating Fan Chart Width and Skewness
2.3.1 Two Options to Accomodate Minority Views
“Although not every member will agree with every assumption on which our pro-
jections are based, the fan charts represent the MPC’s best collective judgement
about the most likely paths for inflation [...], and the uncertainties surrounding
those central projections.”
— Introductory note in the Bank of England Inflation Report.
The introductory note printed in the BoE Inflation Reports already hints at a relation-
ship between minority views on conditioning assumptions and the fan charts. Moreover, in
their description of the BoE’s iterative forecasting process, Britton et al. (1998) state that
MPC and bank staff at their initial meeting, shortly after the MPC decision of the mid-
quarter months, discuss “the key assumptions, the main issues and the starting-point for the
risk assessment” and that after that meeting, “the forecast team map the decisions of the
MPC onto a central projection and risk distribution.”
To investigate how width and skewness of inflation-targeting central banks’ fan charts
are determined, we consider the following stylized but, for BoE, MNB and Riksbank alike,
realistic scenario, bearing the description of Britton et al. (1998) in mind. In every monetary
policy meeting, individual members of the decision-making body come up with their individual
assessment of the future economic environment, i.e., members have their own forecasts of the
target variable inflation.13 Given his individual inflation forecast, each committee member has
a preference for the level of the instrument which is his best approximation of the unobservable
optimal rate, subject to the constraint that the interest rate choice usually obeys a 25-basis-
point steps structure, see Gerlach-Kristen (2004). The member’s individually desired level of
the instrument may coincide with the level resulting from the interest rate step proposed by
the chairman, but it may also be different from that proposal.
The level of the policy instrument to be set determines the future path of the target
variable, and ideally, inflation two years ahead is kept on or brought back to target. Voters
who see the interest rate proposal of the chairman to be consistent with their own desired
interest rate path, based on their individual inflation forecast, will support the proposal, while
the others will vote against the proposal. The majority of voters that have supported the
aggregate interest rate decision will agree upon a joint central projection consistent with the
13We solely concentrate on inflation forecasts in this paper and neglect GDP issues.
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interest rate choice. A different instrument level, however, is consistent with a future inflation
path different from the central projection. A dissenting member that has voted for a different
level of the instrument will argue that the aggregate interest rate decision is inappropriate
such that inflation can be expected to differ from the central projection. If a hawkish minority
votes for monetary policy tightening such that i¯t > it, minority voters may see inflationary
pressure, for instance arising from relaxed credit conditions, and expect future inflation to lie
above the level that the majority finds to correspond to the aggregate interest rate decision.
Vice versa, if a minority votes for a looser monetary policy and considers the interest rate set
too high, it will expect inflation to undershoot the majority’s view.
If there are dissenting views about the future path of inflation, and central bank com-
munication is supposed to subtly transport these views without blurring the central tendency
agreed upon, we see basically two ways to incorporate minority views into the fan charts.
First, the uncertainty bands surrounding the central projection can simply be widened. The
central projection is then surrounded by confidence bands such that majority and minority
positions alike are accommodated. This task can easily be accomplished, though, but may
not be an option in practice. Uncertainty itself is a forecast object and the expected range
of possible outcomes is an important source of information that draws public attention and
potentially influences private sector expectations.
As the BoE, the MNB and the Riksbank all use a tpn distribution for their forecasts,
there might be a second option to incorporate minority views. The central tendency, or, the
central projection, or, simply, the point forecast for inflation of all three central banks is a
mode forecast. The mode forecast is the single most likely outcome. The tpn distribution
can be asymmetric, so that the mean can differ from the mode. The mean forecast can
be used to summarize dissenting views on future inflation and may serve as an average of
likely alternative outcomes. Hence, it could be that dissent on interest rates, which are the
conditioning assumption for the subsequent inflation forecast, translate into forecast skewness
of the aggregate inflation forecast density to accommodate minority views.
2.3.2 Regression Models
Widening and skewing the fan charts are not necessarily mutually exclusive options. However,
both can be addressed by simple regression-based tests. To check whether the fan charts of
the inflation forecasts will widen with more disagreement about monetary policy, we regress
the inflation forecast standard deviation on a constant and the interest rate deviation:
σt+h|t = ασ + βσdσ,t−τ + εt, E(εt) = 0. (2.4)
Particularly important is the impact of the degree of disagreement, whose strength is measured
by βσ. If disagreement about monetary policy translates into fan chart width, we would expect
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an estimate for βσ to be significantly positive. Hence, we should be able to reject the single
hypothesis βσ = 0, but not βσ > 0.
As regards dissent in voting as determinant of fan charts skewness, we analyze whether
the Pearson mode skewness is responsive to a change in interest rate skew:
κt+h|t = ακ + βκdκ,t−τ + ηt, E(ηt) = 0. (2.5)
Here, we are interested in the impact of dissent in voting on fan chart skewness, whose strength
is measured by βκ. We would want to reject βκ = 0, but not βκ > 0, which implies that more
disagreement on the level of interest rates results in larger forecast inflation risk. In that
case, minority views favoring higher [lower] interest rates are captured by forecast upwards
[downward] risks to inflation.
2.3.3 Results
Results for estimating equation (2.4) by OLS are shown in Table 2.1. For all three central
banks, estimates of the coefficient ασ grow across forecast horizons, which implies increasing
forecast uncertainty the farther out the central bank forecasts. Hence, it represents the
fanning-out of the confidence intervals around a baseline forecast. For the BoE and the
Riksbank, we find no support for the hypothesis that disagreement about the level of the
monetary policy instrument leads to wider fan charts. For the BoE, estimates for βσ are
negative for all forecast horizons, but estimation uncertainty is extremely large so that nothing
is significant. The Riksbank’s coefficient estimates for βσ are near zero in magnitude and
insignificant. OLS estimates of the MNB intercept term are all significant at the 1% level.
With exception of the nowcast, estimates of the intercept are larger than those of the BoE
and Riksbank for h > 0. In contrast to BoE and Riksbank, disagreement on MNB monetary
policy seems to widen the inflation fan charts, as implied by positive estimates for βσ being
significant at the 5% level for forecast horizons 1 to 4. For h = 5, the coefficient estimate
is siginificant at the 10% level, for h = 6 at the 1% level. As the coefficient estimates grow
with the horizon, it seems that dissenting views on interest rates become a more important
determinant of fan chart width for forecasts farther out. This is particularly interesting since
the forecasts are made conditional on a constant interest rates assumption, such that no
interest rate variation to be expected in the future drives the degree of uncertainty.14
OLS estimation results for equation (2.5) are shown in Table 2.2. The intercept terms
for all central banks and for all horizons except the MNB nowcast horizon are estimated close
to but slightly above zero. The BoE and Riksbank results shown for βκ are in support of
our hypothesis that dissent is informative about the asymmetry of the inflation fan charts.
14Yet, forecasts for 2011Q1 and 2011Q2 are made ‘conditional’ on central bank expectations.
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Table 2.1: Effects of monetary policy committee dissent on fan charts width
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
ασ 0.30 0.44** 0.56*** 0.65*** 0.68** 0.73** 0.80 0.88 0.93
(0.73) (0.21) (0.18) (0.22) (0.29) (0.34) (0.55) (1.95) (3.23)
βσ -0.01 -0.08 -0.12 -0.14 -0.10 -0.21 -0.31 -0.43 -0.49
(7.96) (3.39) (3.50) (4.85) (6.53) (5.58) (5.93) (11.27) (18.60)
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
ασ 0.23*** 0.55*** 0.72*** 1.06*** 1.34*** 1.46*** 1.62***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.18) (0.19)
βσ -0.02** 0.05** 0.30** 0.35** 0.40** 0.68* 0.80***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) (0.24)
Sveriges Riksbank
ασ 0.30*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.73*** 0.84*** 0.96*** 1.09***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
βσ 0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.09) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Sample ranges: Bank of England -
1998Q1 to 2011Q2 (56 observations), Magyar Nemzeti Bank - 2005Q4 to 2011Q2 (22 observations), Sveriges
Riksbank - 1999Q4 to 2006Q3 (27 observations).
For the BoE, dissent in voting on the official bank rate translates into fan chart skewness
for forecast horizons of up to six quarters ahead. Estimates of βκ are significant at the 5%
level for the nowcast and up to five quarters ahead and significant at the 10% level for one
and a half year out. Although we find insignificant estimates for h = 7, 8, the coefficients’
magnitude ranges between 0.50 and 0.57 over all forecast horizons.
The results are even stronger for the Riksbank. Except for the insignificant impact of
dissent on nowcast skewness, the coefficient steadily grows over the forecast horizons, ranging
between 0.45 for one quarter ahead and 1.21 for seven quarters out. The impact of dissent
on fan chart skewness is significant at the 5% level for h = 1, 2, 6, 7 and at the 10% level for
h = 3, 4, 5. For the MNB, however, we do not find any relationship between interest rate skew
and fan chart skewness, reflected by insignificant coefficient estimates which are basically zero
in magnitude.
To sum up, dissent in voting on MNB monetary policy results in wider fan charts,
but does not affect forecast skewness in any way. In particular, the interest rate deviation
is positively correlated with the forecast inflation standard deviation, while the interest rate
skew shows no significant correlation with the forecast Pearson mode skewness for inflation.
For the BoE and the Riksbank, in turn, fan chart width is unaffected by dissent in voting. The
BoE’s forecast fan charts for up to five quarters ahead and all Riksbank’s fan charts except
the nowcast fan chart, we find a significant relationship between the degree of disagreement on
the level of the instrument, as measured by the interest rate skew, and the forecast Pearson
mode skewness for inflation. That is, at the BoE and the Riksbank, minority views are
accommodated by skewing the inflation forecast density.
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Table 2.2: Effects of monetary policy committee dissent on fan chart skewness
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
ακ 0.04** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05* 0.05 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
βκ 0.52** 0.53** 0.51** 0.51** 0.50** 0.54* 0.56 0.56 0.57
(0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.29) (0.40) (0.50) (0.56)
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
ακ -0.01 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
βκ 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Sveriges Riksbank
ακ 0.00 0.03* 0.02** 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
βκ 0.07 0.45** 0.68** 0.76* 0.98* 1.04* 1.13** 1.21**
(0.07) (0.21) (0.33) (0.44) (0.54) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Sample ranges: Bank of England -
1998Q1 to 2011Q2 (54 observations), Magyar Nemzeti Bank - 2005Q4 to 2011Q2 (22 observations), Sveriges
Riksbank - 1999Q4 to 2006Q3 (27 observations).
2.4 Accounting for Hawkish and Dovish Voting
2.4.1 Individual Monetary Policy Stances
Monetary policy makers are often classified into hawks, favoring tighter monetary policy, and
doves, opting for relaxed monetary policy. Table 2.6 shows such a classification based on
average dissent, i.e. classified by checking whether the deviation of the individual member’s
interest rate from the aggregate interest rate decision was on average positive or negative
during the term in the committee. Besides hawks and doves, a third group can be made
up by of those that (on average) vote with the majority. For the BoE, we find both eleven
hawkish and dovish members, while nine members show no dissent in voting on average. Sir
Edward George as the BoE Governor until June 2006, however, has to be taken out since
his interest rate proposals always achieved the necessary majority, thus he never ‘dissented’.
For the MNB, we identify eight hawkish and seven dovish members while five members show
no dissent in voting. Of the Riksbank’s ten Executive Board members of the sample period
there is one hawkish versus three dovish members, while the other members show no dissent
on average.
2.4.2 Regression Models
Since members of monetary policy committee change from time to time, and the individual
monetary policy stance of a new member may not necessarily coincide with the one of its
predecessor, we cannot build long time series measuring the individual degree of disagreement
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for estimating a panel model. Rather, we classify the voting sessions themselves into hawkish
and dovish rounds. A hawkish voting round is marked by a negative interest rate skew, such
that the members’ average interest rate falls short of the aggregate interest rate decision.
This implies that that at least one dovish member and hence a dovish minority was outvoted.
To the contrary, a dovish voting round is marked by positive interest rate skew, with the
members’ average rate exceeding the aggregate interest rate decision. This indicates that at
least one hawk has been outvoted.
To this extent, we build two indicator variables for hawkish and dovish voting rounds:
IHt =
1, if dκ,t−τ < 00 else , IDt =
1, if dκ,t−τ > 00 else . (2.6)
These indicator variables are used in rewritten versions of the models (2.4) and (2.5) to control
for potentially asymmetric effects of voting, in particular to gauge the impact of hawkish and
dovish voting on fan chart width and skewness. The resulting regression model to analyze
fan chart width is given by
σt+h|t = ασ + βHσ IHt dσ,t−τ + βDσ IDt dσ,t−τ + εt, E(εt) = 0. (2.7)
If hawkish [dovish] dissent widens the fan charts, an estimate of βHσ [βDσ ] should be significantly
positive. The magnitude of the estimates should be equal if on average hawks and doves are
equally often outvoted. For analyzing effects on the fan charts’ skewness, we estimate the
model
κt+h|t = ακ + βHκ IHt dκ,t−τ + βDκ IDt dκ,t−τ + ηt, E(ηt) = 0, (2.8)
such that the estimates for parameters βHκ and βDκ capture the impact of hawkish and dovish
voting on forecast inflation skewness.
2.4.3 Results
Results for estimating equation (2.7) by OLS are shown in Table 2.3. For the BoE and
the Riksbank, we do not find any statistical evidence that minority views translate into fan
chart width. Accounting for hawkish and dovish voting round yields no additional insights
compared to the results from Table 2.1.
For the MNB, however, the widening impact of hawkish voting is significant at least
at the 10% level. While the coefficient estimates for βHσ are close to zero for the nowcast and
one quarter ahead, estimates are significantly positive for h = 2, . . . , 6 and ascend from 0.51
and 1.38. This implies a strong influence of hawkish voting on the width of the fan charts, in
particular for h = 5 and h = 6, where the coefficient estimates are significant at the 5% level
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Table 2.3: Effects of hawkish and dovish monetary policy meetings on fan chart width
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
ασ 0.30*** 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.74*** 0.81*** 0.88*** 0.93***
(0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
βHσ -0.30 -0.54 -0.69 -0.78 -0.79 -0.89 -0.97 -1.05 -1.13
(0.44) (0.56) (0.70) (0.79) (0.82) (0.84) (0.88) (0.90) (0.90)
βDσ 0.34 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.55 0.41 0.25 0.07 0.01
(0.77) (1.12) (1.35) (1.44) (1.46) (1.48) (1.72) (1.96) (2.08)
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
ασ 0.23*** 0.54*** 0.71*** 1.05*** 1.33*** 1.43*** 1.58***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14)
βHσ -0.03* 0.09* 0.51* 0.59* 0.68* 1.16** 1.38**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.26) (0.30) (0.35) (0.55) (0.60)
βDσ -0.01** 0.04** 0.24** 0.29** 0.33** 0.56*** 0.66***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.21)
Sveriges Riksbank
ασ 0.30*** 0.39*** 0.49*** 0.60*** 0.74*** 0.84*** 0.96*** 1.09***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
βHσ 0.08 -0.06 -0.14 -0.10 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13
(0.12) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
βDσ 0.06 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Sample ranges: Bank of England -
1998Q1 to 2011Q2 (54 observations), Magyar Nemzeti Bank - 2005Q4 to 2011Q2 (22 observations), Sveriges
Riksbank - 1999Q4 to 2006Q3 (27 observations).
and exceed unity. A weaker but nonetheless clearly detectable influence on forecast inflation
uncertainty comes from the doves, where the coefficient estimates ascend from 0.24 for h = 2
to 0.66 for h = 6. Estimates for βDσ are significant at the 5% [1%] level for forecast horizons
h = 0, . . . , 4 [h = 5, 6]. One possible explanation for this finding could be that Hungarian
inflation has been in excess of the target of 3% annual CPI inflation, with a median excess
of 2.01. Loose monetary policy as implied by dovish voting, however, is probably the wrong
signal to the public if the central projection has to convey that the central bank will credibly
aim at hitting the inflation target at the policy horizon. Thus, from the bank’s perspective,
the MNB accommodates dovish voters, but to the public, votes on loose monetary policy are
veiled by wider confidence bands.
OLS estimation results for equation (2.8) are shown in Table 2.4. The BoE’s dovish
voters have no impact on the fan chart skewness, as the insignificant estimates of βDκ close to
zero reveal. The impact of hawkish voting on the nowcast and on forecasts for five quarters
out, however, is significant at the 5% level, with a coefficient estimate ranging closely around
unity. This could be interpreted as such that the fan charts are skewed to accommodate dovish
voting, while a hawkish regime in general prevails. Such an interpretation is supported by
results from Hix, Høyland, and Vivyan (2010), who estimate MPC member monetary policy
preferences and find a clear tendency toward hawkishness.
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Table 2.4: Effects of hawkish and dovish monetary policy meetings on fan chart skewness
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
ακ 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.06** 0.06** 0.07** 0.07* 0.07 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
βHκ 1.06** 1.03** 1.03** 0.98** 0.97** 1.04** 0.99 0.93 0.93
(0.49) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.51) (0.75) (0.99) (1.13)
βDκ -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.09 0.11
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.64) (0.79) (0.90)
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
ακ -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
βHκ 0.07 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 -0.14 -0.24
(0.09) (0.03) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.20) (0.22)
βDκ 0.04 -0.01** 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Sveriges Riksbank
ακ 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
βHκ 0.07 0.38 0.27 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.07
(0.24) (0.29) (0.43) (0.62) (0.79) (0.72) (0.64) (0.57)
βDκ 0.08 0.48* 0.89* 1.01* 1.41** 1.49** 1.64** 1.78***
(0.19) (0.26) (0.44) (0.57) (0.68) (0.68) (0.66) (0.64)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Sample ranges: Bank of England -
1998Q1 to 2011Q2 (54 observations), Magyar Nemzeti Bank - 2005Q4 to 2011Q2 (22 observations), Sveriges
Riksbank - 1999Q4 to 2006Q3 (27 observations).
For the Riksbank, in turn, we can find no relationship between hawkish voting and
forecast risk. It is rather the case that the doves determine the fan chart skewness for all
forecast horizons except the nowcast. For h = 1, . . . , 7, the estimates increase steadily from
0.48 to 1.78, being significant at the 10% level for up to one year out and at the 5% level
for horizons farther out. For seven quarters out, the impact of dovish voting is significant
even at the 1% level. Based on the classification of Table 2.6, it seems plausible that a dovish
majority accommodates hawkish voters with skewing the fan charts, although the cross-
sectional dimension is very small to allow final conclusions on this. Yet, for the MNB, we
cannot make any conclusions, since all coefficients estimated are very close to zero, although
βDκ for h = 2 is significant.
Summing up, we find that at the MNB, in case of dissent in voting, both hawkish and
dovish minority views lead to wider fan charts, where the impact of hawkish voting on the
forecast inflation standard deviation is stronger than that of dovish voting. Yet, forecast
inflation skewness remains unaffected by disagreement on monetary policy at the MNB. To
the contrary, for the BoE and the Riksbank there is no relationship between minority views
on interest rates and forecast uncertainty detectable. Minority views on BoE and Riksbank
monetary policy, though, translate into the skewness of the forecast inflation fan charts. The
BoE’s on-average hawkish MPC accommodates dovish voting, while the on-average more
dovish EB of the Riksbank incorporates hawkish minorities into skewness of the fan charts.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this study we investigated if dissent in voting on monetary policy affects the shape of the
forecast inflation fan charts of the Bank of England, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank. These three inflation targeting banks were subject of the analysis because
they are the only central banks to use identical approaches for generating density forecasts
and in addition to publish detailed interest rate voting information for the sample periods
considered.
Using simple OLS regressions, we obtained statistical evidence that there is a relation-
ship between the degree of disagreement on the level of the policy instrument and the shape
of inflation fan charts. In particular, we find that the Magyar Nemzeti Bank fan charts get
wider when the degree of disagreement is higher. We do not find such a relationship for
the Bank of England and the Sveriges Riksbank. Rather, we find that minority views are
accommodated by skewing the fan charts, such that disagreement on monetary policy, mea-
sured by the difference between the members’ average interest rate and the aggregate interest
rate decision, translates into forecast inflation risks. For the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, in turn,
forecast risks seem to be unrelated to dissent in voting.
When controlling for hawkish and dovish voting behavior, we find that Magyar Nemzeti
Bank hawks and doves alike determine the fan chart width, although the impact of the hawkish
voters is significantly stronger. This can be interpreted such that the width of inflation fan
charts is adjusted to rather accommodate dovish voting. For the Bank of England and the
Sveriges Riksbank, fan chart width remains unrelated to voting. There is statistical evidence,
however, that a hawkish minority is accommodated by a more in inflation fan chart skewness
at the Sveriges Riksbank, where the Executive Board is on average rather dovish. To the
contrary, the rather hawkish Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England incorporates
dovish voting on the official bank rate into more skewed forecast inflation fan charts.
Overall, we conclude that dissenting views in monetary policy committees voting on
central banks’ level of the policy instrument are a significant determinant of the shape of
forecast inflation fan charts.
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Table 2.5: Timing of central banks’ interest rate announcements and inflation report pub-
lications
Bank of England Magyar Nezemti Bank Sveriges Riksbank
announcement publication announcement publication annoucement publication
official bank Inflation base rate Report on repo rate Inflation
rate Report Inflation Report
t− τ t n− τ n n− τ n
1998Q1 08.01.1998 11.02.1998
1998Q2 09.04.1998 13.05.1998
1998Q3 09.07.1998 12.08.1998
1998Q4 08.10.1998 11.11.1998
1999Q1 07.01.1999 10.02.1999
1999Q2 08.04.1999 12.05.1999
1999Q3 08.07.1999 11.08.1999
1999Q4 07.10.1999 10.11.1999 11.11.1999 09.12.1999
2000Q1 13.01.2000 17.02.2000 (03.02.2000) (23.03.2000)
2000Q2 06.04.2000 10.05.2000 04.05.2000 08.06.2000
2000Q3 06.07.2000 09.08.2000 16.08.2000 10.10.2000
2000Q4 05.10.2000 16.11.2000 09.10.2000 07.12.2000
2001Q1 11.01.2001 14.02.2001 01.02.2001 27.03.2001
2001Q2 05.04.2001 23.05.2001 26.04.2001 31.05.2001
2001Q3 05.07.2001 08.08.2001 17.09.2001 16.10.2001
2001Q4 04.10.2001 14.11.2001 15.10.2001 05.12.2001
2002Q1 10.01.2002 13.02.2002 07.02.2002 19.03.2002
2002Q2 04.04.2002 15.05.2002 25.04.2002 06.06.2002
2002Q3 04.07.2002 07.08.2002 15.08.2002 17.10.2002
2002Q4 10.10.2002 13.11.2002 14.11.2002 05.12.2002
2003Q1 09.01.2003 12.02.2003 06.02.2003 18.03.2003
2003Q2 10.04.2003 15.05.2003 24.04.2003 05.06.2003
2003Q3 10.07.2003 13.08.2003 14.08.2003 16.10.2003
2003Q4 09.10.2003 12.11.2003 15.10.2003 05.12.2003
2004Q1 08.01.2004 11.02.2004 31.03.2004 30.04.2004
2004Q2 08.04.2004 12.05.2004 28.04.2004 28.05.2004
2004Q3 08.07.2004 11.08.2004 19.08.2004 14.10.2004
2004Q4 07.10.2004 10.11.2004 13.10.2004 09.12.2004
2005Q1 13.01.2005 16.02.2005 27.01.2005 15.03.2005
2005Q2 07.04.2005 11.05.2005 28.04.2005 21.06.2005
2005Q3 07.07.2005 10.08.2005 23.08.2005 20.10.2005
2005Q4 06.10.2005 16.11.2005 24.10.2005 28.11.2005 19.10.2005 02.12.2005
2006Q1 12.01.2006 15.02.2006 23.01.2006 27.02.2006 19.01.2006 23.02.2006
2006Q2 06.04.2006 10.05.2006 24.04.2006 22.05.2006 27.04.2006 20.06.2006
2006Q3 06.07.2006 09.08.2006 24.07.2006 28.08.2006 29.08.2006 26.10.2006
2006Q4 05.10.2006 15.11.2006 24.10.2006 20.11.2006
2007Q1 11.01.2007 14.02.2007 22.01.2007 26.02.2007
2007Q2 05.04.2007 16.05.2007 23.04.2007 21.05.2007
2007Q3 05.07.2007 08.08.2007 23.07.2007 27.08.2007
2007Q4 04.10.2007 14.11.2007 29.10.2007 26.11.2007
2008Q1 10.01.2008 13.02.2008 21.01.2008 25.02.2008
2008Q2 10.04.2008 14.05.2008 28.04.2008 26.05.2008
2008Q3 10.07.2008 13.08.2008 21.07.2008 25.08.2008
2008Q4 08.10.2008 12.11.2008 (20.10.2008) (24.11.2008)
2009Q1 08.01.2009 11.02.2009 19.01.2009 23.02.2009/25.02.2009‡
2009Q2 09.04.2009 13.05.2009 20.04.2009 25.05.2009/27.05.2009‡
2009Q3 09.07.2009 12.08.2009 27.07.2009 24.08.2009/26.08.2009‡
2009Q4 08.10.2009 11.11.2009 19.10.2009 23.11.2009/25.11.2009‡
2010Q1 07.01.2010 10.02.2010 25.01.2010 22.02.2010/24.02.2010‡
2010Q2 08.04.2010 12.05.2010 26.04.2010 31.05.2010/02.06.2010‡
2010Q3 08.07.2010 11.08.2010 19.07.2010 25.08.2010
2010Q4 07.10.2010 10.11.2010 25.10.2010 29.11.2010/01.12.2010‡
2011Q1 10.02.2011 16.02.2011 28.03.2011 28.03.2011/30.03.2011‡
2011Q2 05.05.2011 11.05.2011 20.06.2011 20.06.2011/22.06.2011‡
Notes: Magyar Nezmeti Bank - Dates in parentheses denote missing data. The forecasts from the Report
on Inflation of 20.10.2008 are not available. The symbol ‡ marks dates where the projections for inflation
and output were already released two working days before the official publication date of the Report on
Inflation. Sveriges Riksbank - Dates in parentheses denote missing data. The forecasts from the 2000Q1
Inflation Report from 23.03.2000 are not available.
Ta
bl
e
2.
6:
Ty
pe
ca
st
in
g
of
m
on
et
ar
y
po
lic
y
co
m
m
itt
ee
m
em
be
rs
by
m
ea
su
rin
g
av
er
ag
e
di
ss
en
t
B
an
k
of
E
ng
la
nd
M
ag
ya
r
N
em
ze
ti
B
an
k
Sv
er
ig
es
R
ik
sb
an
k
M
on
et
ar
y
Po
lic
y
Av
er
ag
e
di
ss
en
t
M
on
et
ar
y
Av
er
ag
e
di
ss
en
t
E
xe
cu
tiv
e
Av
er
ag
e
di
ss
en
t
C
om
m
itt
ee
fr
om
offi
ci
al
T
yp
e
C
ou
nc
il
fr
om
T
yp
e
B
oa
rd
fr
om
T
yp
e
m
em
be
r
ba
nk
ra
te
m
em
be
r
re
po
ra
te
m
em
be
r
re
po
ra
te
Si
r
E
dw
ar
d
G
eo
rg
e
0.
00
·
Pé
te
r
A
da
m
ec
z
0.
06
H
V
ill
y
B
er
gs
tr
öm
-0
.0
0
D
Si
r
M
er
vy
n
K
in
g
0.
02
H
H
en
ri
k
A
ut
h
0.
06
H
U
rb
an
B
äc
ks
tr
öm
0.
00
·
R
ac
he
lL
om
ax
-0
.0
0
D
Ta
m
ás
B
án
fi
-0
.1
8
D
La
rs
H
ei
ke
ns
te
n
0.
00
·
Si
r
A
nd
re
w
La
rg
e
0.
06
H
A
nd
re
a
B
ár
tf
ai
M
ág
er
0.
00
·
K
er
st
in
H
es
si
us
0.
00
·
Pa
ul
Tu
ck
er
0.
01
H
Pé
te
r
B
ih
ar
i
-0
.0
1
D
St
ef
an
In
gv
es
0.
00
·
C
ha
rl
es
B
ea
n
-0
.0
1
D
V
ilm
os
B
ih
ar
i
-0
.0
7
D
La
rs
N
yb
er
g
-0
.0
1
D
K
at
e
B
ar
ke
r
-0
.0
1
D
Já
no
s
C
in
ko
ta
i
0.
00
·
K
ri
st
in
a
Pe
rs
so
n
-0
.0
2
D
St
ep
he
n
N
ic
ke
ll
-0
.0
3
D
C
sa
ba
C
sá
ki
-0
.0
5
D
Ir
m
a
R
os
en
be
rg
0.
00
·
C
hr
is
to
ph
er
A
lls
op
p
-0
.0
7
D
Fe
re
nc
G
er
ha
rd
t
0.
00
·
E
va
Sr
ej
be
r
0.
07
H
M
ar
ia
n
B
el
l
0.
03
D
Ilo
na
H
ar
dy
0.
00
D
Sv
an
te
Ö
be
rg
0.
00
·
R
ic
ha
rd
La
m
be
rt
0.
00
·
Zs
ig
m
on
d
Já
ra
i
0.
06
H
Si
r
A
la
n
B
ud
d
0.
00
·
B
él
a
K
ád
ár
0.
00
·
W
ill
em
B
ui
te
r
0.
02
D
Fe
re
nc
K
ar
va
lit
s
0.
03
H
C
ha
rl
es
G
oo
dh
ar
t
0.
00
·
Jú
lia
K
ir
ál
y
0.
03
H
Jo
hn
V
ic
ke
rs
0.
04
H
G
yö
rg
y
K
op
its
0.
04
H
D
eA
nn
e
Ju
liu
s
0.
05
D
Ju
di
t
N
em
én
yi
0.
07
D
Su
sh
il
W
ad
hw
an
i
0.
08
D
G
áb
or
O
bl
at
h
0.
01
D
Ia
n
P
le
nd
er
le
ith
0.
00
H
G
yö
rg
y
K
oc
zi
sz
ky
0.
00
·
H
ow
ar
d
D
av
ie
s
N
aN
·
A
nd
rá
s
Si
m
or
0.
04
H
D
av
id
C
le
m
en
ti
0.
01
H
G
yö
rg
y
Sz
ap
ár
y
0.
02
H
D
av
id
W
al
to
n
0.
02
H
Si
r
Jo
hn
G
ie
ve
0.
01
D
D
av
id
B
la
nc
hfl
ow
er
0.
15
D
T
im
B
es
le
y
0.
05
H
A
nd
re
w
Se
nt
an
ce
0.
09
H
Sp
en
ce
r
D
al
e
0.
03
H
Pa
ul
Fi
sh
er
0.
00
·
D
av
id
M
ile
s
0.
00
·
A
da
m
Po
se
n
0.
00
·
M
ar
tin
W
ea
le
0.
14
H
B
en
B
ro
ad
be
nt
0.
00
·
Chapter 3
The Empirical (Ir)Relevance of the
Interest Rate Assumption for
Central Bank Forecasts
Abstract: The interest rate assumptions for macroeconomic forecasts differ considerably
among central banks. Common approaches are given by the assumption of constant interest
rates, interest rates expected by market participants, or the central bank’s own interest rate
expectations. From a theoretical point of view, the latter should yield the highest forecast
accuracy. The lowest accuracy can be expected from forecasts conditioned on constant interest
rates. However, when investigating the predictive accuracy of the forecasts for interest rates,
inflation and output growth made by the Bank of England and the Banco Central do Brasil,
we hardly find any significant differences between the forecasts based on different interest
assumptions. We conclude that the choice of the interest rate assumption, while being a
major concern from a theoretical point of view, appears to be at best of minor relevance
empirically.
Keywords: Forecast Accuracy, Density Forecasts, Projections
JEL-Codes: E52, C12
This chapter is based on
Knüppel, M. and Schultefrankenfeld, G., 2013, The Empirical (Ir)Relevance of the Interest
Rate Assumption for Central Bank Forecasts, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper
11/2013.
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3.1 Introduction
It is well known that, due to lags in the monetary transmission mechanism, central banks have
to rely on forecasts for the variables they intend to control, often given by inflation and output.
In these forecasts, the policy variable, i.e. the short-term interest rate set by the central bank,
plays a special role. According to Galí (2011), in practice one can basically distinguish three
approaches. Firstly, forecasts can be conditioned on a constant interest-rate (henceforth CIR)
assumption where the interest rate is assumed to remain at the level it had attained at the
time the forecast was made. The CIR approach was pursued, for example, by the ECB until
2006 and the Sveriges Riksbank until the end of 2005. Secondly, the expectations of market
participants can serve as a conditioning assumption about the interest rate path, which is
current practice at, for example, the Bank of Japan and the ECB. Market expectations (ME)
are usually derived from the term structure of interest rates. Finally, a central bank can issue
unconditional forecasts for its target variables by using its own expectations about the interest
rate path. The central bank expectation (CBE) approach has been adopted, for instance, by
the Norges Bank, the Riksbank and the Federal Reserve System. The Fed’s December 2011
FOMC statement, announcing that “participants agreed that adding their projections of the
target federal funds rate to the economic projections already provided in the SEP [Summary
of Economic Projections] would help the public better understand the Committee’s monetary
policy decisions”, contributed to drawing the attention of economists to the topic of interest
rate assumptions.
Among academics, there seems to be a clear favorite among the three approaches,
CIR, ME and CBE, in terms of its suitability for central bank forecasts. Galí (2011), Svens-
son (2006) and Woodford (2005) advocate the CBE approach, i.e. unconditional forecasts.
Galí (2011) shows that it is possible to construct different forecasts conditional on one given
nominal interest rate path based on different policy rules, thus calling into question any con-
ditioning assumptions about interest rates. A similar point is raised by Woodford (2005).
However, if central bank forecasts are based on models, in practice the modest-interventions
approach in the spirit of Leeper and Zha (2003) appears to be the most popular approach
when conditioning assumptions are used.1 In this case, a sequence of unanticipated monetary
policy shocks generating the desired conditional interest rate path is assumed, yielding unique
conditional forecasts.2
Independently of the method employed to construct the conditional forecasts, it is evi-
dent that the CBE approach is supposed to yield the highest forecast accuracy.3 Actually, this
1This approach is employed in the models used by Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne (2007) and Adolfson,
Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (2005). Faust and Wright (2008) state that the conditional forecasts of the Bank of
England are also produced in a way that is in line with the modest-interventions approach. Yet, the work of
Laséen and Svensson (2011) suggests that a different approach is currently considered at the Sveriges Riksbank.
2Yet, the assumption that the associated policy interventions are modest is not necessarily justified, as
found by Adolfson et al. (2005).
3The forecast-accuracy measure should, of course, take the forecaster’s loss function into account. We will
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property serves as one of the main reasons for preferring the CBE approach over conditional
forecasts. Gali (2011, p.539) states that “it is not clear why the central bank would want to
base its projections on a rule other than the actual rule it follows for, among other things, in
that case the projections would also correspond to the best unconditional forecasts”. Svens-
son (2006) also resorts to the potential gains in forecast accuracy when advocating the CBE
approach.4 The literature does not provide comparably clear ideas concerning the relative
forecast accuracy of the ME approach with respect to the CIR approach. However, it seems
plausible that the ME approach should perform better unless the policy rate is best described
by a random walk.5
Practitioners do not necessarily share the views prevalent among academics, as reflected
by the fact that a large share of central banks does not base its forecasts on its own interest
rate expectations. This could be due to several reasons, among other things communication
issues. For example, Goodhart (2009) finds that using the central bank’s expectations of
the interest rate could be misunderstood as a commitment. Therefore, an interest rate path
derived from market expectations could be regarded as “a brilliant compromise” (Goodhart
2009, p.94) between the potential lack of credibility of a constant rate assumption and the
problems associated with publishing a path of future interest rates expected by the central
bank. However, there are also central banks that use the constant interest rate assumption,
for instance the Swiss National Bank. Arguments in favor of this approach can be found in
Goodhart (2001). An interesting argument against the CBE approach follows from Morris
and Shin (2002), who find that more precise public information can, in principle, decrease
welfare by crowding out private information.
Several empirical aspects related to interest rate assumptions are investigated in Ander-
sson and Hofmann (2009). When comparing central banks which either use the ME approach
or the CBE approach, Andersson and Hofmann (2009) conclude that if a central bank is
transparent and committed to maintaining price stability, the behavior of key variables like
inflation expectations and long-term bond yields does not seem to be affected by the type of
interest-rate assumption. In contrast to that, Winkelmann (2010) finds that using the CBE
approach instead of the ME approach leads to better private-sector forecasts of longer-term
interest rates.
elaborate on this issue below.
4Svensson (2006, p.2), referring to the CBE approach as the optimal projection, claims that “Since mone-
tary policy has an impact on the economy via the private-sector expectations of inflation, output, and interest
rates that it gives rise to, announcing the optimal projection (including the instrument-rate projection) and
the analysis behind it would have the largest impact on private sector expectations and be the most effective
way to implement monetary policy. Since the optimal projection is the best forecast in the sense of minimizing
expected squared forecast errors, it also provides the private sector with the best aggregate information for
making individual decisions.”
5Svensson (2006, p.5) notes that “ME are usually more realistic than the CIR, depending on the market’s
understanding and prediction of future instrument-rate decisions. This makes projections based on ME better
forecasts of future instrument-rate decisions than CIR projections.”
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In this paper, we propose to assess the effects of the interest rate assumptions by
testing for differences in forecast accuracy. We do so because forecast accuracy is one the
main reasons given in the academic literature for preferring the CBE approach. Forecast
accuracy is, of course, also directly related to all other issues mentioned above. For example,
it appears unlikely that the central bank will be able to better steer market expectations for
interest rates, inflation, and growth, and, thus, financial variables like bond yields, with the
CBE approach, if the central bank’s forecasts with the CBE approach do not turn out to
be more accurate than with the CIR approach or the ME approach, at least in the medium
term.6 The validity of the reasons brought forward against the CBE approach depends on
forecast accuracy as well. For example, misunderstanding the CBE approach as the central
bank’s commitment to an interest rate path will be unlikely, if the CBE approach does not
turn out to yield better interest rate forecasts than the ME approach or the CIR approach.
The potential crowding out of private information as stated by Morris and Shin (2002) also
requires the forecasts with the CBE approach to be sufficiently precise.
Comparisons of forecast accuracy under different approaches can also be important
in other respects. When investigating the reasons for the Great Moderation as described by
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), an important role is often attributed to the improvements
in monetary policy, especially for inflation, as, for example, done in Boivin and Giannoni
(2006) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010). If this is true, we would expect forecasts conditional
on ‘bad’ monetary policy to yield inferior forecast accuracy than forecasts based on ‘good’
monetary policy, i.e. with the CBE approach. In general, forecasts based on the CIR approach
can be regarded as forecasts conditional on ‘bad’ monetary policy, because ‘good’ monetary
policy usually implies a mean-reverting behavior of the policy rate.
Finally, another very basic interest in the comparison between the forecast accuracies
with the different interest rate assumptions results from the way central banks construct
prediction intervals around their forecasts. Many central banks assess their future forecast
uncertainty based on past forecast errors.7 If there was a switch in the interest assumption, the
question arises whether using forecast errors from the time before the switch may distort the
prediction intervals too much.8 Similarly, the evaluation of central bank forecasts commonly
ignores their conditionality with respect to the assumed interest rates, as stated in Faust and
Wright (2008). Therefore, Faust and Wright (2008) derive an evaluation framework which
6In the short term, market participants might simply believe that the central bank’s forecasts become more
accurate with the CBE approach. In the medium term, this belief can be assessed using the forecasting record
obtained with the CBE approach.
7For a short survey, see Deutsche Bundesbank (2010, p.13).
8For example, Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) ask if the interest rate assumption affects the usefulness of
past forecast errors of the Greenbook forecasts (produced with the CIR approach) for assessing the uncertainty
surrounding current FOMC forecasts (employing the CBE approach). Reifschneider and Tulip (2007, p.13)
conjecture that “the Greenbook’s historical forecast errors may tend to overstate the uncertainty of the outlook
to some degree.”
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takes the conditionality into account. It is, thus, interesting to assess how large the errors
might be if conditionality is ignored and simple standard evaluation procedures are used.
In principle, comparisons of forecast accuracy could be made for two central banks
which operate under distinct interest rate assumptions, or for two samples from a single central
bank which switched from one approach to another approach. Both types of comparisons
can be found in Andersson and Hofmann (2009), and only the latter is used in Winkelmann
(2010). However, when comparing the forecasts of two central banks, the differences in forecast
accuracy could, of course, be due to country-specific issues. A comparison of two samples
from a single central bank is likely to suffer from the instability of the predictive content of
forecasting models over time often encountered in the case of macroeconomic forecasts.9
In this work, we therefore exploit the forecasts of the Bank of England (BoE) in order
to assess the impact of the interest rate assumption on forecast accuracy. The feature which
makes these forecasts excellent candidates for our investigation is given by the fact that,
since 1998, the BoE has published forecasts for inflation and GDP growth conditional on two
different interest rate assumptions: CIR and ME. Thus, conclusions reached with these data
should be rather robust with respect to instabilities over time. A drawback of these data
is the absence of forecasts with the CBE approach. However, reasonable proxies for CBE
forecasts can be constructed using additional data on forward rates.
In addition to the BoE data, we also consider forecasts issued by the Banco Central do
Brasil (BCB). Similar to the BoE, the BCB has published forecasts for inflation conditional
on two different interest rate assumptions: CIR and ME. Yet, due to data limitations, we
cannot construct proxies for forecasts with the CBE approach in this case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set
of this study, and in Section 3 proxies for additional BoE forecasts are constructed. Section
4 presents some properties of the forecasts, and in Section 5, test results for equal predictive
accuracy of point and density forecasts are presented. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Data
There have been many changes in the interest rate assumptions used for central bank forecasts.
In Table 3.1 we show the history for selected central banks that have varied their assumptions
in recent years.10 In general, central banks have tended to move away from the CIR approach
towards the ME or the CBE approach. In some cases, the ME approach has turned out to
be an intermediate step only on the way towards the CBE approach.
With respect to data availability, the BoE and the BCB are special cases among the
central banks considered. Since 1998, the BoE’s quarterly Inflation Reports comprise two
9See, for instance, Rossi (forthcoming).
10Appendix A.2 lists references and statements of central bank publications on which Table 3.1 is based.
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Table 3.1: Interest rate assumptions in central banks
Constant Market Central Bank
Central Bank Rates Expectations Expectations
(CIR) (ME) (CBE)
Banco Central CIR since report ME since report -
do Brasil of September 1999 of September 1999
Banco Central CIR for reports of ME since report of -
de Chile May 2000 to May 2004 September 2004
Bank of CIR since report of ME added with -
England February 1993 for report of February
inflation and since 1998
August 1997 for real
output growth
Bank of Japan CIR for reports of ME since report -
October 2000 to of April 2006
October 2005
Board of Governors CIR assumption - CBE assumption
of the Federal for earlier for FOMC forecasts
Reserve System Greenbook forecasts∗ since 2007∗∗
European CIR for Eurosystem ME for Eurosystem -
Central Staff Macroeconomic Staff Macroeconomic
Bank Projections from June Projections since
2001 to March 2006 June 2006
Magyar CIR for reports - CBE since report
Nemzeti of June 2000 to of March 2011
Bank November 2010
Norges Bank CIR for reports ME for reports CBE since report
of June 2001 of March 2000 to of March 2005
to June 2003 March 2001 and
March 2003 to
November 2004
Reserve Bank CIR up to report ME since report -
of Australia of May 2009 of August 2009
Reserve Bank CIR before 1997 - CBE since 1997
of New Zealand
Sveriges CIR for reports ME for reports CBE since report
Riksbank from March 1997 from October 2005 of February 2007
to June 2005∗∗∗ to October 2006
Swiss National Bank CIR since 1999 - -
Note: The above categorization is based on references and quotations shown in Appendix A.2.
∗ Based on Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) and Goodhart (2009).
∗∗ Based on the Fed’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress of February 2007.
∗∗∗ Including scenario analyses using market rates.
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different forecasts for inflation and output growth, respectively, made by the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) for up to eight quarters ahead. The difference between the forecasts is
given by the underlying interest rate assumption. For one of the forecasts, nominal interest
rates are assumed to be constant over the forecast horizon (CIR approach), whereas the other
forecast is conditioned on an interest rate path that is based on market expectations about the
future level of the official bank rate (ME approach). The forecast data are publicly available
on the BoE website.11 The BoE has no clearly laid-out preference for one over the other
interest rate assumption. With the Inflation Report of August 2004, however, the emphasis
was slightly shifted towards the ME approach.
In a similar fashion, the BCB Inflation Reports since 1999Q4 contain quarterly inflation
nowcasts and forecasts for at least up to five quarters out, based on the CIR approach as well
as the ME approach.12 In contrast to the BoE, the BCB forecasts are also made conditional
on exchange rate paths using the two competing conditioning assumptions, i.e. constant
exchange rates and market expectations. These exchange rate paths, however, are rather
similar, because the market expectations are mostly very close to a random walk. Therefore,
we neglect the exchange rates issue in the following analysis.13 Regarding the preference
of the conditioning assumption, the BCB’s September 1999 Report, p.79, puts more weight
on the CIR approach when stating that “Normally, the Inflation Reports will issue two fan
charts. The first and most important is constructed on the assumption of a constant nominal
interest rate over the course of the projection period, while the second is accessory by nature
and is based on the assumption that the nominal interest rate will be that built-into market
expectations.”
A special feature of the BoE Inflation Report forecasts, or, rather, the forecasts by
the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is that they are actually issued as density forecasts,
using the two-piece normal distribution. The BoE reports the three location parameters
mean, mode, and median along with measures of skew and uncertainty, from which the
parameters of the forecast densities can be inferred using the formulas in Wallis (2004). The
inflation forecasts will be evaluated based on the price indices targeted and forecast by the
BoE.14 Real output growth realizations are those calculated for the seasonally adjusted GDP
11The forecast data are available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/
irprobab.htm.
12Up to December 2000, the number of forecast horizons of the BCB inflation forecasts varied between six
and at most ten. With the December 2000 report, the BCB started to publish forecasts for up to the end
of the next year, with the December forecasts made for up to eight quarters out and the number of forecast
horizons diminishing one by one over the three consecutive Inflation Reports. Since December 2007, every
Inflation Report contains quarterly forecasts made for up to eight quarters out.
13Exchange rate expectations are available from the BCB online under https://www3.bcb.gov.br/
expectativas/publico/en/serieestatisticas.
14Before 2004, the relevant price index was the ‘retail price index excluding mortgage interest payments’,
called RPIX in short. Since 2004, the forecast objective is the inflation rate of the ‘all items consumer price
index’, abbreviated CPI. The UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) provides inflation figures for RPIX
The Empirical (Ir)Relevance of the Interest Rate Assumption 79
chained volume measure ABMI, taken from the BoE realtime database.15 We use the second
vintage thereof, yielding observations up to 2010Q4 for the construction of forecast errors and
determining the end of the BoE data set.16 The forecast horizons under study range from 0
(the nowcast) to 8 quarters ahead, such that h = 0, . . . , 8.17
The forecasts made by the BCB’s monetary policy committee, the COPOM (Comitê
de Política Monetária), are also published as density forecasts. Yet, different from the BoE’s
publication practice, the COPOM forecasts are presented as quantiles belonging to the 10%,
30% and 50% prediction intervals of the central projection for inflation. Moreover, this central
projection is a median forecast. The forecast data are publicly available in the Inflation
Reports from 1999Q4 to 2011Q4.18 To utilize information from the entire period, we restrict
the sample to contain the nowcast and forecasts for up to five quarters out, i.e. h = 0, . . . , 5.
Yet, there are no market rate forecasts available for 2002Q4 and 2003Q1, such that these
quarters are missing in our data set. As we are interested in the mean and standard deviation
of the distributions underlying the fan charts, we back out these parameters by fitting a
normal distribution to the medians and quantiles provided in the BCB Inflation Reports, using
a least squares criterion. Since the confidence intervals are symmetric around the median,
and there is no significant forecast skewness in the BCB figures, the normal distribution
appears to be a proper choice and the central projection being a median no crucial point.19
The BCB generally forecasts inflation in the Broad National Consumer Price Index, or IPCA
(Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo), as reported by the Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE). “The IPCA is the most important price index from the
standpoint of macroeconomic policy because it is the consumer price index that is used in
the country’s inflation targeting regime adopted in June 1999” , as stated in the BCB’s ‘Price
Indices’ explanations on p.7.20
In addition to the BoE inflation and output growth forecasts and BCB inflation fore-
casts, we also evaluate the BoE’s and BCB’s interest rate paths. The constant interest rate
path used by the BoE corresponds to the level of the official bank rate (formerly the repo
rate) in the mid-quarter months February, May, August and November, constantly written
and CPI with one decimal place. To be closer to the two-decimal-place precision of the BoE inflation forecasts,
we recalculate the quarterly year-on-year growth rates of these indices.
15The realtime database is available under http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/gdpdatabase/.
16In anticipation of the statistical inference conducted later in this study, we can state at this point that
all test results are robust with respect to varying the real GDP vintage. For the price indices, there are no
real-time data available. However, the RPIX figures are never revised, see for instance the discussion in Groen,
Kapetanios, and Price (2009). The CPI comprises only minimal revisions, as described by the ONS (2003).
17The BoE has been publishing CPI inflation forecasts and real output growth forecasts made conditional
on market rates for up to 12 quarters ahead since August 2004.
18See http://www.bcb.gov.br/?id=INFLAREPORT&ano=1999 for further details.
19Specifically, the Inflation Report of September 2005, p.96, says that “With the exception of June 1999
and December 2002, past issues of the Inflation Report presented symmetric fan charts.”
20IPCA figures are obtained from the International Monetary Fund’s International Finance Statistics
database.
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forth over the two-year horizon. The available market rates data begin in 2000Q1 and thus
determine the start date of the BoE data set. This date corresponds to the introduction of a
new calculation method for market expectations of the BoE’s official bank rate, as stated in
the August 2000 Inflation Report.21 Forecast errors of the interest rate paths are calculated
by subtracting a quarterly average of the monthly interest rates from the respective interest
rate forecast. It should be noted at this stage that the constant interest rate path uses the
interest rate which is set in the MPC meetings in February, May, August and November. The
market rate path is constructed based on data available until the day before these meetings.
Thus, the constant rate path contains information which is not present in the market rate
path. This issue will be addressed in the following analysis.
The constant interest rate path that is underlying the BCB’s benchmark scenario for
inflation is the level of the SELIC rate set by the COPOM in the meeting of the publication
month of the Inflation Report.22,23,24 Since the Inflation Reports are published quarterly
in the end-of-quarter months March, June, September and December, we naturally obtain a
quarterly series of interest rate decisions, which is written forth constantly over the forecast
horizon.25 The market expectations about the SELIC rate are also publicly available on the
BCB’s website.26 The daily data is carefully matched to the constant-rate path using the
fixing dates provided in the BCB Minutes and Inflation Reports. The starting date of the
interest rate sample is determined by the availability of the market expectations, which are
reported from November 2001 onwards. Both the constant-rate path and the market-rate
path aim at forecasting SELIC interest rates at the end the quarter. Hence, the series of
SELIC observations is identical to the nowcast of the constant-rate path.
21The passage cites as follows: “Since the November 1999 Report, market expectations have been de-
rived from interest rates on gilt-edged securities used as collateral in short-term sale and repurchase agree-
ments and from the gilt-edged yield curve. These rates provide a more direct guide to market expecta-
tions of the future path of official interest rates.” The data are available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/inflationreport/market_profiles.xls. Moreover, the calculation of the market rates path
is changing from time to time to adjust to market conditions, as stated under http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publications/inflationreport/conditioning_path.htm.
22The 2006Q2 fan charts’ rates were set in May 2006, see the BCB Inflation Report June 2006, p.89, while
the 2006Q3 fan charts’ constant rates were set in August 2006, see the BCB Inflation Report September 2006,
p.108.
23The SELIC rate is a short-term interest rate and the main monetary instrument of the BCB, where
SELIC is an acronym terming the Sistema Especial de Liquidação e Custodia, translated as Special Clearance
and Escrow System.
24Until March 1999, the TBC rate (basic interest rate) and the TBAN (Financial Assistance Rate) served
as main monetary instruments.
25Although the BCB publishes forecasts four times a year, there are eight MPC meetings a year since 2006.
Initially, there were monthly COPOM meetings, beginning with the first meeting of June 1996, with occasional
extra meetings, see http://www.bcb.gov.br/?COMMITTEE.
26Again, see http://www.bcb.gov.br/?id=INFLAREPORT&ano=1999 for further details.
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3.3 Proxies for BoE Forecasts under Additional Interest Rate
Assumptions
3.3.1 The Interest Rate Forecast of the BoE
As mentioned above, due to timing issues, the CIR forecasts contain information which is
not present in the ME forecasts. This might make the forecasts with the CIR approach more
accurate than those with the ME approach, above all at short horizons. Moreover, no CBE
forecasts are available. In the following subsections, these problems will be addressed for the
case of the BoE.
In a first step, we will try to construct proxies for the own interest rate forecast of the
BoE. In order to do so, it is convenient to employ daily yield curve data on forward rates for
UK government bonds and forward interbank rates published by the BoE. The policy rate
forecast of the ME approach is actually based on these data. In order to derive the forward
rates of the policy rate, the level of the yield curve data has to be adjusted due to certain
types of premia and other issues, as explained in Brooke, Cooper, and Scholtes (2000).27
Denoting the instantaneous forward rate m months ahead that was expected on the day d of
the policy rate decision by gm (d), we measure the monetary policy surprise with respect to
the m-months-ahead policy rate forecast based on the published yield curve data as
s˜m (d) = gm (d+ 1)− gm (d) . (3.1)
Note that, by taking differences, the difference in levels between the published forward rates
and the forward rates of the policy rate does not affect our measure of the monetary policy
surprise as long as that difference in levels is approximately constant over time. According to
the information in Brooke et al. (2000), this appears to be a reasonable assumption, but this
issue will be briefly discussed below. While the surprises have a monthly frequency and are
defined for monthly policy rates, the forecasts to be investigated are available on a quarterly
basis only. Since the surprises are a relatively smooth and persistent function of the horizon
in months, i.e. because of s˜m (d) ≈ s˜m+1 (d), we simply use sˆq (d) := s˜3h+1 (d) as the measure
of the surprise for the quarterly rates with respect to a horizon of h quarters. Note that sˆq (d)
itself has a monthly frequency, because the surprises for the quarterly rates are calculated
27The data are available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/yieldcurve/default.
aspx. As done by the BoE when deriving the market expectations of the policy rate, for our analysis, we
employ the government liability curve until October 2004 and the commercial bank liability forward curve
thereafter. Due to problems related to the financial crises, the BoE has further modified its derivation of market
expectations since November 2007, but the corresponding yield curves are not available on its website. However,
the modifications were necessary mainly in order to estimate the correct levels of forward rates. We will be
using differenced data only, which should be robust with respect to level effects caused by higher liquidity or
risk premia. See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/inflationreport/conditioning_
path.aspx for further details.
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for each MPC meeting, and these meetings take place every month. Henceforth, a hat will
be used to indicate quantities that are subject to measurement uncertainty or estimation
uncertainty.28
The measures s˜m (d) and, thus, sˆq (d) might be distorted mainly due to three reasons.
Firstly, news other than the monetary policy surprise also affect the forward rates. However,
since the window for these shocks to occur lasts 24 hours only, their effect should be relatively
small. Secondly, in contrast to what was observed in the more distant past considered by
Brooke et al. (2000), it might be that the risk premia in the forward curves changed due
to the monetary policy decision during the financial crisis, but it is difficult to quantify the
importance of this issue. Yet, for example, on 06 November 2008, the BoE decreased the
policy rate by as much as 150 basis points in order to demonstrate its resoluteness to dampen
the effects of the financial crisis, which might have led to a pronounced decrease in risk premia.
While the financial markets had apparently expected the policy rate to decrease strongly in
the coming months, they were surprised by the unprecedented size of the decrease on a single
day.29 Consequently, the 1-month forward rate dropped by 119 basis points, but the change
in the 60-month forward rate amounted to 8 basis points only. This might suggest that the
risk-premia effects of the monetary policy decisions do not lead to large distortions in the
measurement of the monetary policy shock at least at longer horizons.30 Finally, as pointed
out by Anderson and Sleath (1999), there can be considerable uncertainty about the rates at
the short end of the forward curve.
Denoting the market expectations of the policy rate in quarter t for quarter t + h by
MEt+h|t with h = 0, 1, . . . , 8, we calculate a proxy for the BoE’s own interest rate forecast
ĈBEt+h|t as
ĈBEt+h|t = MEt+h|t +
h∑
i=0
sˆ
(t)
t+h|t+i (3.2)
where sˆ(t)t+h|t+i is the monetary policy surprise that occurred in quarter t + i for the forecast
made in quarter t for t+h. In general, this quarterly surprise is the sum of the three monthly
monetary policy surprises that occurred within quarter t+ i. To be more precise, sˆ(t)t+h|t+i is
28Measurement uncertainty is only indicated for variables constructed in this work. Of course, s˜m (d) is
also subject to measurement uncertainty, but it will not be used in what follows.
29According to the Consensus Forecasts from 13 October 2008, the most likely policy rate change mentioned
by survey participants was a decrease by 50 basis points. Put differently, financial markets had expected
the interest to decrease by 150 basis points and more, but they had not expected this decrease to happen
immediately.
30This conclusion rests on the assumption that on 06 November 2008, the BoE did not make statements
which led the markets to revise their expectations concerning the interest rate in 60 months upwards. However,
we have not found any indications for such statements.
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determined by
sˆ
(t)
t+h|t+i = sˆh (d1,t+i) + sˆh (d2,t+i) + sˆh (d3,t+i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , h; h > 0 (3.3)
sˆ
(t)
t+h|t+i = sˆh (d2,t+i) + sˆh (d3,t+i) for i = 0;h ≥ 0 (3.4)
where dj,t+i is the day of the monetary policy decision in the jth month of quarter t+ i. Since
the Inflation Reports are published in the second month of a quarter, and, thus, the market
expectations of the policy rate are also determined at that date, sˆ(t)t+h|t+i only contains the
surprises of the second and third month if i = 0.
At first sight, it might appear that we assume that the BoE knows how it will surprise
the markets h quarters ahead, which might seem implausible. However, the approach proposed
should rather be thought of as capturing surprises which result from the updating of market
expectations.31 Whether the proxy of the BoE’s own interest forecast defined by equation (3.2)
is useful in spite of the simplifications used and the distortions potentially having occurred
is also an empirical question. Below, we will present empirical evidence suggesting that the
proxy appears to be useful.
3.3.2 Synchronizing Market Expectations and Constant Rate Forecasts
In order to make the interest rate forecasts based on market expectations and the constant
interest rate forecasts comparable, they should be adjusted such that both forecasts are
conditioned on information at the same point in time. In order to clarify the differences
between the forecasts, a more precise notation than used before is now needed.
The market expectations of the policy rate are based on data immediately before the
MPC decision. Instead of denoting these forecasts byMEt+h|t, they will henceforth be referred
to as MEpret+h|t. Consequently, the h-quarter-ahead constant-rate policy rate forecasts based
on the rate immediately after the MPC decision in quarter t will be denoted by CIRpostt+h|t.
These are the two interest rate paths that the BoE (and the BCB) actually condition their
forecasts on. In what follows, the constant-rate policy rate forecasts based on the rate before
the MPC decision will be denoted by CIRpret+h|t, and the market expectations of the policy
rate based on data immediately after the MPC decision by MEpostt+h|t.
31To give an example, neglecting the nowcasting issue, assume that in quarter t − 2, markets expect an
interest rate of 3% in quarter t, while the central bank expects 4%. In quarter t − 1, the central bank still
has the same expectation, and in its Inflation Report, it thus communicates that its own expectations are
above those of the markets (without stating the number itself). The markets then revise their expectations
upwards from 3% to x%. Finally, in quarter t, the central bank sets the interest rate to 4%. The central bank’s
expectation of 4% in quarter t − 2 thus equals the markets’ expectation of 3% in quarter t − 2 plus the two
surprises x%− 3% (the surprise in quarter t− 1) and 4%− x% (the surprise in quarter q). This example can
easily be extended to more general cases with more periods and time-varying expectations due to shocks.
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The latter forecast is calculated as
M̂E
post
t+h|t = ME
pre
t+h|t + sˆh (d2,t) . (3.5)
Thus, the construction of M̂Epostt+h|t uses the monetary policy surprises as defined above, but
only those which occurred on the day of the MPC decisions prior to which MEpret+h|t was
calculated.
3.3.3 Effects of an Interest Rate Change on Inflation and Growth
The previous calculations yield additional interest rate paths that can be investigated. In
what follows, corresponding proxies for inflation and output growth will be constructed.
The basis for this construction is given by the forecasts based onMEpret+h|t and CIR
post
t+h|t.
The BoE does not mention any differences between these forecasts except for the interest rate
path. Thus, the differences between the inflation and growth forecasts should be uniquely
determined by the differences in interest rates. We assume that the modest-interventions
approach is used for the forecasts. As mentioned above, this assumption is based on Faust
and Wright (2008) and the corresponding references therein. Moreover, like Faust and Wright
(2008), we assume that the responses of inflation and growth to an interest rate shock are
linear.
Under the assumptions mentioned, forecasts for a variable x made in t are related by
(
xME
pre
t+h|t − xCIR
post
t+h|t
)
=
h∑
j=0
αt,j
(
MEpret+h−j|t − CIRpostt+h−j|t
)
, (3.6)
with h = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,H, where xpt+h|t denotes the h-period-ahead mean forecast conditional
on the interest rate path p =
{
pt|t, pt+1|t, . . . , pt+h|t
}
. That is, the H coefficients αt,j for
the forecast from period t can simply be calculated using the corresponding H observations
concerning the differences with respect to the interest rate and the variable x. Note that
time variation is accounted for by letting the response coefficient αt,j depend on t. Given the
coefficients αt,j , forecasts xqt+h|t being conditional on the interest rate path q can either be
constructed as
xqt+h|t = x
CIRpost
t+h|t +
h∑
j=0
αt,j
(
qt+h−j|t − xCIR
post
t+h|t
)
(3.7)
or
xqt+h|t = ME
pre
t+h−j|t +
h∑
j=0
αt,j
(
qt+h−j|t −MEpret+h−j|t
)
. (3.8)
Under the assumptions mentioned, expression (3.6) holds with equality. However, even
in this case, the coefficients αt,j could not be pinned down exactly based on the available
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data, because all variables used are only published as rounded numbers.32 If equation (3.6)
is nevertheless used to calculate the coefficients αt,j , they can imply very implausible effects
of interest rate changes, such as sign switches and explosive dynamics. This issue is also
described in Faust and Leeper (2005). Moreover, if MEpret+h|t − CIRpostt+h|t equals zero for at
least one h, it is impossible to calculate the coefficients αt,j .
Therefore, we use more data and restrictions on the coefficients to estimate them. In
order to rely on more data, if the time variation is not too extreme, one can estimate the
coefficients employing the system of equations
(
xME
pre
t+i+h|t+i − xCIR
post
t+i+h|t+i
)
=
h∑
j=0
αt,j
(
MEpret+i+h−j|t+i − CIRpostt+i+h−j|t+i
)
+ εt+i,h (3.9)
with h = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,H and i = −n,−n + 1, . . . , n with n ≥ 1. This system collapses to the
case described above if n = 0. Implicitly, here it is assumed that the coefficients αt,j for the
forecast made in t are well approximated by the average of these coefficients for the forecasts
made in t−n, t−n+1, . . . , t+n. Thus, mH observations are used to estimate H coefficients,
with m = 2n+ 1.
Instead of estimating H coefficients αt,j for the forecast made in t, one can also try to
model the coefficients as a function of a smaller number of parameters. This can be achieved
using the functional form proposed by Almon (1965), yielding
αAt,h =
K∑
k=0
γt,kh
k, (3.10)
with K < H. Given that inflation and output growth are unlikely to increase in response
to higher interest rates, it is also interesting to consider the exponential Almon lag model
proposed by Lütkepohl (1981), with the coefficients determined by
αeAt,h = − exp
(
K∑
k=0
γt,kh
k
)
. (3.11)
In what follows, we set K = 2.33 It should be noted that the estimation uncertainty for
αt,h, αAt,h and αeAt,h increases with h, because the number of equations which include these
coefficients decreases with h.
The estimated coefficients imply a response path with respect to a change in the interest
rate. This response path is only indirectly related to the impulse-responses with respect to a
32Rounding is important here, because, for example, the differences in inflation rates due to interest rate
differences are very close to zero for short horizons. The rounded effects are thus likely to equal zero, but
setting at,0, at,1, . . . to zero distorts the values of at,h for larger horizons.
33Similar results are obtained with K = 3, but the estimation uncertainty increases with K.
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monetary policy shock. While monetary policy shocks tend to lead to long-lasting increases
in interest rates, as, for example, found in Stock and Watson (2001), the response paths
described by the coefficients αt,h with h = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,H are caused by a one-unit increase in
the interest rate in t, a one-unit decrease in t + 1 and no changes after that period. That
is, for example αt,4 indicates how much lower inflation would be in t + 4 due to a one-unit
increase in the interest rate in t which is offset in t+ 1.
The estimated coefficients for inflation αˆt,h, αˆAt,h, and αˆeAt,h, i.e. the response paths for
inflation are displayed in Figure 3.1. Due to the time variation, each panel contains 44−m+1
response paths. The upper left panel shows the results if equation (3.6) is employed to
calculate αˆt,h. Obviously, increasing m, i.e. using more data, yields more plausible results.
However, the inflation response can become positive for longer horizons. Using the Almon lag
model displayed in the panels in the middle leads to smoother responses, but the values for
longer horizons are still positive. By construction, this problem is avoided with the exponential
Almon lag model for which results are shown in the right panel. In general, increasing m from
9 to 13 only leads to minor changes, whereas an increase from 5 to 9 has noticeable effects.
Corresponding results for output growth can be found in Figure 3.2. The response
paths with unrestricted coefficients and with the Almon lag model do not appear to be very
plausible even for large values of m. Often, the responses are negative for short horizons,
positive for medium horizons, and again pronouncedly negative for long horizons. Even using
the exponential Almon lag model would result in some very peculiar paths.34 Therefore, the
additional restriction γt,2 < 0 is imposed in the estimations. This approach leads to several
paths with a negative response on impact and almost no response thereafter. However, there is
also a large number of responses that approach zero for long horizons only. Again, increasing
m from 9 to 13 only leads to minor changes.
Apart from plausibility considerations, statistical criteria are helpful for selecting a set
of coefficients. In Table 3.2, the average R2 of the regressions for each panel is shown. For
inflation, the restrictions imposed with the exponential Almon lag model lead to an almost
identical R2 as the standard Almon lag model and the approach with unrestricted coefficients,
and the R2 always exceeds 0.9. Thus, the restrictions imposed on the coefficients αˆeAt,h appear
to be very mild. Since they also give economically plausible response paths, in what follows
they will be used, with m set to 9. For output growth, the results are not as clear. In order
to facilitate comparisons with inflation, and because of the still relatively high fit obtained,
we will focus on the coefficients αˆeAt,h and m = 9 also for output growth.
It should be noted that the importance of the estimated coefficients for the subsequent
analyses decreases with h. This is due to the the fact that, for example, αˆeAt,H only affects
the forecast xt+H|t, and that this effect is only caused by the differences in the interest rate
34These paths show a strong negative response on impact, then virtually no response for all horizons but
the longest, and then again a strongly negative response for the latter.
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assumptions in t, where these differences are typically small. In contrast to that, αˆeAt,0 affects
all forecasts xt+h|t with h = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,H given the differences in the interest rate assumptions
in t, t+ 1, . . . t+H. Therefore, the differences in the coefficients observed across methods for
large h hardly affect the following results.35
For the construction of the proxies based on ĈBEt+h|t and M̂E
post
t+h|t, we use equation
3.8, i.e. these proxies are calculated using the BoE’s forecasts with the ME approach as the
baseline. For the determination of the proxies based on CIRpostt+h|t, equation 3.7 is employed,
so that these proxies are calculated using the BoE’s forecasts with the CIR approach as the
baseline.36
3.4 Properties of the Forecasts
It might be interesting to shed some light on the results of the constructions in the previous
section. A good impression can be obtained simply by looking at two examples. In Figure
3.3, the different forecasts of the BoE dating from 2004Q2 and 2008Q4, respectively, are
displayed together with the corresponding realizations. At both forecast dates, the policy
rate was changed. In 2004Q2, the proxy ĈBEt+h|t suggests that the BoE was aiming for
lower future policy rates than expected by the markets, whereas in 2008Q4, there were no
such discrepancies for the longer horizons.37
The most striking feature of the inflation and growth forecasts based on different interest
rate assumptions is their strong similarity. At short horizons, the forecasts are virtually
indistinguishable. While small differences can be observed for longer horizons, the forecast
errors appear to be of similar magnitudes. At best, the inflation forecasts based on CIRpret+h|t
might be expected to perform somewhat differently.
The observations based on two examples only are confirmed by the correlations of the
forecasts. For the interest rate forecasts considered, these are shown in Table 3.3. Obviously,
the correlations between all interest rate forecasts are very pronounced for short horizons.
For medium and long horizons, the correlations between constant rates and market rates are
mostly below 0.9, with 0.35 being the lowest value observed.
The correlations of the inflation forecasts can be found in Table 3.4. In the case of the
BoE, except for long horizons, they are close to 1. Only for h = 7 and h = 8, the correlations
between forecasts based on constant rates and the other forecasts can fall short of 0.9, with the
35We also conducted large parts of the following analyses using the coefficients αˆt,h and αˆAt,h. Basically, this
led to the same conclusions as those reached with the coefficients αˆeAt,h. The results are available upon request.
36We also conducted the following analyses employing all other possible combinations of baselines. Again,
this led to the same conclusions as with the choices described above. The results are available upon request.
37In the short run, however, before the interest rate decision the markets had expected the interest rate to
decrease to 3% over the next quarters, but did not expect this to happen immediately. The surprise observed
is thus similiar to what is called a timing surprise by Gürkaynak (2005) and Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson
(2007).
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lowest value being equal to 0.78. In contrast to that, for the BCB, the correlations are around
0.7 for the medium horizons h = 4 and h = 5. Of course, the strong correlations at short
horizons are, in both cases, due to the fact that interest rate surprises affect inflation with a
certain delay only. In the case of the BoE, even stronger correlations than for inflation can
be observed for the GDP growth forecasts, which are given in Table 3.5. Here, the smallest
correlation equals 0.84.
It remains to be investigated whether the proxies for the policy rate forecasts con-
structed above have plausible empirical properties. To this end, we compute the root mean
squared errors (RMSEs) of the forecasts which are displayed in Table 3.6. Obviously, the
RMSEs are as expected. For horizons h ≥ 1, the ME approach gives more accurate forecasts
than the corresponding CIR approach, and the best forecasts are obtained with the CBE
approach. Moreover, forecasts based on information including the policy rate decision are
more accurate than their respective counterparts that do not contain the information about
the policy rate decision. The ME approach gives better forecasts than the CIR approach for
h ≥ 2 even if the former is based on pre-decision information while the latter is not. For the
BCB forecasts and h = 5, the forecast accuracy of the CIR approach is larger, but this might
at least partly be due to the small sample size for this horizon.
The fact that the ranking of the ME approach, the CIR approach and the CBE approach
with respect to forecast accuracy is different for h = 0 could be caused by the difficulties in
estimating the rates at the short end of the forward curve mentioned by Anderson and Sleath
(1999). Of course, the information about the policy rate decision is especially important for
the nowcasts, so that it is not too surprising that, for example, CIRpostt+h|t gives better forecasts
than MEpret+h|t for h = 0.
For inflation and GDP growth, in addition to the mean forecasts, we can also evaluate
the density forecasts. BoE density forecasts under the ME approach and the CIR approach
only differ with respect to the location parameter, whereas the variance and the skewness
parameters are always identical. Therefore, we use these two parameters for the construction
of the density forecasts as well. We employ a standard scoring function for density forecasts,
the logarithmic score.38 Since density forecasts are available, we could also evaluate other
types of point forecasts like quantiles which imply loss functions other than the quadratic loss
associated with the mean forecast.39 However, using, for example, the absolute errors of the
median forecasts of the BoE does not yield additional insights, so that we do not report them
in what follows.40
38The logarithmic score is the only proper local scoring rule as shown by Bernardo (1979) and explained in
Gneiting and Raftery (2007).
39See Gneiting (2011) for a comprehensive treatment of loss functions and the corresponding point forecasts.
The central forecast discussed by the BoE is the mode forecast, but as pointed out by Wallis (1999), the
corresponding all-or-nothing loss function is unrealistic.
40The results for the median forecasts conditional on CIRpost
t+h|t and ME
pre
t+h|t are available from the authors
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The results for inflation can be found in Table 3.7. As expected, the differences between
the RMSEs and the mean logarithmic scores (henceforth referred to as MLSs) are very small
for short horizons at least in the case of the BoE. For medium and long horizons, the differences
become larger, but remain at a low level. For example, one of the largest differences observed
for the BoE occurs for h = 8, where the RMSE of pˆiCIRpret+h|t is about 10% larger than the RMSE
of pˆiMEpostt+h|t .
The accuracy ranking found for interest rates does not hold for the inflation forecasts.
While pˆiCIRpret+h|t tends to be the least accurate forecast, pˆiCBEt+h|t is never the single most accurate
forecast. Especially with respect to the MLS, the performance of pˆiCBEt+h|t is often worse than
that of all other forecasts except for pˆiCIRpret+h|t . The highest MLS for h ≥ 5 is mostly obtained
by piCIRpostt+h|t .
In the case of GDP growth, the results differ pronouncedly from what one would expect,
as shown in Table 3.8. While also in this case, the differences between the RMSEs and the
MLSs are very small, the most accurate forecasts are almost always given by yˆCIRpret+h|t and
yCIR
post
t+h|t . yˆCBEt+h|t tends to deliver the least accurate forecasts, and its performance is very
similar to that of yˆMEpostt+h|t .
In summary, while the results for the interest rate forecasts are in line with our ex-
pectations, the inflation forecasts and the GDP growth forecasts do not display the expected
patterns of forecast accuracy.
3.5 Testing for Equal Predictive Accuracy
In this section, we try to compare the predictive accuracy of the forecasts based on different
interest rate assumptions. Given the sample sizes and the strong correlations observed, the
tests can, of course, not be expected to have large power.
The forecasts for inflation and output growth can probably be thought of as coming from
nested models. However, the forecast models are not available to us, so that its population-
level predictive accuracy cannot be evaluated.41 Yet, the test for finite-sample predictive
accuracy by Giacomini and White (2006) can be employed, assuming that the forecasting
models are subject to non-vanishing parameter estimation uncertainty. Put differently, this
test is valid if the central banks do not expand the size of the estimation window over time.42
upon request.
41See Clark and McCracken (2010) for a survey on forecast evaluation methods.
42Probably, none of the estimation schemes typically considered in the literature (recursive, rolling, fixed)
exactly corresponds to the approach of practitioners. Rather, practitioners might switch between the schemes,
with their choice depending on structural breaks and data availability. For example, the estimation window
might expand for some time and then be reduced again, because data prior to a structural break is discarded.
Therefore, asymptotically, the assumption of non-vanishing estimation uncertainty is probably justified here,
even if neither the rolling nor the fixed scheme are used.
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Concerning the point forecasts, in the following analysis we concentrate on the means
of the forecast series. Moreover, as also noted by Mitchell and Wallis (2011), the framework of
Giacomini and White (2006) is general enough to encompass density forecasts. Therefore, we
also evaluate the competing density forecasts for inflation and for real output growth based
on their logarithmic scores. Let
dSE(xpt+h|t, x
q
t+h|t) ≡ (xpt+h|t − xt+h)2 − (xqt+h|t − xt+h)2 (3.12)
denote the difference in the squared forecast errors of two competing mean forecasts for the
variable x based on the interest rate paths p and q, respectively.43 Furthermore, let
dLS(xpt+h|t, x
q
t+h|t) ≡ −
(
log(fpt+h|t(xt+h))− log(f qt+h|t(xt+h))
)
(3.13)
be the difference in the logarithmic scores of the two competing density forecasts. The score
is the value of the forecast density made in t for t+h at the value of the realization xt+h. Note
that both differences are defined such that positive values occur if the forecasts using interest
rate path q imply a higher forecast accuracy than the forecasts based on the interest rate
path p. Given the ordering of interest rate paths that we are going to use (CIRpre, CIRpost,
MEpre, MEpre, CBE), we would expect the means of the loss differentials dSE and dLS to
be positive.
We calculate the loss differentials for the interest rate, inflation, and output growth
forecasts. To conduct a Giacomini and White (2006) test (henceforth GW test), we simply
regress the respective differences on a constant. An estimate of the constant being significantly
different from zero implies the rejection of the null of equal predictive accuracy of the two
competing forecasts. We use a significance level of 5%. Note that, given that there are going
to be many pairwise tests, one can expect some rejections even if all forecasts are equally
accurate.44
The results for the interest rate mean forecasts, based on quadratic loss, are shown in
Table 3.9. In line with the RMSEs displayed in Table 3.6, the means of dSE are positive
except for some cases at short horizons for the BoE and for h = 4 for the BCB. However, it
turns out that dSE is never significantly different from zero. Thus, even for the conditioning
assumptions themselves, we cannot detect significant differences in their forecast accuracies.
Of course, this result suggests that significant results for inflation and output growth are
unlikely, at least with respect to the mean forecasts, because of the uncertainty about the
43If x refers to the interest rate forecast, we have xp
t+h|t = pt+h|t and x
q
t+h|t = qt+h|t.
44Moreover, according to the results in Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1997), the GW test can be
expected to overreject pronouncedly in small persistent samples. In order to avoid this problem, we estimate
the variance of the loss differentials under the null hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy, i.e. with the mean
of dSE and dLS set to zero. This Lagrange Multiplier version of the test is more conservative in small samples.
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effects of an interest rate change on these variables. If, for instance, the true inflation response
to an interest rate change does not coincide with the response assumed by the forecaster, it
could easily happen that an inflation forecast based on the CBE approach is not more accurate
than an inflation forecast based on the CIR approach, even if the interest rate forecast of the
central bank is very precise.
For the inflation mean forecasts, indeed, there are no significant differences, as shown
in Table 3.10. For GDP growth, the results reported in Table 3.11 contain three significant
differences. Two of them, however, are negative. Thus, in the samples under study, there is no
convincing evidence for differences in mean forecast accuracy for inflation and GDP growth
caused by the rate interest assumption.
For the tests of the density forecasts of inflation and GDP growth based on the loga-
rithmic scores, displayed in Tables 3.12 and 3.13, in total, four significant differences appear.
Yet, two of them are negative. Thus, again, there is no evidence that ‘better’ interest rate
assumptions lead to more accurate forecasts of inflation and GDP growth.
It might be argued that the sample sizes under study are simply to small in order to
detect significant differences in forecast accuracy. The results observed for the interest rate
forecasts of the BoE, indeed, suggest that with moderately larger samples it might become
possible to empirically confirm the results expected based on economic theory, because the
differences, albeit insignificant, have the expected signs. For inflation and output growth,
however, many differences are negative. Thus, much larger samples would be needed in order
to unveil the supposed superiority of, for example, the CBE approach, if this superiority exists
at all. In our opinion, this need for much larger samples casts considerable doubts on the
empirical relevance of the interest rate assumption.
3.6 Conclusion
The choice of the interest rate path underlying the forecasts of central banks has been in-
tensively discussed in the economic literature. Empirical studies concerning the choice of the
interest rate assumption have hardly been conducted. In this work, we attempt to rank the
different approaches with respect to their effects on forecast accuracy. From a theoretical
point of view, the CBE approach is the preferred option and should lead to the highest ac-
curacy. While there is no clear theoretical ranking for ME approach and the CIR approach
with respect to forecast accuracy, it seems plausible to expect the ME approach to yield more
accurate forecasts than the CIR approach.
The macroeconomic forecasts by the BoE and the BCB turn out to be ideal candidates
for a comparison, because both central banks publish forecasts using the ME approach as well
as the CIR approach. The data situation for the BoE also allows the construction of proxies
for the CBE forecasts.
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In stark contrast to our expectations, we hardly find any significant differences between
the performance of forecasts based on different interest rate assumptions. In general, for the
interest rate mean forecasts themselves, the proxy for the central bank’s own expectations
are more accurate than the market expectations. The latter yield better forecasts than the
assumption of a constant interest rate. However, the differences are all insignificant. For the
inflation and output growth mean and density forecasts, there is no clear relation between
forecast accuracy and the interest rate assumption. Very few significant differences are found,
and about half of them do not have the expected sign.
One might argue that the sample under study is simply too small in order to find
significant differences between the forecasts conditioned on constant or on market rates. Yet,
if about ten years of data are not enough to detect such differences, it seems that the relevance
of the conditioning assumption is rather limited, at least empirically.
The empirical irrelevance of the interest rate assumption for forecast accuracy has
important implications for the issues raised at the beginning. Firstly, at least in the medium
term, it is going to be difficult for central banks to steer market expectations by using the
CBE approach, especially for variables other than the policy rate itself. Of course, this also
implies that it does not appear very likely that markets misunderstand the central bank’s own
interest rate expectation as a commitment. Secondly, at least for the samples under study,
monetary policy is unlikely to be a major cause for the level of macroeconomic volatility
observed, because the inflation and growth forecasts conditional on ‘bad’ monetary policy
(on the CIR approach) have virtually the same accuracy as forecasts conditional on ‘good’
monetary policy (on the CBE approach). This might cast doubts on the prominent role that
is sometimes attributed to monetary policy concerning the Great Moderation.45 Thirdly, the
construction of prediction intervals for central bank forecasts and the evaluation of central
bank forecasts can probably be agnostic toward the underlying interest rate assumptions. Put
differently, past forecast errors are a good indicator for future forecast uncertainty if the only
structural change is due to a change in the interest rate assumption used. And the errors
made when using standard evaluation procedures instead of those proposed by Faust and
Wright (2008) are probably going to be small. Finally, the risk that private information is
crowded out if central banks switch to the CBE approach is unlikely as well.
45However, it might also be that, currently, ‘good’ monetary policy is responsible for a regime with relatively
high macroeconomic stability where the differences in forecast accuracy between the CIR approach and the
CBE approach are relatively small, and that ‘bad’ monetary policy would lead to a different regime with strong
differences between the forecast accuracy of both approaches.
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Appendix
A.1 Plots and Results Tables
Figure 3.1: Response paths for inflation
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Note: Response paths for inflation, given by the coefficients αˆt,h (unrestricted coefficients, shown in first
column), αˆAt,h (coefficients restricted by Almon lag model, shown in second column), and αˆeAt,h (coefficients
restricted by exponential Almon lag model, shown in third column). These are responses to a one-unit
increase in the interest rate in h = 0, a one-unit decrease in h = 1 and no changes thereafter. m denotes
the number of adjacent forecasts used to estimate the coefficients.
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Figure 3.2: Response paths for real GDP growth
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Note: Response paths for GDP growth, given by the coefficients αˆt,h (unrestricted coefficients, shown
in first column), αˆAt,h (coefficients restricted by Almon lag model, shown in second column), and αˆeAt,h
(coefficients restricted by exponential Almon lag model, where the additional restriction γt,2 < 0 is imposed,
shown in third column). These are responses to a one-unit increase in the interest rate in h = 0, a one-unit
decrease in h = 1 and no changes thereafter. m denotes the number of adjacent forecasts used to estimate
the coefficients.
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Table 3.2: Average R2 for different estimation approaches
m inflation output growth
unrestricted coefficients
1 − −
5 0.96 0.96
9 0.94 0.94
13 0.93 0.93
Almon lag
1 0.96 0.98
5 0.95 0.95
9 0.94 0.94
13 0.93 0.92
exponential Almon lag
1 0.97 0.86
5 0.96 0.85
9 0.94 0.85
13 0.93 0.85
Note: No entries for m = 1 and unrestricted coefficients, be-
cause coefficients cannot be calculated for forecasts where values
of conditioning interest rate paths are identical for at least one
horizon.
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Figure 3.3: Forecasts by the BoE and corresponding realizations for the policy rate, inflation,
and GDP growth from 2004Q2 and 2008Q4, respectively
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Table 3.3: Correlations of interest rate forecasts
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
correlation of CIRpret+h|t with...
CIRpostt+h|t 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.89
MEpret+h|t 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.79 0.68 0.39
M̂E
post
t+h|t 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.77 0.65 0.35
ĈBEt+h|t 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.70 0.55
correlation of CIRpostt+h|t with...
MEpret+h|t 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.81 0.59
M̂E
post
t+h|t 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.86 0.79 0.56
ĈBEt+h|t 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.78 0.63
correlation of MEpret+h|t with...
M̂E
post
t+h|t 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
ĈBEt+h|t 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.85 0.73
correlation of M̂Epostt+h|t with...
ĈBEt+h|t 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.86 0.74
Banco Central do Brasil
N 39 38 37 30 19
correlation of CIRpostt+h|t with...
MEpret+h|t 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.93
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
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Table 3.4: Correlations of inflation forecasts
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
correlation of pˆiCIRpret+h|t with...
piCIR
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
piME
pre
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.85
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.90 0.86 0.83
pˆiCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.78
correlation of piCIRpostt+h|t with...
piME
pre
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.89
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.88
pˆiCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.91 0.83
correlation of piMEpret+h|t with...
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
pˆiCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.96
correlation of pˆiMEpostt+h|t with...
pˆiCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97
Banco Central do Brasil
N 47 46 45 44 43 42
correlation of piCIRpostt+h|t with...
piME
pre
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.90 0.72 0.67
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
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Table 3.5: Correlations of GDP growth forecasts
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
correlation of yˆCIRpret+h|t with...
yCIR
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98
yME
pre
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.89 0.87
yˆME
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.84
yˆCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.88 0.87
correlation of yCIRpostt+h|t with...
yME
pre
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.87
yˆME
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.87
yˆCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.91
correlation of yMEpret+h|t with...
yˆME
post
t+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
yˆCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.98
correlation of yˆMEpostt+h|t with...
yˆCBEt+h|t 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
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Table 3.6: Root mean squared errors of interest rate mean forecasts
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
CIRpret+h|t 0.27 0.76 1.13 1.44 1.69 1.93 2.15 2.34 2.51
CIRpostt+h|t 0.06 0.51 0.94 1.27 1.54 1.80 2.04 2.24 2.43
MEpret+h|t 0.16 0.54 0.90 1.18 1.46 1.75 2.00 2.22 2.40
M̂E
post
t+h|t 0.08 0.46 0.85 1.15 1.43 1.73 1.99 2.20 2.38
ĈBEt+h|t 0.14 0.33 0.72 1.06 1.37 1.64 1.91 2.14 2.34
Banco Central do Brasil
N 39 38 37 30 19
CIRpostt+h|t 0 1.85 2.96 3.70 4.69
MEpret+h|t 0.15 1.62 2.66 3.69 4.83
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
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Table 3.7: Root mean squared errors and mean logarithmic scores of inflation mean and
density forecasts
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
RMSE of mean forecasts
pˆiCIR
pre
t+h|t 0.18 0.45 0.71 0.92 1.03 1.12 1.10 1.08 1.03
piCIR
post
t+h|t 0.18 0.45 0.71 0.92 1.01 1.06 1.02 1.00 0.96
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.18 0.45 0.70 0.91 1.02 1.09 1.05 1.01 0.94
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.18 0.45 0.70 0.90 1.01 1.07 1.04 1.01 0.93
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.18 0.46 0.72 0.92 1.02 1.08 1.04 1.01 0.94
MLS of density forecasts
pˆiCIR
pre
t+h|t 0.13 −0.51 −1.00 −1.34 −1.50 −1.59 −1.48 −1.44 −1.44
piCIR
post
t+h|t 0.13 −0.52 −1.00 −1.33 −1.48 −1.53 −1.41 −1.38 −1.41
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.13 −0.51 −0.99 −1.31 −1.48 −1.57 −1.46 −1.40 −1.39
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.13 −0.52 −0.99 −1.31 −1.47 −1.55 −1.45 −1.40 −1.39
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.13 −0.52 −1.01 −1.34 −1.49 −1.58 −1.47 −1.43 −1.43
Banco Central Do Brasil
N 47 46 45 44 43 42
RMSE of mean forecasts
piCIR
post
t+h|t 0.19 0.78 3.53 8.07 13.52 17.64
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.19 0.89 3.76 8.22 12.80 15.77
MLS of density forecasts
piCIR
post
t+h|t −0.41 −1.14 −1.85 −2.42 −2.83 −2.99
piME
pre
t+h|t −0.43 −1.14 −1.87 −2.45 −2.77 −2.88
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
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Table 3.8: Root mean squared errors and mean logarithmic scores of GDP growth mean
and density forecasts
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
RMSE of mean forecasts
yˆCIR
pre
t+h|t 0.53 0.88 1.32 1.77 2.19 2.48 2.67 2.82 2.92
yCIR
post
t+h|t 0.56 0.92 1.36 1.79 2.21 2.48 2.67 2.82 2.92
yME
pre
t+h|t 0.55 0.91 1.37 1.82 2.24 2.51 2.69 2.84 2.95
yˆME
post
t+h|t 0.57 0.95 1.39 1.84 2.26 2.51 2.69 2.84 2.95
yˆCBEt+h|t 0.58 0.96 1.40 1.85 2.26 2.51 2.69 2.84 2.95
MLS of density forecasts
yˆCIR
pre
t+h|t −1.08 −1.30 −2.07 −2.82 −3.46 −3.75 −3.89 −4.09 −4.56
yCIR
post
t+h|t −1.10 −1.34 −2.12 −2.86 −3.48 −3.75 −3.88 −4.08 −4.54
yME
pre
t+h|t −1.09 −1.34 −2.14 −2.90 −3.54 −3.78 −3.90 −4.11 −4.60
yˆME
post
t+h|t −1.10 −1.37 −2.17 −2.93 −3.56 −3.78 −3.90 −4.11 −4.60
yˆCBEt+h|t −1.11 −1.39 −2.18 −2.95 −3.57 −3.79 −3.90 −4.11 −4.60
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters.
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Table 3.9: Test results for equal predictive accuracy of interest rate mean forecasts based
on squared errors
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
mean of dSE
(
CIRpret+h|t, x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
CIRpostt+h|t 0.07 0.32 0.40 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.38
(0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19) (0.26)
MEpret+h|t 0.05 0.29 0.48 0.67 0.72 0.68 0.59 0.54 0.54
(0.11) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.17) (0.26) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28)
M̂E
post
t+h|t 0.06 0.37 0.56 0.73 0.79 0.75 0.64 0.61 0.63
(0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.25) (0.31) (0.30) (0.27)
ĈBEt+h|t 0.05 0.48 0.76 0.93 0.98 1.03 0.97 0.89 0.81
(0.14) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.19) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.20)
mean of dSE
(
CIRpostt+h|t, x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
MEpret+h|t −0.02 −0.03 0.07 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.16
(0.28) (0.33) (0.19) (0.24) (0.48) (0.65) (0.74) (0.75) (0.61)
M̂E
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.19 0.18 0.25
(0.27) (0.27) (0.14) (0.20) (0.41) (0.58) (0.69) (0.67) (0.52)
ĈBEt+h|t −0.01 0.15 0.35 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.52 0.46 0.42
(0.25) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) (0.39) (0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47)
mean of dSE
(
MEpret+h|t, x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
M̂E
post
t+h|t 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.09
(0.29) (0.25) (0.20) (0.14) (0.10) (0.18) (0.41) (0.37) (0.33)
ĈBEt+h|t 0.01 0.19 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.26
(0.33) (0.23) (0.20) (0.23) (0.30) (0.30) (0.33) (0.38) (0.50)
mean of dSE
(
M̂E
post
t+h|t, x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
ĈBEt+h|t −0.01 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.17
(0.27) (0.30) (0.25) (0.28) (0.38) (0.33) (0.33) (0.41) (0.62)
Banco Central do Brasil
N 38 37 30 19
mean of dSE
(
CIRpostt+h|t, x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
MEpret+h|t 0.82 1.70 0.07 −1.36
(0.26) (0.36) (0.98) (0.83)
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters. Positive values of dSE indicate
that the forecast xq
t+h|t is more accurate. p-values are in parentheses. For the tests, Newey-West (1987)
standard errors are employed. The truncation lag is set to h.
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Table 3.10: Test results for equal predictive accuracy of inflation mean forecasts based on
squared errors
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
mean of dSE
(
pˆiCIR
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
piCIR
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.14
(0.45) (0.44) (0.59) (0.16) (0.27) (0.33) (0.31) (0.34) (0.37)
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.19
(0.56) (0.80) (0.57) (0.09) (0.41) (0.57) (0.55) (0.43) (0.33)
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.20
(0.44) (0.53) (0.90) (0.07) (0.27) (0.46) (0.50) (0.43) (0.37)
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.19
(0.44) (0.31) (0.43) (0.91) (0.41) (0.49) (0.52) (0.50) (0.46)
mean of dSE
(
piCIR
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 −0.01 −0.05 −0.06 −0.02 0.05
(0.31) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11) (0.55) (0.09) (0.09) (0.53) (0.31)
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 0.06
(0.46) (0.95) (0.13) (0.09) (0.55) (0.34) (0.19) (0.86) (0.42)
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.02 0.05
(0.46) (0.25) (0.39) (0.65) (0.46) (0.12) (0.13) (0.76) (0.67)
mean of dSE
(
piME
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.32) (0.31) (0.46) (0.39) (0.05) (0.10) (0.22) (0.49) (0.74)
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 −0.01
(0.35) (0.20) (0.20) (0.32) (0.75) (0.54) (0.52) (0.99) (0.92)
mean of dSE
(
pˆiME
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
(0.45) (0.21) (0.17) (0.20) (0.33) (0.47) (0.87) (0.66) (0.60)
Banco Central Do Brasil
N 47 46 45 44 43 42
mean of dSE
(
piCIR
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.00 −0.11 −0.22 −0.15 0.72 1.87
(0.31) (0.45) (0.57) (0.78) (0.34) (0.15)
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters. Positive values of dSE indicate
that the forecast xqt+h|t is more accurate. p-values are in parentheses. For the tests, Newey-West (1987)
standard errors are employed. The truncation lag is set to h.
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Table 3.11: Test results for equal predictive accuracy of GDP growth mean forecasts based
on squared errors
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
mean of dSE
(
yˆCIR
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yCIR
post
t+h|t −0.03 −0.08 −0.09 −0.09 −0.06 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.17) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.65) (0.61) (0.35) (0.66)
yME
pre
t+h|t −0.02 −0.07 −0.12 −0.19 −0.22 −0.14 −0.09 −0.08 −0.13
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.29) (0.40) (0.45) (0.31) (0.09)
yˆME
post
t+h|t −0.05 −0.13 −0.19 −0.26 −0.27 −0.16 −0.09 −0.07 −0.15
(0.22) (0.24) (0.19) (0.20) (0.27) (0.39) (0.47) (0.38) (0.09)
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.05 −0.15 −0.21 −0.30 −0.30 −0.17 −0.09 −0.08 −0.16
(0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) (0.24) (0.36) (0.47) (0.35) (0.08)
mean of dSE
(
yCIR
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yME
pre
t+h|t 0.01 0.01 −0.04 −0.10 −0.16 −0.13 −0.10 −0.11 −0.15
(0.26) (0.61) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.37) (0.35) (0.22) (0.05)
yˆME
post
t+h|t −0.01 −0.05 −0.10 −0.17 −0.21 −0.14 −0.10 −0.10 −0.16
(0.39) (0.21) (0.16) (0.20) (0.28) (0.36) (0.37) (0.27) (0.04)
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.02 −0.07 −0.12 −0.20 −0.24 −0.16 −0.10 −0.10 −0.18
(0.34) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.32) (0.37) (0.25) (0.03)
mean of dSE
(
yME
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yˆME
post
t+h|t −0.02 −0.06 −0.06 −0.07 −0.05 −0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01
(0.32) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.44) (0.06) (0.04) (0.54)
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.03 −0.08 −0.09 −0.10 −0.08 −0.03 0.00 0.01 −0.03
(0.31) (0.30) (0.27) (0.22) (0.21) (0.24) (0.73) (0.48) (0.30)
mean of dSE
(
yˆME
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.02
(0.28) (0.31) (0.22) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15) (0.71) (0.29) (0.06)
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters. Positive values of dSE indicate that
the forecast xq
t+h|t is more accurate. Bold numbers are significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance
level. p-values are in parentheses. For the tests, Newey-West (1987) standard errors are employed. The
truncation lag is set to h.
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Table 3.12: Test results for equal predictive accuracy of inflation density forecasts based on
logarithmic scores
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
mean of dLS
(
pˆiCIR
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
piCIR
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04
(0.70) (0.50) (0.79) (0.10) (0.26) (0.40) (0.37) (0.49) (0.61)
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06
(0.95) (0.98) (0.45) (0.07) (0.48) (0.84) (0.86) (0.72) (0.59)
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05
(0.69) (0.63) (0.64) (0.07) (0.25) (0.67) (0.78) (0.73) (0.70)
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.68) (0.29) (0.48) (0.87) (0.69) (0.87) (0.93) (0.96) (0.92)
mean of dLS
(
piCIR
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
piME
pre
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 −0.04 −0.05 −0.02 0.02
(0.31) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09) (0.86) (0.27) (0.23) (0.52) (0.60)
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.02 0.01
(0.74) (0.82) (0.18) (0.10) (0.48) (0.52) (0.27) (0.59) (0.81)
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.06 −0.05 −0.02
(0.70) (0.22) (0.37) (0.69) (0.45) (0.11) (0.05) (0.28) (0.80)
mean of dLS
(
piME
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
pˆiME
post
t+h|t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 −0.01
(0.36) (0.29) (0.45) (0.35) (0.03) (0.04) (0.33) (0.92) (0.68)
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.04
(0.40) (0.18) (0.14) (0.21) (0.56) (0.86) (0.68) (0.25) (0.31)
mean of dLS
(
pˆiME
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
pˆiCBEt+h|t 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03
(0.58) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23) (0.29) (0.23) (0.09) (0.17)
Banco Central Do Brasil
N 47 46 45 44 43 42
mean of dLS
(
piCIR
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
piME
pre
t+h|t −0.02 0.00 −0.02 −0.03 0.06 0.11
(0.43) (0.96) (0.70) (0.63) (0.35) (0.18)
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters. Positive values of dLS indicate that
the forecast xqt+h|t is more accurate. Bold numbers are significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance
level. p-values are in parentheses. For the tests, Newey-West (1987) standard errors are employed. The
truncation lag is set to h.
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Table 3.13: Test results for equal predictive accuracy of GDP growth density forecasts based
on logarithmic scores
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Bank of England
N 36 36 36 36 36 35 34 33 32
mean of dLS
(
yˆCIR
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yCIR
post
t+h|t −0.02 −0.05 −0.04 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.44) (0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.38) (0.87) (0.56) (0.28) (0.37)
yME
pre
t+h|t −0.01 −0.04 −0.06 −0.08 −0.08 −0.03 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
(0.75) (0.22) (0.20) (0.32) (0.41) (0.62) (0.79) (0.44) (0.14)
yˆME
post
t+h|t −0.02 −0.08 −0.10 −0.11 −0.10 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
(0.52) (0.24) (0.21) (0.28) (0.37) (0.59) (0.80) (0.50) (0.15)
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.03 −0.09 −0.11 −0.13 −0.11 −0.04 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05
(0.48) (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.33) (0.55) (0.78) (0.46) (0.12)
mean of dLS
(
yCIR
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yME
pre
t+h|t 0.01 0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.06 −0.03 −0.02 −0.03 −0.05
(0.20) (0.70) (0.39) (0.43) (0.45) (0.58) (0.66) (0.28) (0.07)
yˆME
post
t+h|t 0.00 −0.03 −0.06 −0.08 −0.08 −0.04 −0.02 −0.03 −0.06
(0.77) (0.20) (0.19) (0.30) (0.38) (0.55) (0.68) (0.33) (0.07)
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.01 −0.04 −0.07 −0.09 −0.09 −0.04 −0.02 −0.03 −0.06
(0.59) (0.23) (0.17) (0.24) (0.33) (0.50) (0.66) (0.30) (0.05)
mean of dLS
(
yME
pre
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yˆME
post
t+h|t −0.01 −0.04 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.39) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.29) (0.44) (0.27) (0.07) (0.70)
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.02 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.03 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.37) (0.30) (0.26) (0.21) (0.18) (0.19) (0.87) (0.95) (0.26)
mean of dLS
(
yˆME
post
t+h|t , x
q
t+h|t
)
with xqt+h|t = . . .
yˆCBEt+h|t −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01
(0.34) (0.33) (0.19) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15) (0.54) (0.20) (0.03)
Note: N denotes the sample size, h is the forecast horizon in quarters. Positive values of dLS indicate that
the forecast xq
t+h|t is more accurate. Bold numbers are significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance
level. p-values are in parentheses. For the tests, Newey-West (1987) standard errors are employed. The
truncation lag is set to h.
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A.2 Central Bank Statements on Forecast Conditioning As-
sumptions
Banco Central Do Brasil
First report available is from September 1999 (“Inflation Report”) and states on p.79 that
“Normally, the Inflation Reports will issue two fan charts. The first and most important
is constructed on the assumption of a constant nominal interest rate over the course of the
projection period, while the second is accessory by nature and is based on the assumption
that the nominal interest rate will be that built-into market expectations.”
Banco Central de Chile
Reports available since May 2000 (“Monetary Policy Report”).
CIR for reports of May 2000 to May 2004. For instance, the report of September 2000,
p.8, states that
“Confidence intervals [...] summarize the Central Bank’s risk assessment for future economic
growth, on the assumption that the monetary policy rate will remain at UF + 5.0% over the
next two years.”
ME assumption since report of September 2004, p.63:
“This section presents the Board’s recent evaluation of Chile’s economic prospects for the
next two years, including the analysis and the decisions made during the last monetary policy
meeting of 7 September 2004. It provides projections for the most likely course of inflation
and economic growth, and examines the main risks. These projections are based on the
methodological assumption that the monetary policy rate will reflect a gradual decline in
the monetary impulse in coming years, consistent with achieving the inflation target focused
on 3% and which is comparable to trends deduced from financial asset prices. Projections
are also conditional on a series of developments that make up the baseline, or most likely,
scenario. New information will modify this scenario and associated projections. Forecasts are
presented in the form of confidence intervals, to reflect the future risks to monetary policy.”
Also variations are reported, e.g. in the report of May 2009, p.23:
“The projections used in this Report are based on the working assumption that, in the short
term, the MPR path will be similar to what can be inferred from financial asset prices on 8
May 2009. However, toward the end of the projection horizon, the MPR path will be lower
than the trend being signaled by these prices.”
Bank of England
Reports are available since 1997 (“Inflation Report”).
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CIR inflation forecasts since 1993 are available in a spreadsheet format under
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/irprobab.htm
The report of February 1998 states on p.42 that
“The projection for inflation is based on the assumption that official interest rates will remain
unchanged at 7.25% during the next two years. The projection was agreed by the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) on 5 February. In addition, for the first time, a new projection is
presented under the assumption that official interest rates follow market expectations over
the next two years.”
Bank of Japan
Reports available since October 2000 (“Outlook and Risk Assessment of the Economy and
Prices”, since April 2004 “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices”).
CIR assumption in early days, for instance in October 2000 (only available online under
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outlook/gor0010.htm/):
“The forecasts of Policy Board members are based on the assumption that there will be no
change in monetary policy. Forecasts of the majority of Policy Board members are shown as
a range with the highest and lowest figures excluded. If there are multiple highest and/or
lowest figures, only one from either end is excluded.”
Switch from CIR to ME assumption made with report of April 2006, p.8:
“Individual Policy Board members make the above forecasts with reference to market par-
ticipants’ view regarding the future course of the policy interest rate that is incorporated in
market interest rates. Their forecasts made in October 2005 were based on the assumption
that there would be no change in monetary policy.”
Example of ME assumption in report of October 2011, p.17:
“Individual Policy Board members make their forecasts with reference to the view of market
participants regarding the future course of the policy interest rate - a view that is incorporated
in market interest rates.”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
The conditioning assumptions of the Fed are not entirely clear.
Reifschneider and Tulip (2007), pp.12-13, state that Greenbook based on interest rate
assumptions, while FOMC projections are made rather on a CBE assumption:
“A final issue of comparability concerns the conditionality of forecasts. Currently, each FOMC
participant conditions his or her individual projection on “appropriate monetary policy”, de-
fined as the future policy most likely to foster trajectories for output and inflation consistent
with the participant’s interpretation of the dual mandate. Although the definition of “ap-
propriate monetary policy” was less explicit in the past, Committee participants presumably
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had a similar idea in mind when making their forecasts historically. Whether or not the other
forecasters in our sample generated their projections on a similar basis is unknown, but we
think it reasonable to assume that most sought to maximize the accuracy of their predictions
and so conditioned their forecasts on their assessment of the most likely outcome for mone-
tary policy. However, this assumption is not valid for the Greenbook projections. Through
most of the 1990s, the Federal Reserve staff conditioned its forecasts on a roughly flat path
for the federal funds rate. This practice meant that real activity and inflation might evolve
over the projection period in a way that was potentially inconsistent with the FOMC’s policy
objectives and, therefore, unlikely to occur. That is, the staff took the approach over much
of our sample period of designing its forecasts not to maximize forecasting accuracy but in-
stead to inform the FOMC about the potential consequences of unchanged policy. Thus, the
Greenbook’s historical forecast errors may tend to overstate the uncertainty of the outlook
to some degree.”
The “Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress” of February 2007 names
for the first time the term “appropriate monetary policy” which is likely to correspond to
a CBE assumption (available online under http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/bernanke20070214a.htm):
“The central tendency of those forecasts - which are based on the information available at
that time and on the assumption of appropriate monetary policy–is for real GDP to increase
about 2-1/2 to 3 percent in 2007 and about 2-3/4 to 3 percent in 2008.”
Goodhart (2009), p.87, finds that
“For simplicity, most MPCs initially chose constant future policy interest rates, from the
latest available level, as their main framing assumption. Occasionally, such an assumption
would have been grossly at odds with perceived reality, as in the case of the United States
from 2004 until early 2006, when the explicit position of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) was for there to be a “measured increase” in policy rates over time. In that case,
the Greenbook conditioning assumption, which has also been usually for constant rates,3 is
widely believed to have been changed, but the degree of secrecy, and length of lag before
publication (five years), means that we will not have confirmation of this for some time.”
European Central Bank
The ECB in “A Guide to Eurosystem Staff Macroeconomic Projection Exercises” of June
2001 states on p.7 the CIR assumption:
“The projections are based on the technical assumption that three-month interest rates in
the euro area remain constant over the horizon of the projection.”
Publication of June 2006 staff projections, p.1, available online under http://www.ecb.
int/pub/pub/mopo/html/index.en.html?skey=staff+macroeconomic+projections, has
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the ME assumption underlying:
“For the first time, the Eurosystem projections are based on the technical assumption that
short-term market interest rates move in line with market expectations rather than, as pre-
viously assumed, remain constant over the projection horizon. This change is of a purely
technical nature. It was introduced in order to further improve the quality and the internal
consistency of the macroeconomic projections and does not imply any change in the ECB’s
monetary policy strategy or in the role of projections within that strategy.”
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
Reports available since June 2000 (“Report on Inflation”).
MNB has moved from CIR assumption to CBE assumption, as stated in the report of
March 2011 on p.15:
“Starting in march 2011, the staff of the national Bank of Hungary moved on to the prepa-
ration of a forecast with endogenous policy rate path from former forecasts with unchanged
policy rate. The change is in line with the practice of inflation targeting central banks, the
majority of which also having shifted to forecasts with endogenous policy rate path.”
Reserve Bank of Australia
First report available is from February 1997 (changing names since then; “Quarterly Report on
the Economy and Financial Markets”, “Semi-Annual Statement on Monetary Policy”, “The
Economy and Financial Markets”; since November 2000 “Statement on Monetary Policy”).
Switch from CIR to ME assumption with “Statement on Monetary Policy” of August
2009:
“The forecasts presented below are based on the assumption that the exchange rate remains
around its current level and that oil prices move broadly in line with near-term futures
pricing. In previous Statements the forecasts were prepared using the additional technical
assumption that the cash rate remained constant throughout the forecast period. In the
current environment, however, it is not particularly realistic to assume that the cash rate
remains at the historically low level of 3 per cent out to the end of 2011. Given this, the
current forecasts have been prepared on the technical assumption of a return towards a more
normal setting of monetary policy over the forecast horizon. This use of a more realistic
technical assumption by the Bank staff in no way constitutes a commitment by the Board to
a particular future path of the cash rate.”
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
In the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin 65 No. 2 of June 2002, the article by Hampton
(2002) states on p.6:
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“In order to understand our preference for using an endogenous interest rate path, it is
intuitive to refer to the period prior to our use of the endogenous policy reaction function.
Up until 1997, the projections used in policy evaluation and in the Bank’s publications were
conventional constant interest rate projections. Interest rates and the exchange rate were
generally held constant throughout the projection horizon at the values prevailing at the time
the forecasts were prepared.”
Sveriges Riksbank
The report of March 1997, p.21, (“Inflation Report” until 2007, since 2007 “Monetary Policy
Report”) introduces CIR assumption; before 1997 not really forecasting but rather deriving
inflation expectations:
“The assessment of inflation in the coming years is presented in this chapter, together with
some conceivable alternative paths. [...] A technical assumption for the assessment is that
economic policy remains unchanged.”
Example from report of December 2002, p.46 hints at scenario analysis with ME as-
sumption:
“In the Riksbank’s main scenario [...], inflation is forecast as usual on the technical assump-
tion that the repo rate will be unchanged at the present level of 4.0 per cent; this serves to
bring out the consequences for the formation of monetary policy. An illustrative calculation is
therefore presented here that incorporates a path for the repo rate that is in line with market
expectations as reported in the survey that Prospera undertook on behalf of the Riksbank in
November 2002.”
Switch to ME assumption with report 2005:3, p.5, of October 2005:
“The analyses in the Report’s main scenario to date have been based on the assumption that
the repo rate is held unchanged for the coming two years. In this Report the forecasts in the
main scenario are based instead on the assumption that the repo rate evolves in line with
financial market expectations, as reflected in implied forward interest rates. These forecasts
extend three years ahead. One advantage of such an assumption is that it normally provides
a more realistic picture of future monetary policy. Another benefit is that it makes it easier
to compare the Riksbank’s forecasts with those of other forecasters. Moreover, it facilitates
evaluations of the forecasts. One advantage of extending the forecast horizon is that it gives
a clearer idea of how inflation is being influenced by various temporary shocks.”
Explanations on the entire strategy are provided in the Monetary Policy Report 2007/1
of February 2007 in a box starting on p.19:
“Up to the autumn of 2005, the Riksbank based its forecasts in the main scenario on the
assumption that the repo rate remained constant during the forecast period. This made it
easy for the Riksbank to communicate, which was particularly important when establishing
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the new monetary policy regime and building up credibility for the inflation target. At the
same time, it was mostly an unrealistic assumption that made it difficult to make good
forecasts. Moreover, it gave no clear guidance as to how the Riksbank viewed future interest
rate developments. This was a disadvantage since the general public’s and the markets’
expectations of the future interest rate path are just as important for the way monetary policy
influences the economy as the expectations regarding the decision on the current level of the
interest rate. These problems diminished when the Riksbank began making forecasts based
on market expectations, as reflected in implied forward rates (Footnote: Between 1999 and
2003, the Riksbank published alternative inflation forecasts based on repo rate expectations
in market surveys. The Riksbank’s decision to publish its own forecasts for the repo rate
is a further step towards greater clarity. Market expectations do not necessarily reflect the
considerations that form the basis for monetary policy decisions. By making its own forecasts
for the repo rate, the Riksbank can explain more clearly to the general public and the financial
markets how it envisages future interest rate developments and how it reasons when making
monetary policy decisions. It is also natural in forecasting work to treat the repo rate as one
forecast variable among others.”
Swiss National Bank
SNB has introduced the CIR assumption in 1999 and has since not changed it.
In the Monetary Policy Report of 2000, p.1, available online under http:
//www.snb.ch/en/iabout/monpol/earlier/id/monpol_earlier_1999/pdf/monpol_
earlier_1999.pdf, is says that
“At the end of 1999, the National Bank for the first time published a medium-term inflation
forecast and a target range for the three-month Libor rate.”
The Monetary Policy Report of 2001, p.1, available online under http://www.snb.ch/
en/iabout/monpol/earlier/id/monpol_earlier_2000/pdf/monpol_earlier_2000.pdf,
completes:
“The inflation forecast published by the National Bank in December 2000 predicted that, at
an unchanged interest rate of 3.5%, inflation would increase somewhat in the course of 2001
and slightly exceed 2% for a limited period of time.”
The Quarterly Bulletin of December 2011 reports on p.7 that
“These forecasts are based on the assumption of a constant three-month Libor of 0% over the
entire twelve-month forecast horizon and implies a depreciating Swiss franc.”
Chapter 4
Forecast Uncertainty and the Bank
of England’s Interest Rate Decisions
Abstract: To assess the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee decisions on the
official bank rate under forecast uncertainty, I estimate simple forecast-based interest rate
rules augmented by the exact forecast standard deviations recovered directly from the Inflation
Report fan charts. I find that forecast inflation uncertainty strongly intensifies the reaction of
the interest rate decisions to a forecast deviation of inflation from target. Conversely, forecast
output growth uncertainty attenuates the reaction of the interest rate decisions to a forecast
deviation of output growth from its long-run mean. Asymmetries in forecast uncertainty are
highly relevant for inflation. Forecast upward risks to inflation contribute strongly to the
intensifying effect of forecast inflation uncertainty, while forecast downward risks have hardly
any significant impact. Moreover, I find that forecast risks to inflation have a direct effect on
the interest rate decisions, in particular when inflation is forecast close to target. Uncertainty
forecasts obtained from the Survey of External Forecasters, though, contain no explanatory
power.
Keywords: Forecast Uncertainty, Forecast Risk, Bank of England
Monetary Policy Committee, Forecast-based Interest Rate Rules
JEL-Codes: E37, C12, C53
This chapter is based on
Schultefrankenfeld, G., 2013, Forecast uncertainty and the Bank of England’s interest rate
decisions, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics, 17(1), 1-20.
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4.1 Introduction
Adequate monetary policy is widely recognized to be forward-looking. It is a common view
that interest rate decisions hinge crucially on a proper assessment of future developments
in prices and output so as to account for the lags in monetary policy transmission. As the
future is unknown, practical central banking is concerned with forecasting inflation and output
growth. Forecasts, however, are inherently subject to uncertainty. Nowadays, monetary policy
makers are aware of this significant issue and central banks, such as the Bank of England,
Sveriges Riksbank, Banco de Portugal, or Magyar Nemzeti Bank, to name but a few, publish
not only point forecasts for inflation and output growth but entire probability distributions of
the forecast variables. By doing so, these institutions explicitly quantify forecast uncertainty.
Forecasting entire densities is not an end in itself. If monetary policy decisions are made
subject to economic prospects, it seems reasonable that uncertainty about these prospects
may have an influence on the decisions. The Bank of England (BoE) refined its inflation
targeting and introduced its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in June 1997. Since then,
it has been a leading institution in making monetary policy decisions and forecasts publicly
available. In 1997Q4, the BoE started to jointly publish quarterly forecasts for inflation
and real output growth, together with their corresponding forecast uncertainty measures, for
up to two years out in its Inflation Report. I use the considerable record of interest rate
decisions and quarterly forecasts to contribute to the still narrow field of literature dealing
with forecast-based interest rate rules augmented by measures of forecast uncertainty and
forecast risk.
Forecast-based rules encompass the lags of monetary policy transmission, and the fore-
cast data are already conditioned on the relevant information set on future economic develop-
ments, see Batini and Haldane (1999). Thus, forecast-based rules can be a fairly precise and
yet compact tool for characterizing historical monetary policy decisions, as shown by Kuttner
(2004) who evaluates forecast-based rules for New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Similarly, Goodhart (2005) presents estimates of a forecast-based
BoE MPC reaction function and emphasizes the MPC’s high degree of forward-looking with
respect to inflation. Besley, Meads, and Surico (2008) analyze the role of heterogeneity among
the board members of the BoE MPC in a forecast-based rule setting. Gorter et al. (2008,
2009) provide evidence for the performance of interest rate rules for the European Central
Bank, based on expectations data constructed from Consensus Economics forecasts. Or-
phanides and Wieland (2008) explain the Federal Open Market Committee decisions by its
own projections for inflation and unemployment.
Regarding the impact of forecast uncertainty on interest rate decisions, Bhattacharjee
and Holly (2010) use a mix of observed and forecast data, including the BoE fan chart one-
year-ahead input standard deviations for inflation and output growth when analyzing the BoE
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MPC members’ decisions in a panel estimation of interest rate reaction functions. Despite
the fact that most of their coefficient estimates on uncertainty measures are insignificant,
inflation uncertainty is positively correlated with the change in interest rates while output
uncertainty is negatively correlated. Kim and Nelson (2006) use standardized prediction errors
for inflation and output as a bias correction in their forecast-based interest rules for the Federal
Reserve. Their findings differ over subsamples, but basically show that the probability of an
interest rate reaction to a change in inflation, sufficiently strong to stabilize the economy,
deteriorates when accounting for inflation uncertainty. Accounting for output uncertainty
tends to improve the probability of a sufficiently strong reaction. The studies by Martin and
Milas (2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2009), who investigate UK and US monetary policy in forward-
looking policy rules are noteworthy. They use observed inflation and output data and control
for the impact of inflation and output volatility derived from GARCH processes. Their basic
result is that inflation uncertainty dampens the policy response to inflation, favoring the
attenuation principle of Brainard (1967).
The uncertainty measures mentioned above are already good approximations. Yet, they
do not reflect the measure of uncertainty that the institution under study was facing when
making the monetary policy decision. For the BoE, I therefore recover the exact forecast
standard deviation for inflation and for output growth directly from the forecast densities
published by the BoE, as proposed by Wallis (2004). These forecast standard deviations orig-
inally associated with the forecast location parameters reflect the genuine and thus relevant
measure of uncertainty about future economic developments which the MPC has available at
the time the interest rate decision is made. I include the forecast standard deviations directly
in reaction functions in order to estimate the strength and the direction of the impact of
forecast uncertainty on the MPC interest rate responses to forecast deviations of inflation
from target and output growth from long-run mean. Since the BoE emphasizes its use of the
two-piece normal distribution, potential asymmetries in forecast uncertainty have to be taken
into consideration. Forecast uncertainty is asymmetric when an average of likely alternative
outcomes for one variable is seen to exceed or to fall short of the central projection for that
variable. The MPC defines such a difference between mean and mode forecast as forecast
risk to the central projection. I control for these risks by incorporating their normalized val-
ues, the exact forecast Pearson mode skewness for inflation and for output growth, into the
regression models.
I find that the MPC interest rate decisions react to deviations of forecast inflation from
target in the medium term, that is, for one and a half year or more out. When accounting
for the forecast inflation uncertainty, I find a strongly intensifying effect on interest rate
reactions. The partial effect of the forecast standard deviation implies a very aggressive
MPC behavior in order to pursue the inflation target. Forecasts for current and near-term
inflation and their associated forecast uncertainty measures have no significant impact. On
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the other hand, information from forecast demeaned output growth for the near term is used,
and its associated forecast uncertainty has an attenuating effect on the interest rate decision
response. Unlike inflation, output growth medium-term forecasts have no explanatory power
for the interest rate decisions.
When accounting for asymmetries in forecast uncertainty I find that forecast upward
risks to inflation contribute to the intensifying effect of forecast inflation uncertainty, while the
corresponding downward risks to inflation hardly have an effect. This casts doubt on the BoE
statement that the inflation target is symmetric. Forecast risks of either direction to forecast
output growth have no significant effect for the relevant forecast horizons. Moreover, I find
that the forecast risk for inflation has a direct effect on interest rate decisions, in particular
when the central projection for inflation is close to target.
Using direct uncertainty and risk measures constructed from the density forecasts of the
Survey of External Forecasters (SEF), which is prominently featured in each Inflation Report,
adds no information to the Monetary Policy Committee’s own uncertainty forecasts. While
forecast standard deviations for inflation and output growth are insignificant, risk measures
constructed from the survey data are indicating the same directions of risks as their bank
counterparts. Although there is mild evidence that the committee reacts to risk measures
derived from the survey, these results have to be interpreted with caution due to the, in
comparison with the BoE mode forecast, rougher construction of the modal value from SEF
histogram data.
The paper is organized as follows: Section two explains the data set used. Section three
shows the regression model and estimation results for a forecast-based interest rate reaction
function augmented by forecast uncertainty. Section four assesses asymmetries in the forecast
uncertainty. Section five provides results from re-estimating the models on SEF data. Section
six concludes.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Interest Rate Decisions
The interest rate data for this study have been collected from the interest rate voting spread-
sheet published on the BoE website. They refer to the decision of the MPC on the level of the
key interest rate, the official bank rate, from 1997Q3 to 2009Q4.1 Interest rate decisions are
made monthly by the MPC. I select, however, only the values of the end-of-quarter months,
that is, of March, June, September and December, for mainly two reasons. First, I thereby
choose only those decisions which are made in light of the most recent forecast results pre-
1The BoE key interest rate was (named) the ‘repo rate’ from 1997 to 2006.
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Figure 4.1: Plots of Bank of England forecast data for inflation
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Note: Bank of England data spans from 1997Q4 to 2009Q4 (49 observations). Top panels: deviation of
mode forecast from target. Middle panels: demeaned forecast standard deviation. Bottom panels: forecast
Pearson mode skewness. Panels in left column show forecast horizons h = 0 (solid), h = 1 (dashed) and
h = 2 (dotted), panels in middle column h = 3 (solid), h = 4 (dashed) and h = 5 (dotted) and panels in
right column h = 6 (solid), h = 7 (dashed) and h = 8 (dotted).
sented in the BoE Inflation Report.2 These reports, and thus the forecasts, are published only
quarterly, in the middle of the mid-quarter months February, May, August and November.
The assessment of the economy underlying the decisions of the first and second months of
the quarters are not available, such that it is a natural switch to quarterly frequency for the
following analysis. Second, with the timing of the dependent variable, I aim to circumvent
the undesired introduction of endogeneity between interest rate decisions and forecasts for
2The observation resulting from the extra meeting after September 11 is dropped. It was unanimously
decided to lower interest rates by 25 basis points.
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inflation and output growth. The standard notation for the quarterly series of the bank rate
and the lagged series with 49 observations in each is it and it−1, respectively.3
4.2.2 Forecast Inflation and Forecast Real Output Growth
The BoE has popularized presenting its forecasts for inflation and real output growth as fan
charts, a bird’s-eye view of the probability distributions of the forecasts made for the two-year
forecast horizon. These “fan charts [...] encompass the views of all members” with respect
to the medium-term outlook for the UK economy, as stated on the top page of the Inflation
Report of February 1998.4 Underlying the fan charts is an entire forecast density based on the
two-piece normal distribution. Hence, the BoE publishes three forecast location parameters,
mean, mode and median, together with a measure of uncertainty and a measure of the skew
of the distribution.5
From the location parameters, I choose the mode forecast as the relevant point forecast,
since it is highlighted as the central projection by the BoE. Moreover, I focus on the available
constant-rate nowcasts and forecasts, made for up to eight quarters ahead. In the BoE termi-
nology, ‘constant-rate forecasts’ means that forecasts are made conditional on the assumption
that monetary policy remains unchanged over the forecast horizon.6 The inflation forecasts
are indexed by h = 0, . . . , 8, and the output growth forecasts are indexed by k = 0, . . . , 8.7
Using constant-rate forecasts only should drain another source of endogeneity that may arise
from forecasts conditioned on interest rates which, in turn, depend on market expectations
about the future course of monetary policy. The Bank used to forecast RPIX inflation until
the end of 2003, targeted at 2.5%. Since the Inflation Report of February 2004, the target
has remained at an annual CPI inflation of 2%.8 As an inflation measure for the interest rate
3The official bank rate has been lowered massively since the financial turmoil following the Lehman collapse,
from a 2008Q3 value of 5% to a 2009Q1 value of 0.5%. Since then it has remained at that level. As a
consequence, a decreasing time trend might indeed be eye-balled out in the MPC interest rate decisions. I skip
plots and detailed unit root test results here, but the four alternative test results obtained from conducting
the Ng and Perron (2001) test utilizing a spectral GLS-detrended autoregression based on modified AIC with
automatic lag length selection indicate three times a rejection and one time no rejection of the null of a unit
root. To this end, interest rates are treated as being stationary throughout this study.
4The Inflation Report’s introductory statement on the fan charts has been refined over time. In the Inflation
Report of August 1998, it already says that the “fan charts represent the MPC’s best collective judgement about
the most likely paths for inflation and output, and the uncertainties surrounding those central projections.”
5The entire forecast history is provided as ‘Numerical Parameters for [...] Probability Distributions’ on the
BoE website.
6Since 1998Q1, in addition to its density forecasts made conditional on constant interest rates, the BoE
publishes ‘market-rate’ density forecasts, where it is assumed that interest rates follow a path as expected by
market participants, given certain adjustments.
7The BoE presents fixed-horizon forecasts for up to two years ahead, although market-rate forecasts for up
to three years ahead are available from 2004Q3 onwards. I repeated the estimation exercises with market-rate
forecast data and also instrumented the forecast data by lagged forecast data. The efforts, however, did not
result in further insights beyond the results shown here.
8Actually, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the British cabinet minister responsible for economic and
financial matters, announces the inflation target every 12 months.
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rules, I calculate the deviation of forecast inflation from target for time t + h, made at time
t, denoted by p˜it+h|t ≡ pit+h|t−pi∗. Since the BoE’s potential output or trend output measure
data are not published, I use the deviation of forecast output growth from its long-run mean
as an output measure instead.9 This is denoted by y˜t+k|t ≡ yt+k|t − y¯k, where the latter
term, y¯k, implies that the mean is taken horizon-wise over the time domain.10 Using data
as deviations from target and mean, respectively, imposes an expected value of zero for the
exogenous regressors. The top panels of figures 4.1 and 4.2 show plots of these variables.
4.2.3 Forecast Inflation Uncertainty and Forecast Real Output Growth
Uncertainty
The BoE forecasts have a two-piece normal distribution potentially skewed, as described in
Britton, Fisher, and Whitley (1998). The aforementioned measure of uncertainty, also called
‘input standard deviation’ in the BoE material, corresponds to the forecast standard deviation
of this two-piece normal distribution only if its forecast density is symmetric, see Wallis (2004).
Whenever forecast mode and forecast mean do not coincide, the forecast variance and, hence,
the forecast standard deviation have to be calculated using the reported parameters. For a
two-piece normal distributed variable X, the variance is given by
σ2X =
(
1− 2
pi
)
(σ2 − σ1)2 + σ1σ2. (4.1)
A two-piece normal distribution has parameters µ, σ1 and σ2, where µ is the mode of the
distribution, and σ1 and σ2 are the dispersion parameters, see, for instance, Novo and Pinheiro
(2005). The larger the difference between σ1 and σ2 is, the more skewed is the density. While
the mode forecast published by the BoE corresponds to µ, the dispersion parameters have
to be calculated as described by Wallis (2004). They are given by σ1 = ω/(1 + γ) and
σ2 = ω/(1− γ), where γ can be recovered from
γ = sign(s)
√√√√1− 4(√1 + pis2 − 1
pis2
)
, (4.2)
which depends on a standardized measure of skewness,
s = E(X)− µ
ω
. (4.3)
Inserting the BoE mean forecasts for E(X), the mode forecasts for µ, and the input standard
deviations for ω, we can calculate the latter quantity as the starting value to recover the fore-
9Using HP-filtered output data alternatively has not led to results different from those presented below.
10For all demeaned figures presented in this study, the mean is taken, for each forecast horizon separately,
over the time domain.
Forecast Uncertainty and the Bank of England’s Interest Rate Decisions 125
Figure 4.2: Plots of Bank of England forecast data for real output growth
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Note: Bank of England data spans from 1997Q4 to 2009Q4 (49 observations). Top panels: demeaned mode
forecast. Middle panels: demeaned forecast standard deviation. Bottom panels: forecast Pearson mode
skewness. Panels in left column show forecast horizons h = 0 (solid), h = 1 (dashed) and h = 2 (dotted),
panels in middle column h = 3 (solid), h = 4 (dashed) and h = 5 (dotted) and panels in right column h = 6
(solid), h = 7 (dashed) and h = 8 (dotted).
cast standard deviation for each inflation report density. I repeat this exercise for all nine
forecast horizons. The resulting series are demeaned and in the following denoted by σ˜pi,t+h|t ≡
σpi,t+h|t − σ¯pi,h for forecast inflation uncertainty and by σ˜y,t+h|t ≡ σy,t+h|t − σ¯y,h for forecast
real output growth uncertainty. The middle panels of figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide plots of the
time series.
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4.2.4 Forecast Inflation Risk and Forecast Real Output Growth Risk
The BoE uses the functional form of the two-piece normal distribution also to communicate
forecast risks to its central projection, which is the mode forecast. If an average of considered
alternatives is likely to exceed [fall short of] the central projection, then the forecast mean is
larger [smaller] than the mode forecast. In that case, the BoE speaks of an upward [downward]
risk.
The reported measure of skew, i.e. the difference between the mean and mode forecast,
is the quantification of that risk. I normalize the risk figures with the respective forecast
standard deviation and obtain a simple and scale-free measure of skewness, known as Pearson
mode skewness:
κx,t+h|t ≡
xet+h|t − xt+h|t
σx,t+h|t
, x ∈ {pi, y}. (4.4)
Besides its desirable testing properties that have been analyzed in Knüppel and Schulte-
frankenfeld (2011), the Pearson mode skewness is a measure of risk that is most closely
related to the original BoE measure of risk and the quantities used to construct the Inflation
Report’s density forecasts. The relationship becomes obvious when comparing the definition
in equation (4.4) with equation (4.3).
The Pearson mode skewness is used to account for the asymmetries of forecast uncer-
tainty in the following regression analysis. In addition, I separate the interest rate reactions
under forecast uncertainty into the cases where alternative outcomes of inflation and output
growth are likely to either exceed or to drop below the respective central projection. Yet,
I reduce the information of the Pearson mode skewness to the direction of risk. A variable
I+x,t+h, x ∈ {pi, y} takes value one when the central projection is subject to an upward risk and
the forecast period considered is marked by an upward risk and, accordingly, by a positive
Pearson mode skewness. In the case of downward risks and balanced risks it takes value zero:
I+x,t+h =
1, if κx,t+h|t > 00, if κx,t+h|t ≤ 0 . (4.5)
Conversely, if the central projection is subject to downward risks, a variable I−x,t+h, x ∈ {pi, y}
takes value -1 and is zero otherwise:
I−x,t+h =
−1, if κx,t+h|t < 00, if κx,t+h|t ≥ 0 . (4.6)
Table 4.1 shows the number of forecast risks by forecast horizons h and k. The first
row of the top panel shows the number of occasions when the inflation mean was forecast to
exceed the inflation mode forecast, implying an upward risk forecast. This is the prevalent
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Table 4.1: Overview on the Bank of England’s number of forecast upward, balanced and
downward risks
h 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
pie
t+h|t − pit+h|t > 0 16 16 16 16 16 22 22 21 18
pie
t+h|t − pit+h|t = 0 26 26 26 26 26 15 16 15 18
pie
t+h|t − pit+h|t < 0 7 7 7 7 7 12 11 13 13
k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ye
t+h|t − yt+h|t > 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2
ye
t+h|t − yt+h|t = 0 18 17 17 17 17 14 13 15 15
ye
t+h|t − yt+h|t < 0 27 28 28 28 28 31 33 31 32
Note: Bank of England data spans from 1997Q4 to 2009Q4 (49 observations).
case for forecasts made for more than four quarters out, i.e. h = 5 . . . , 7. At the policy horizon
(h = 8), upward and balanced risks have been forecast equally often. For the nowcast and
forecasts up to one year out, however, balanced risks to inflation are the major case, with 26
out of 49 risk forecasts being balanced.
Downward risks to inflation, where the mean is forecast to fall short of the mode, were
present in 7 out of 49 forecasting rounds for the forecast horizons up to one year. Forecast
output growth has tended to be subject to balanced risks and even more so to downward risks
over the sample period of this study. This is also reflected in the data plots in the bottom
panels of figure 4.1 and figure 4.2, where the Pearson mode skewness series for all forecast
horizons over the entire sample are drawn, thus adding the time dimension to Table 4.1.
Only the early forecast history shows upward risks to forecast output growth, and there has
been no forecast upward risk after 2001Q1.11 Moreover, the plots reveal that risk forecasts
are relatively close together over horizons, where inflation risk shows more cross-sectional
variation when approaching the policy horizon.
4.3 Forecast-based Interest Rate Rules augmented by Fore-
cast Uncertainty
4.3.1 The Regression Model
The starting point for the regression analysis are forecast-based interest rate rules as proposed
by Batini and Haldane (1998, 1999) and analyzed by, e.g., Levin, Wieland, and Williams
(2003) or Kuttner (2004). The functional forward-looking specification is also known from
Clarida et al. (1998, 2000). Since forecasts are inherently subject to uncertainty, the question
arises of whether (and, if so, in which direction and to what extent) the responses to forecast
11See Knüppel and Schultefrankenfeld (2012) for a comprehensive study of the BoE inflation risk forecasts.
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inflation and forecast output growth are affected when forecast uncertainty is included in a
forecast-based rule. The BoE has emphasized the role of forecast uncertainty by reporting
entire probability distributions for inflation and output growth in its Inflation Reports. The
importance of forecast uncertainty is underlined by the careful construction of the Inflation
Report fan charts which visualize ranges of possible future developments in prices and output.
When the MPC decides on the level of interest rates in response to economic prospects, then
the Bank’s own measures of uncertainty about these prospects should play a significant role
in the decision-making process.
To this extent, I augment a forecast-based rule by an interaction term of the forecast
inflation gap with the demeaned forecast standard deviation for inflation and an interaction
term of demeaned forecast real GDP growth with the corresponding demeaned forecast stan-
dard deviation. Since demeaned uncertainty measures enter the specification it is assumed
that the MPC in general recognizes forecasts to be subject to uncertainty. Only deviations
from the ‘usual level’ of uncertainty play a role. The resulting model is written as
it = c+ ρit−1 + αpip˜it+h|t + αyy˜t+h|t + αpipip˜it+h|tσ˜pi,t+h|t + αyyy˜t+h|tσ˜y,t+h|t + εt, (4.7)
where εt is a zero-mean error term.12 The parameters αpi and αy represent the reaction to
a change in the forecast inflation gap and forecast demeaned output growth when forecast
uncertainty is on track, i.e. equals the long-run mean. Whenever the forecast standard
deviations depart from their mean, αpipi and αyy capture the response of the MPC decisions
to forecast uncertainty. The partial effects of forecast inflation gap and demeaned forecast
output growth are thus linear transformations of the respective forecast standard deviations.
That is, the policy reactions depend on forecast uncertainty:
∂it
∂p˜it+h|t
= αpi + αpipiσ˜t+h|t,
∂it
∂y˜t+h|t
= αy + αyyσ˜t+h|t. (4.8)
The reaction function given by equation (4.7) is estimated for all 81 possible combinations
of the forecast horizons h for inflation and k for output growth. This is to check, without
preconceived notions, which combination of forecast data has the greatest explanatory power
for interest rate decisions. Moreover, this is intended to detect the degree of forward-looking
of the MPC, since the forecasts might not be equally informative to the decision makers. To
account for the sluggish adjustment of output, it is likely that the MPC considers current or
very near-term output developments for today’s interest rate decisions. These developments
can be evaluated and the interest rate can be set such that a desired growth path in the future
is more likely to be achieved. Yet, output data as provided by the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) are published, at best, with a lag of one quarter. Furthermore, GDP figures are usually
12Below, εt always denotes a zero-mean error term.
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subject to extensive revision after their initial release. If the MPC wants to respond to current
and very-near term output developments, it is ultimately forced to forecast.
As regards the inflation forecasts, inflation today cannot be affected by monetary policy
action, so the inflation nowcast might not be important for the interest rate decision. The
BoE medium-term objective, though, is to have two-year-ahead inflation back on target.
Although not explicitly stated, this two-year policy horizon is highlighted in every Inflation
Report inflation prospects section and, for instance, was referred to in a recent speech by
former MPC member Kate Barker (2010), p.9, where “the MPC has tended to put weight
on the projection for CPI inflation around two years ahead”. Thus, the inflation forecasts for
one and a half years up to two years ahead, i.e. for h = 6, 7, 8, can be expected to be highly
informative. If the Bank forecasts a deviation from target for the medium-term perspective, it
seems reasonable that today’s interest rate decisions respond to them. Yet, the BoE is leaving
herself a way out in the Inflation Report of November 2000, when stating on p. 67 that “The
inflation projection is a key input to policy decisions. However, there is no mechanical link
between the projected level of inflation in two years’ time based on constant interest rates
and the appropriate current setting of monetary policy.”
4.3.2 Estimation Results
Figure 4.3 visualizes the p-values for the usual two-sided t-tests when estimating equation
(4.7). One array consists of (max(h) + 1) × (max(k) + 1) = 81 tiles. The conventional row-
and column order of a matrix is changed here. Along the x-axis, the horizon of the inflation
forecasts, h, ascends from 0 quarters (the nowcast) to 8 (the policy horizon), and along the
y-axis, real output growth forecast horizon k ascends from 0 to 8 quarters out. White [light
gray, dark gray] tiles imply significance of the estimate at the 1% [5%, 10%] level, and black
tiles imply an insignificant estimate. That is, the tile in a bottom left corner corresponds to
the marginal significance level of a coefficient estimate when the regression model is estimated
on a combination of nowcast data. The tile in a right upper corner consequently implies a
combination of forecasts for the policy horizon, and so on. For instance, in the lower right
panel for αpipi, the white tile at (h = 0, k = 0) implies that an estimate of the coefficient αpipi
is significantly different from zero at the 1% level, when the rule is estimated on inflation
data for h = 0 and real output growth data for k = 0. It is significantly different from zero at
the 10% level, when the rule is estimated on inflation data for h = 0 and real output growth
data for k = 8, as indicated by the dark gray tile. Finally, the p-value exceeds 0.10 for the
combination h = 8 and k = 0, rendering this estimate insignificant. As indicated by the
shading, the MPC interest rate decisions respond to forecasts for output growth for up to one
and a half years ahead. Longer-term forecasts, i.e. horizons k = 6, 7, 8, are not taken into
account. Conversely, the responses to the inflation gap vanish for h = 0, . . . , 6, whereas for
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h = 7, 8 they seem to provide the relevant information content required to set interest rates in
response to forecasts. The arrays for the estimates of αpipi and αyy, though, are more mixed.
The significance pattern, however, remains intact, with short-term output growth uncertainty
forecasts and inflation uncertainty forecasts at the policy horizon mattering, as indicated by
white tiles.
Combining inflation forecasts for h = 7, 8 and real output growth forecasts for k = 1, 2, 3
yields the most promising specifications in terms of the log-likelihood, as Table 4.2, comprising
the best results from estimating equation (4.7), selected by their log-likelihood, shows. The
findings on the horizon choice of the MPC reverify the results of Goodhart (2005), who
similarly detects diminishing estimates for inflation at shorter horizons and for output growth
at farther horizons. The results based on inflation forecasts for h = 7 have an even higher
log-likelihood than for the policy horizon h = 8. This can be interpreted as support to the
argument of Bhattacharjee and Holly (2010), who state that two-years ahead forecasts are
less informative since they are adjusted to meet the inflation target in a policy-consistent
manner, while the forecast deviations from target for one period earlier are less subject to
judgement but yield more information content on which to base interest rate decisions.
The immediate implication of the results in Table 4.2 is that the MPC is very forward-
looking with respect to inflation, but considers the very near term with respect to output
growth. In terms of the log-likelihood, the horizon combination (h = 7, k = 2) yields the
best description of monetary policy for the period 1997Q4 to 2009Q4. The autoregressive
parameter, however, reflects quite inertial interest rates, with ρˆ = 0.99.13 The MPC seems to
have a strong desire to smooth interest rates, with only little additional information from the
forecasts utilized, given the degree of forward-looking implied by this horizon combination.
Hence, the reaction to a change in forecast inflation seven quarters ahead is relatively weak,
implied by αˆpi = 0.68, significant at the 5% level. Hence, this estimate does not satisfy the
principle proposed by Taylor (1993), according to which the coefficient should exceed unity,
implying an overproportional reaction of interest rates to a change in inflation to stabilize the
economy. What is highly significant is the fairly weak reaction to a change in output growth,
as reflected by αˆy = 0.20. The findings of the optimal degree of forward-looking implied by
(h = 7, k = 2) partly contradict the results of the theoretical literature on optimal monetary
policy rules, for instance, by Svensson (2001) and by Giannoni and Woodford (2003), where
optimal policy should, rather, depend on forecasts for the current period or the very near
term. Levin et al. (2003) come to similar conclusions. Their benchmark rule for US data,
however, depends on the current output gap forecast and the one-year-ahead inflation gap
forecast, with interest rates being very persistent. Longer horizons are advocated by Batini
and Nelson (2001), who provide UK data VAR evidence that the optimal feedback horizon of
monetary policy is between two and four years.
13Throughout this study, I stick to the notational convention using hat characters to denote estimates of
coefficients.
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Figure 4.3: Visualized marginal significance levels for coefficient estimates when varying the
forecast horizons in equation (4.7)
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Note: X-axes show forecast horizons h and Y -axes forecast horizons k. White [light gray, dark gray] tiles
imply significance of the estimate at the 1% [5%, 10%] level, and black tiles imply an insignificant estimate.
The significant estimates of coefficients αpipi and αyy, which capture the interest rate
reactions in response to a change in forecast uncertainty, are remarkable. In particular for the
tuple (h = 7, k = 2), the high value of αˆpipi = 3.51 is significant at the 1% level and implies
a very aggressive reaction by the MPC when forecast inflation in almost two years ahead
becomes very uncertain. The positive sign of the estimate is particularly sensible bearing in
mind that the BoE seeks to have two-year-ahead inflation back on target. Any uncertainty
about achieving this target results in increased efforts to finally succeed.
A hint that these clear-cut results are not obvious comes again from the Inflation
Report of November 2000, p.67. If forecast uncertainty proxies the uncertainty “about the
current conjuncture or the impact of any policy change, both of which tend to encourage more
cautious decisions”, then a reading of this report’s box would lead one to expect a negative
value of αpipi.
However, the significantly positive value found is not overly surprising and corresponds
to the idea of “preventing particularly costly outcomes”, as Ben Bernanke (2007) puts it.14
14The speech “Monetary Policy under Uncertainty” is available on the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System webpage.
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Table 4.2: Selected OLS estimation results for equation (4.7) - Accounting for forecast
uncertainty
(h, k) c ρ αpi αy αpipi αyy `
(7, 1) -0.03 0.98∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 3.70∗∗∗ −0.95∗∗∗ -7.71
(0.24) (0.05) (0.33) (0.05) (0.90) (0.14)
(7, 2) -0.08 0.99∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 3.51∗∗∗ −0.75∗∗∗ -5.97
(0.18) (0.04) (0.34) (0.07) (0.80) (0.07)
(7, 3) 0.19 0.95∗∗∗ 0.70∗ 0.16∗ 3.18∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ -10.49
(0.26) (0.05) (0.41) (0.09) (1.07) (0.08)
(8, 1) -0.20 1.00∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.98 −0.70∗∗∗ -13.64
(0.23) (0.05) (0.26) (0.04) (0.94) (0.17)
(8, 2) −0.46∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗ -10.61
(0.17) (0.04) (0.28) (0.06) (0.54) (0.07)
(8, 3) −0.35∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 0.72∗ 0.23∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ −0.55∗∗∗ -12.48
(0.13) (0.03) (0.39) (0.10) (0.70) (0.06)
Note: Bank of England data spans from 1997Q4 to 2009Q4 (49 observations). Figures in parentheses
are Newey-West (1987) standard errors where the bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure
proposed by Andrews (1991). Asterisks [∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ ] correspond to the marginal significance level of the
coefficient estimates of [10%, 5%, 1%].
When the MPC forecasts that two-year-ahead inflation will be off target, it will change interest
rates today. If forecast uncertainty becomes larger and confidence bands widen so to give a
certain probability to values that are even more off target, the MPC will increase efforts
to ultimately meet its two-year-ahead objective. Such aggressive behavior is in line with the
robust control theory of Hansen and Sargent (2008). In the context of a New-Keynesian model,
Soederstroem (2002) finds on p.126 that “when the central bank attaches some weight to
stabilizing output in addition to inflation”, uncertainty about inflation (persistence) increases
the policy response, while “uncertainty about other parameters, in contrast, always dampens
the policy response”.
That finding is supported by the highly significant coefficient estimate αˆyy = −0.75
for (h = 7, k = 2). Forecast uncertainty of output growth can be considered as a proxy for
uncertainty about the current state of the economy. If forecast uncertainty is high such that
positive point estimates are surrounded by confidence bands that reach well into negative
territory, the MPC might be better off with a cautious interest rate change, as suggested
by the Inflation Report of November 2000. The motivation could be to avoid the danger of
having changed interest rates too much when output growth indeed materializes below zero.
The cautious MPC dampens its response to a change in forecast output growth when the
forecast standard deviation of output growth increases, in favor of the attenuation principle
of Brainard (1967). Another explanation for the dampened response could be based on a
certain
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trade-off between forecast uncertainty and data uncertainty the MPC might have. Estimates
of current real GDP are subject to forecast uncertainty, as early releases of GDP are subject
to revisions. Any change in forecast uncertainty also affects the forecast uncertainty/data
uncertainty trade-off. As the reliability of forecast output growth deteriorates with increasing
forecast uncertainty, and the relative reliability of reported data thus improves, the response
of interest rates to a change in forecast output growth becomes muted.
4.4 Accounting for Asymmetric Uncertainty Forecasts
4.4.1 The Regression Model
In every forecasting period there is a certain probability that forecast inflation exceeds the
inflation target. In particular for h = 7, the best horizon in terms of the log-likelihood, and
for h = 8, the policy horizon, inflation is usually forecast close to target, as seen in the top
panels of figure 4.1. Given that forecast uncertainty is higher at longer-term forecast horizons,
outcomes well above the target are to be taken into account. The BoE explains in its current
monetary policy framework statements that “Inflation below the target of 2% is judged to
be just as bad as inflation above the target. The inflation target is therefore symmetrical”.15
This implies a symmetric loss function and concern about either forecast upward and forecast
downward risks.
However, a development of prices towards high inflation is in general considered a more
important issue than a development towards low inflation. A forecast upward risk implies
that inflation is expected to materialize above the central projection. If the central projection
is forecast close to target, forecast upward risk indicates that inflation is more likely to be
materialize even closer to target. Since upward risks also mean that forecast uncertainty
is greater on the upside, inflation can be expected to realize above target with a certain
probability. To the contrary, downward risks imply that inflation is expected to fall below
the central projection and to drop below the inflation target more likely.
One way to account for forecast risks and to assess whether the MPC loss function
is probably asymmetric is to include the Pearson mode skewness into the regression model
introduced by equation (4.7). The resulting reaction function is written as
it = c+ ρit−1 + αpip˜it+h|t + αyy˜t+h|t + αpipip˜it+h|tσ˜pi,t+h|t + αyyy˜t+h|tσ˜y,t+h|t . . .
+ γpiκpi,t+h|t + γyκy,t+h|t + εt.
(4.9)
Estimates for γpi and γy measure the response of the interest rate decisions to forecast
risk and are expected to be positive. That is, if inflation (the same holds true for output
15See the BoE’s ‘Monetary Policy Framework’ webpages for further documentation.
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growth) is expected to materialize above the central projection, the interest rates change
should be stronger than in the absence of risks. Conversely, a forecast downward risk should
imply a less strong interest rate change than in the absence of risks. Another way to assess
whether the interest rate reaction with respect to inflation (again, the same argument goes
for output growth) in the presence of upward risks is different from those in the presence of
downward risks, is to estimate a model that incorporates interactions of the indicator variables
for the direction of forecast risk with the respective demeaned forecast standard deviation:
it =c+ ρit−1 + αpip˜it+h|t + αyy˜t+h|t + αpipip˜it+h|tσ˜pi,t+h|t + αyyy˜t+h|tσ˜y,t+h|t . . .
+ γ+pipiI+pi,t+hσ˜pi,t+h|t + γ
+
yyI
+
y,t+hσ˜y,t+h|t . . .
+ γ−pipiI−pi,t+hσ˜pi,t+h|t + γ
−
yyI
−
y,t+hσ˜y,t+h|t + εt.
(4.10)
The parameters γ+pipi and γ+yy capture the response to a forecast upward risk to forecast inflation
and to forecast output growth. Conversely, γ−pipi and γ−yy are the responses to the respective
forecast downward risks. The partial effects of forecast uncertainty are given by
∂it
∂σ˜pi,t+h|t
= αpipip˜it+h|t + γ+pipiI+pi,t+h + γ
−
pipiI
−
pi,t+h,
∂it
∂σ˜y,t+h|t
= αyyy˜t+h|t + γ+yyI+y,t+h + γ
−
yyI
−
y,t+h.
(4.11)
If the BoE’s loss function is symmetric, the reactions to a change in forecast uncertainty in
the presence of forecast upward and forecast downward risks should be equally strong, i.e.
γ+pipi = −γ−pipi and γ+yy = −γ−yy should hold.
4.4.2 Estimation Results
Except for slight variations, estimating equation (4.9) for all combinations of forecast horizons
h and k yields about the same results as estimating equation (4.7), i.e. when not accounting
for forecast risk. The overall significance pattern is again visualized by p-value arrays, shown
in figure 4.4. The best six specifications selected by the log-likelihood are presented in Table
4.3, and the horizon combination (h = 7, k = 2) is again providing the best description of
MPC interest rate decisions. Yet, the coefficient estimate on the inflation gap is insignificant.
Coefficient estimates for αpipi and αyy, however, are significant at the 1% level and quite
strong, with values of 3.07 and −0.73, respectively. As before, the impact of forecast inflation
uncertainty strengthens the response to a change in forecast inflation while the response to
output growth is attenuated by forecast output growth uncertainty.
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Figure 4.4: Visualized marginal significance levels for coefficient estimates when varying the
forecast horizons in equation (4.9)
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Note: X-axes show forecast horizons h and Y -axes forecast horizons k. White [light gray, dark gray] tiles
imply significance of the estimate at the 1% [5%, 10%] level, and black tiles imply an insignificant estimate.
As the results show, asymmetries in the uncertainty forecast have a direct impact on
interest rate decisions. An upward risk to the central projection for inflation causes an interest
rate increase as reflected by γˆpi = 0.69, significant at the 1% level. If inflation is forecast to
exceed the central projection at the policy horizon, the MPC responds with a stronger interest
rate step than in a situation of balanced risks.
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Table 4.3: Selected OLS estimation results for equation (4.9) - Accounting for forecast risk
(h, k) c ρ αpi αy αpipi αyy γpi γy `
(7, 1) -0.05 0.98∗∗∗ 0.84∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗∗ 0.60 -0.08 -4.73
(0.19) (0.05) (0.47) (0.04) (1.18) (0.17) (0.40) (0.97)
(7, 2) -0.21 1.00∗∗∗ 0.65 0.25∗∗∗ 3.07∗∗∗ −0.73∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ -0.49 -2.72
(0.18) (0.03) (0.45) (0.06) (1.11) (0.09) (0.26) (0.53)
(7, 3) -0.12 0.99∗∗∗ 0.64 0.23∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗ −0.48∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗ -0.70 -7.28
(0.25) (0.04) (0.55) (0.09) (1.38) (0.05) (0.35) (0.46)
(8, 1) -0.27 0.99∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.40 −0.71∗∗∗ 0.82∗ -0.61 -9.64
(0.18) (0.03) (0.32) (0.04) (1.20) (0.13) (0.43) (1.35)
(8, 2) −0.57∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.92 −0.65∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗ -0.59 -6.49
(0.13) (0.02) (0.27) (0.04) (0.67) (0.08) (0.33) (0.78)
(8, 3) −0.51∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 1.18 −0.51∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ -0.48 -9.40
(0.16) (0.03) (0.39) (0.08) (0.86) (0.06) (0.33) (0.46)
Note: Bank of England data spans from 1997Q4 to 2009Q4 (49 observations). Figures in parentheses
are Newey-West (1987) standard errors where the bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure
proposed by Andrews (1991). The log-likelihood values are denoted by `. Asterisks [∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ ] correspond
to the marginal significance level of the coefficient estimates of [10%, 5%, 1%].
As the inflation forecasts for h = 7 are close to the inflation target, upward risks to the
central projection imply that inflation is seen more likely to materialize above target than
below. This seems to require a rise in interest rates today, such that inflation in the future is
prevented from materializing above target. Asymmetries in the forecast uncertainty of output
growth, however, seem to carry no information content, as the insignificant estimates for γy,
in particular for (h = 7, k = 2), show and the p-value tiles in figure 4.4 indicate.
The significant risk term and, thus, the relevance of asymmetries for the monetary
policy decisions could cast doubt on the statement of a symmetric loss function. To elaborate
further on this issue, estimation of equation (4.10) serves to assess whether and how the
direction of risk contributes to the effect of forecast uncertainty. Figure 4.5 visualizes the sig-
nificance patterns of the relevant coefficient estimates. Table 4.4 picks out the best six models
from the results when controlling separately for the impact of upward risks and downward
risks. The horizon combination (h = 7, k = 2) yields the largest log-likelihood value of all
models estimated, as shown in Table 4.4. The effect of asymmetric forecast uncertainty is cap-
tured by γˆ+pipi = 2.32, which is significant at the 1% level. This underlines the previous findings
that forecast risk matters in explaining the MPC interest rate decisions. Moreover, upward
risks to inflation contribute to the intensifying effect of forecast uncertainty on the responses
to a change in forecast inflation. Given the width of the fan charts, with every quarterly
forecast for inflation, there is a certain probability of inflation exceeding the target. However,
the forecasts for seven quarters ahead are generally close to the inflation target. If the MPC
is serious about its medium-term objective to have two-year-ahead inflation back on tar-
get, then alternative outcomes that are, first, seen to exceed the central projection for inflation
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Figure 4.5: Visualized marginal significance levels for coefficient estimates when varying the
forecast horizons in equation (4.10)
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Note: X-axes show forecast horizons h and Y -axes forecast horizons k. White [light gray, dark gray] tiles
imply significance of the estimate at the 1% [5%, 10%] level, and black tiles imply an insignificant estimate.
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and, second, seen likely to exceed the inflation target, must be undesirable. Hence, if the
MPC forecasts upward risk for seven quarters ahead, it is plausible that this intensifies the
interest rate response.
Forecast downward risks to inflation appear to have a much smaller influence on the
interest rate decisions. The coefficient estimate γˆ−pipi = 1.02 is significant at the 10% level
only. The stark difference in the coefficient estimates γ+pipi and γ−pipi seems to be in line with the
presumption that the loss function of the MPC is not symmetric. However, the significance
of the coefficient estimate on downward risks to inflation and the rather large standard errors
may not rule out the possibility that the coefficient estimates on forecast upward and forecast
downward risks are equal at some reasonable significance level. With this in mind, I conduct
F-tests for the following null hypotheses: a.) Ha0 : γ+pipi + γ−pipi = 0 and γ+yy + γ−yy = 0, b.)
Hb0 : γ+pipi + γ−pipi = 0, and c.) Hc0 : γ+yy + γ−yy = 0. The F -test for two restrictions yields a
p-value of 0.40. Hence, I cannot reject Ha0 and therefore cannot rule out symmetric reactions
to forecast upward and forecast downward risks. The difference in the coefficient estimates on
output growth upward and downward risk are smaller than the differences in the corresponding
inflation estimates. Separating into two tests for a single restriction, however, does not allow
other conclusions. Hb0 cannot be rejected with a p-value for the F -test statistic of 0.21, and
the corresponding p-value of the test statistic for Hc0 is 0.87.
Thus, although coefficient estimates are apparently different in magnitude and have
opposite signs in case of inflation, F -tests fail to reject the null that the estimates sum up to
zero. For inflation, these findings are in line with the statement that the BoE MPC considers
the inflation target to be symmetrical. I cannot reject a symmetric loss function, although
the evaluation of single estimates indicates major concern about upward risks to inflation
rather than about downward risks. A BoE MPC loss function seems to be symmetric in
output growth, too. Yet, there is no publicly available statement about a growth target to
be evaluated analogously to the symmetric inflation target statement.
4.4.3 Remarks on Robustness Checks
From the interest rate voting spreadsheet provided by the BoE I calculated a member-specific
interest rate imt , which is the previous-month level of the official bank rate plus the basis point
change the individual MPC member voted for in the current month.16 For every month, the
resulting rates are averaged across the total M members. This yields i¯t = M−1
∑M
m=1 i
m
t ,
the average member interest rate, which is used similarly by Gerlach-Kristen (2004). As an
example, I consider February 2006, with January 2006 interest rates of 5%. Incidentally, only
one member (Stephen Nickell) voted for a 25 basis point decrease. The MPC decision in
16Before November 1998, for some members only the direction of the preferred interest rate change is
available but not the number of basis points. I assume the change then to be 25 basis points in line with
Besley et al. (2008).
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Table 4.4: Selected OLS estimation results for equation (4.10) - Separating the direction of
forecast risk
(h, k) c ρ αpi αy αpipi αyy γ+pipi γ+yy γ−pipi γ−yy `
(7, 1) 0.32 0.91∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 3.11∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ -0.46 −0.77∗ -0.18 -2.06
(0.25) (0.06) (0.34) (0.06) (1.00) (0.17) (0.56) (2.46) (0.46) (0.31)
(7, 2) 0.15 0.94∗∗∗ 0.57 0.32∗∗∗ 2.24∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 0.55 −1.02∗ -0.06 0.88
(0.17) (0.04) (0.40) (0.08) (1.06) (0.09) (0.78) (2.75) (0.61) (0.21)
(7, 3) 0.15 0.95∗∗∗ 0.56 0.32∗∗∗ 2.08 −0.29∗∗∗ 2.43∗∗∗ −2.20∗ -1.08 0.02 -1.39
(0.25) (0.04) (0.42) (0.11) (1.30) (0.08) (0.88) (1.28) (0.70) (0.17)
(8, 1) 0.15 0.92∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.06 -0.54 2.03 -1.28 -0.53 -0.37 -8.07
(0.34) (0.07) (0.37) (0.08) (2.59) (0.44) (1.46) (4.61) (1.40) (0.96)
(8, 2) -0.10 0.97∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 1.28 −0.70∗∗∗ 2.56∗ -0.38 -0.72 0.28 -1.71
(0.23) (0.05) (0.32) (0.06) (0.81) (0.09) (1.14) (4.97) (0.72) (0.30)
(8, 3) 0.05 0.95∗∗∗ 0.81∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 1.84∗ −0.61∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗∗ -2.14 -0.87 0.40 -2.80
(0.23) (0.04) (0.45) (0.11) (1.02) (0.05) (0.82) (1.40) (0.85) (0.33)
Note: Bank of England data spans from 1997Q4 to 2009Q4 (49 observations). Figures in parentheses
are Newey-West (1987) standard errors where the bandwidth parameter is chosen based on the procedure
proposed by Andrews (1991). The log-likelihood values are denoted by `. Asterisks [∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ ] correspond
to the marginal significance level of the coefficient estimates of [10%, 5%, 1%].
February was to maintain interest rates at 5%, but for nine board members, the resulting
member average is roughly 4.97%. The average member interest rate can be motivated to be
closer to the optimal rate, since in the event of positive [negative] dissent it incorporates a
minority belief that optimal interest rates should be higher [lower] than the aggregate MPC
sets them.17 However, using the members’ interest rate average as dependent variable when
estimating equations (4.7), (4.9) and (4.10) basically yielded about the same coefficient esti-
mates as presented up to now. Although there where minor variations in the responsiveness,
there were no significant differences in the partial effects of forecast uncertainty and forecast
risk.
As regards the estimation technique, recent work, for example by Chevapatrakul, Kim,
and Mizen (2009) for the Fed and the Bank of Japan and Wolters (2012) for the Fed has
featured LAD quantile regressions. In these papers, it is shown that across the conditional
distribution of interest rates, central banks deviate significantly from their reactions evaluated
at the conditional mean, and the interest rate reactions are significantly different at the various
quantiles. After having run quantile regressions on the BoE data, however, I can state that the
MPC does not deviate from its conditional mean reaction function at a reasonable significance
level. Despite variations in the responses across the conditional distribution of both the MPC
interest rate decisions and the member interest rate average, these interest rate reactions are
not significantly different from the OLS estimates in terms of a 10% confidence band.
17For the average member interest rate, the same results for tests of stationarity apply as to the decisions
on the official bank rate.
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4.5 Forecast Uncertainty derived from the Survey of External
Forecasters
4.5.1 Data Description
Since 1998, the section on ‘Prospects for inflation’ in the BoE Inflation Reports also contains
‘Other Forecasts’ for the future developments in inflation and in real output growth. These
forecasting results are obtained from the Survey of External Forecasters (SEF), where “Every
three months, the Bank asks a sample of external forecasters for their latest economic pro-
jections.”, see for instance the August 2009 Inflation Report on p.50.18 The survey, usually
carried out in the first month of the quarter, comprises point and density forecasts in the
form of histograms, made by a varying number of professional economists that are “regularly
providing forecasts and analysis to economic and financial institutions [...]”, as pointed out
by Boero et al. (2008, p.1108).
The SEF data of the Inflation Reports are presented as histograms, aggregated from the
individual respondents’ histograms. The aggregate histograms are characterized by probabil-
ities that inflation and output growth, respectively, fall into a certain interval. The number of
intervals and their width varies over time, and left and right intervals are open in general. For
the SEF inflation forecasts starting in 1998, there were initially four intervals, or, bins, where
the interior bins had a width of 100 basis points. After five survey rounds, the number rose
to six bins and the grid was refined to a bin width of 50 basis points. Since 2009Q1, there are
seven bins for the inflation forecast histograms. For output growth, there were initially six
bins, four bins from 2002Q1 to 2008Q3, five for the report of 2008Q4, and six bins afterwards.
The bin width has always been 100 basis points.
Forecast mean, mode and standard deviation of each (aggregate) histogram can be
calculated. Although each SEF survey contains three different histograms for three distinct
forecast horizons, I concentrate on the forecasts for two years out, since they are the only
‘fixed-horizon’ forecasts available for all 48 survey rounds from 1998Q1 to 2009Q4.19 I assume
that the reported probabilities are concentrated at the mid-points of the respective intervals
and that open intervals at the left and right end of each histogram are closed and to have dou-
ble width (Boero et al. 2008, pp. 1112-1113).20 As the mode, denoted by xt+h|t, x ∈ {pi, y}
as before for notational consistency, I choose the mid-point of the interval the highest
18The survey started in 1996 for inflation only. With the Inflation Report of February 1998 (see p.49),
output growth was added.
19The SEF data comprises forecasts for the end of the current year, forecasts for the end of next year and
forecasts for two years out. The methodology was changed for inflation in 2006Q2 and for real output growth
in 2007Q4, such that variables are now forecast for one, two and three years ahead, respectively. Between
2006Q3 and 2007Q3, only two- and three-year-ahead forecasts are available in the reports. These issues are
discussed in detail by Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008).
20With the latter point, Boero et al. (2008) are following Batchelor and Dua (1996).
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Figure 4.6: Comparing Bank of England’s and the Survey of External Forecasters’ point
and uncertainty forecasts at the policy horizon
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Note: Bank of England (solid lines) and Survey of External Forecaster (dashed lines) data spans from
1998Q4 to 2009Q4 (48 observations). All forecasts shown are made for h = k = 8. Top left to right:
deviation of forecast inflation from target and demeaned forecast real output growth. Bottom left to right:
demeaned forecast standard deviation for inflation and demeaned forecast standard deviation of real output
growth.
probability is assigned to.21 The mean xet+h|t for each survey round t is calculated using a
standard textbook formula:
xet+h|t =
B∑
j=1
px,t+h|t,jax,t+h|t,j . (4.12)
21Choosing the mid-point as the modal value is of course a simplifying assumption. See Engelberg, Manski,
and Williams (2009) for potential issues when inferring the mode from survey data histograms.
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Similarly, one can compute the standard deviation σx,t+h|t:
σx,t+h|t =
√√√√ B∑
j=1
px,t+h|t,j
(
ax,t+h|t,j − xet+h|t
)2
. (4.13)
The value ax,t+h|t,j denotes the mid-point of interval j, and px,t+h|t,j the forecast prob-
ability that a realization of x falls into interval j. The plots in figure 4.6 show that point
and uncertainty forecasts for inflation and real output growth constructed from SEF data are
much smoother, while the overall direction is equal to the corresponding BoE series.
4.5.2 Estimation Results
Estimation results using the SEF data are shown in Table 4.5. In the top panel, coefficients of
equations (4.7) and (4.10) are estimated on the survey’s point and uncertainty forecasts. The
point forecasts in this case are the mean forecasts, rather than the mode forecasts.22 When
using SEF inflation and real output growth data for the policy horizon, i.e. h = k = 8, I
find that the reaction to a change in the SEF forecast inflation gap is extremely strong, with
αˆpi = 3.14 being significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The fairly strong reaction
to a change in the SEF real output growth gap of αˆy = 1.28 is significant at the 1% level.
SEF uncertainty measures, however, are insignificant. Although their signs hint at
attenuation in decision-making under uncertainty, estimation uncertainty is too large to allow
any conclusions about the impact of SEF forecast uncertainty on the BoE monetary policy
conduct. Standard errors for the uncertainty measures are about the same when controlling
for forecast upward and downward risks in inflation and output growth. An attenuated
reaction to a change in the real output growth gap, however, is now significant at the 5%
level. Given the crude measure for the forecast mode, there are no balanced risks for the SEF.
The signs of the Pearson mode skewness derived from SEF data, indicating the direction of
risk, however, are in line with the directions of risk implied by the figures in Table 4.1.
The lower panel of Table 4.5 shows estimation results when only the BoE forecast
standard deviations of inflation and real output growth are substituted by SEF measures in
equation (4.7), while the point forecasts are the BoE MPC forecasts. Then, only the smooth-
ing parameter and the reaction to a change in the forecast inflation gap remain significantly
different from zero. The forecast deviation of output growth from its long-run mean as well
as both uncertainty measures are statistically insignificant.
22To be precise, the gap variables are redefined for estimating equations (4.7) and (4.10) on the SEF data.
The forecast inflation gap is given by p˜it+h|t ≡ piet+h|t − pi∗, and the forecast real output growth gap by
y˜t+k|t ≡ yet+k|t − y¯k, where xet+h|t is the forecast mean as given by equation (4.12).
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Table 4.5: OLS estimation results for data from Survey of External Forecasters
(h, k) c ρ αpi αy αpipi αyy γ+pipi γ+yy γ−pipi γ−yy `
SEF point and uncertainty forecasts
Estimation results for equation (4.7)
(8, 8) 0.71 0.87∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ -4.12 -3.55 -22.54
(0.44) (0.07) (1.49) (0.41) (7.89) (2.87)
Estimation results for equation (4.10)
(8, 8) 0.38 0.91∗∗∗ 1.91 1.77∗∗∗ 6.53 −6.05∗∗ 0.25 5.13∗∗∗ −1.63∗ 0.84 -15.06
(0.40) (0.09) (1.16) (0.45) (7.93) (2.40) (0.78) (0.85) (0.88) (1.00)
BoE MPC point forecasts, SEF uncertainty forecasts
Estimation results for equation (4.7)
(8, 8) 0.21 0.93∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗ -0.09 -5.17 -0.49 -40.37
(0.32) (0.06) (1.03) (0.23) (5.10) (1.87)
Estimation results for equation (4.10)
(8, 8) -0.10 0.99∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗ -0.12 -5.12 0.72 -0.39 1.77∗∗ -0.15 1.28∗∗ -37.93
(0.31) (0.07) (1.00) (0.22) (5.28) (1.14) (0.54) (0.84) (0.67) (0.59)
Note: Bank of England and Survey of External Forecaster data spans from 1998Q4 to 2009Q4 (48 obser-
vations). Figures in parentheses are Newey-West (1987) standard errors where the bandwidth parameter is
chosen based on the procedure proposed by Andrews (1991). The log-likelihood values are denoted by `.
Asterisks [∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ ] correspond to the marginal significance level of the coefficient estimates of [10%, 5%,
1%].
When adding the indicator variables for forecast risk in the SEF, results are roughly
equal. Finally, it seems that forecast upward and downward risks for real output growth in the
SEF, however, are considered by the BoE MPC, as implied by γˆ+yy = 1.77∗∗ and γˆ−yy = 1.28∗∗.
Yet, given the the crude measure for the forecast mode, these results are to be interpreted
with caution.
4.6 Conclusion
The historical Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee decisions about the official bank
rate can be described fairly well by a simple forecast-based interest rate rule. In terms of log-
likelihood, the combination of forecast inflation gap for seven quarters ahead and demeaned
output growth for the very near term of two quarters ahead has the greatest explanatory
power.
The Monetary Policy Committee is very forward-looking with respect to inflation, but
less forward-looking with respect to output. An estimated interest rate rule for this best
horizon combination displays a fairly high degree of interest rate smoothing. Nonetheless,
the Monetary Policy Committee utilizes the information content of the forecast inflation
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gap and of forecast demeaned output growth. Estimates show greater weights on inflation
forecasts than on output growth, although the coefficient on the forecast deviation of inflation
from target is estimated below unity, implying an insufficiently strong interest rate reaction,
inconsistent with the Taylor principle.
Forecast uncertainty measures are found to be highly significant. In particular, the
positive and strong coefficient estimates on forecast inflation uncertainty at the policy horizon
imply very aggressive interest rate reactions when inflation two years out is forecast to deviate
from target. Conversely, forecast output growth uncertainty leads to attenuation in decision
making when near-term forecasts see output growth deviating from its long-run mean.
The aggressive reaction under inflation uncertainty and the attenuated reaction under
output growth uncertainty is confirmed when assessing the asymmetries of forecast uncer-
tainty. It is shown that forecast upward risks to inflation have a direct and positive impact on
Monetary Policy Committee interest rate decisions. Moreover, there is econometric evidence
that the asymmetry of forecast uncertainty contributes to the intensifying effect of forecast
uncertainty on the reaction of interest rates to a change in forecast inflation. When the central
projection for inflation is close to target, but an average of alternative outcomes is forecast
to exceed this central projection, the partial effect of the forecast standard deviation of infla-
tion is stronger than without controlling for upward risk. The Monetary Policy Committee
is found to be very concerned about upward risks to inflation, while downward risks have
hardly any significant effect. Although coefficient estimates for upward and downward risks
differ apparently in size and sign, F -tests cannot reject the null hypothesis about the Bank
of England’s statement that the inflation target is symmetrical.
Using direct uncertainty and risk measures constructed from the density forecasts of
the Survey of External Forecasters, which is prominently featured in each Inflation Report,
adds no information to the Monetary Policy Committee’s own uncertainty forecasts. While
forecast standard deviations for inflation and output growth are insignificant, and risk mea-
sures constructed from the survey data are in line with their bank counterparts. Although
there is mild evidence that the committee reacts to risk measures derived from the survey,
these results have to be interpreted with caution due to the different nature of the Bank of
England’s mode forecast and the modal value of the histograms from the Survey of External
Forecasters.
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Conclusion
This thesis provided potential answers to four specific questions related to the informational
and political dimensions of central bank density forecasts and fan charts by questioning, first,
the information content of macroeconomic risk forecasts, second, the construction principles
of fan charts, third, the implication of conditioning assumptions for forecast accuracy of point
and density forecasts and, fourth, the overall usability of uncertainty and risks forecasts for
monetary policy decisions.
The information content of macroeconomic risk forecasts was investigated by first sur-
veying how central banks address macroeconomic risks. It was shown that many central banks
augment their point forecasts with assessments of the balance of risks. Moreover, almost all
central banks surveyed state relatively clearly that the presence of unbalanced forecast risks
corresponds to an asymmetry of forecast densities. Surprisingly, the point forecasts published
almost always correspond to the modes of the forecast densities. Central banks risk forecasts
were found to be either quantitative, as in the case of the BoE and the Riksbank, or qualita-
tive, thus only indicating the direction of the balance of risks, as, for example, in the case of
the Federal Reserve and the ECB. Risk forecasts were also found to be be discussed without
referring to the balance of risks, as for instance is practice for the Reserve Banks of Aus-
tralia and New Zealand. Furthermore, balance-of-risks forecasts were found to be frequently
represented in potentially asymmetric fan charts.
Since the balance of risks is supposed to contain information about the asymmetries
of the densities of the forecast variables, a systematic connection between risk forecasts and
realized risks was investigated. Results for quantitative forecasts and direction-of-risk fore-
casts based on the risk forecast data for inflation produced by the BoE and the Riksbank
yielded no evidence for the existence of such a connection. Therefore, it seems questionable
whether macroeconomic risk forecasts are meaningful and this exercise illustrated the difficult
challenges in making accurate real-time assessments of temporal changes in the distribution
of forecast errors.
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In the light of the apparent lack of information content in macroeconomic risk fore-
casts, the construction principles underlying potentially asymmetric fan charts were further
analyzed. Specifically, it was investigated if dissent in voting on monetary policy affects the
shape of the forecast inflation fan charts of the Bank of England, the Sveriges Riksbank and
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. These three inflation targeting banks were subject of the analysis
because they are the only central banks to use identical approaches for generating density
forecasts and in addition to publish detailed interest rate voting information for the sample
periods considered.
Results from simple OLS regressions provided statistical evidence that there is a rela-
tionship between the degree of disagreement on the level of the policy instrument and the
shape of inflation fan charts. In particular, it was shown that the Magyar Nemzeti Bank fan
charts get wider when the degree of disagreement is higher while fan charts at the Bank of
England and the Sveriges Riksbank become more skewed to accommodate minority views on
monetary policy. Hawkish and dovish voting behavior was found to have significant impact
on the shape of inflation fan charts. At the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, hawks and doves alike
were found to determine the fan chart width, although the hawks’ impact was found to be
stronger. The analysis of the Bank of England fan charts yielded evidence that the hawkish
Monetary Policy Committee incorporates dovish voting into more skewed forecast inflation
fan charts, while test results for the Sveriges Riksbank fan charts showed that a hawkish
minority is accommodated by a more in inflation fan chart skewness. Overall, it was found
that dissenting views in monetary policy committees voting on central banks’ level of the
policy instrument are a significant determinant of the shape of forecast inflation fan charts.
Furthermore, this dissertation attempted to rank different approaches regarding the
choice of the interest rate assumption underlying central bank forecasts with respect to their
effects on forecast accuracy, where the approach of using unconditional forecasts, from a
theoretical point of view, should be ranked higher than using the approaches of using forecasts
made conditional on market interest rates or constant interest rates, respectively.
Results obtained from analyzing interest rate, inflation and real output growth forecasts
from the Bank of England and the Banco Central Do Brazil, did not reveal any significant
differences between the performance of forecasts based on different interest rate assumptions.
Although proxies for the central bank’s own expectations were found to be more accurate
than market expectations, where the latter yielded better forecasts than the assumption of
a constant interest rate, all differences in forecast accuracy were found insignificant. For
the inflation and output growth mean and density forecasts, there was no clear relationship
between forecast accuracy and the interest rate assumption.
The empirical irrelevance of the interest rate assumption for forecast accuracy has im-
portant implications. Firstly, at least in the medium term, it is going to be difficult for central
banks to steer market expectations by using the approach of central bank expectations, espe-
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cially for variables other than the policy rate itself. This also implies that it does not appear
very likely that markets misunderstand the central bank’s own interest rate expectation as a
commitment. Secondly, at least for the samples under study, monetary policy is unlikely to
be a major cause for the level of macroeconomic volatility observed, because the inflation and
growth forecasts conditional on ‘bad’ monetary policy (on the approach of constant interest
rates) have virtually the same accuracy as forecasts conditional on ‘good’ monetary policy (on
the approach of central bank expectations). This might cast doubts on the prominent role
that is sometimes attributed to monetary policy concerning the Great Moderation. Thirdly,
the construction of prediction intervals for central bank forecasts and the evaluation of cen-
tral bank forecasts can probably be agnostic toward the underlying interest rate assumptions.
Put differently, past forecast errors are a good indicator for future forecast uncertainty if the
only structural change is due to a change in the interest rate assumption used. Finally, the
risk that private information is crowded out if central banks switch to the CBE approach is
unlikely as well.
Finally, it was analyzed how information on potentially asymmetric uncertainties of
future values are utilized when it is to decide on monetary policy. The analysis conducted
revealed that the historical Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee decisions about the
official bank rate can be described fairly well by a simple forecast-based interest rate rule.
The bank’s Monetary Policy Committee was found to be very forward-looking with respect
to inflation, but less forward-looking with respect to output and to show a fairly high degree
of interest rate smoothing. Forecast uncertainty measures were found to be highly significant
when deciding on interest rates, where strongly positive coefficient estimates on forecast
inflation uncertainty at the policy horizon implied very aggressive interest rate reactions when
inflation two years out is forecast to deviate from target. Conversely, forecast output growth
uncertainty was found to lead to attenuation in decision making when near-term forecasts see
output growth deviating from its long-run mean.
It was shown that forecast upward risks to inflation have a direct and positive impact
on Monetary Policy Committee interest rate decisions and that the asymmetry of forecast
inflation uncertainty contributes to the intensifying effect of forecast uncertainty on the re-
action of interest rates. Using direct uncertainty and risk measures constructed from the
density forecasts of the Survey of External Forecasters, which is prominently featured in each
Inflation Report, added no information to the Monetary Policy Committee’s own uncertainty
forecasts. Overall, these results showed that the bank’s own assessments of future uncertain-
ties are informative for the Monetary Policy Committee decisions on interest rates.
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